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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) and 63-46b-16 and Rule 14 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE 1
A.

Issue:

Is there sufficient evidence in the record

to sustain the Utah State Tax Commission's (the "Commission's" or
the "Tax Commission's") Finding of Fact that Kennecott Corporation's ("Kennecott's") state-assessed property was assessed as of
January 1, 1988 using the capitalized net revenue method?
B.

Standard

of Review:

The standard

of

appellate

review applicable to this issue is that there must be substantial
evidence in the record, considered as a whole, to support this
Finding of Fact by the Commission.

First Nat'l Bank v. County

Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).
ISSUE 2
A.
that

the

Issue:
appraisal

Did the Commission erroneously
methods

used

to

value

conclude

Kennecott's

state-assessed real property and those used by Salt Lake County
(the "County") to value county-assessed commercial and industrial
real property were not the same?
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

Standard

of Review:

The standard of appellate

review applicable to this issue is that there must be substantial
evidence in the record, considered as a whole, to support this
Conclusion of Law by the Commission.

First Nat'l Bank v. County

Bd. of Equalization, supra.
ISSUE 3
A.

Issue:

Did the Commission err in failing to apply

the 20% reduction enunciated

in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304(1)

(1987) to Kennecott's state-assessed real property as of January
1, 1988 under Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990)?
B.

Standard

of Review:

The standard

of appellate

review applicable to this issue is a correction of error standard.

The Commission's decision should be upheld only if it is

not erroneous.

Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,

811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
ISSUE 4
A.

Issue: As an alternative to Issue 3 above, did the

Commission err in failing to grant Kennecott's

state-assessed

property the 14% reduction in value which the Commission granted
to the railroads as of January 1, 1988?
B.
review

Standard

applicable

to

of Review:
this

issue

The standard of appellate
is

a

correction

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of

error

standard.
is not

The Commission's decision should be upheld only if it

erroneous.

Savage

Industries,

Inc. v. Utah

State Tax

Common, supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
1.

Art. XIII, Sec. 2(1), Utah Constitution:
All tangible property in the state, not
exempt under the laws of the United
States, or under this Constitution,
shall be taxed at a uniform and equal
rate in proportion to its value, to be
ascertained as provided by law.

2.

Art. XIII, Sec. 3(1), Utah Constitution:
The Legislature shall provide by law a
uniform and equal rate of assessment on
all tangible property in the state,
according to its value in money, . . . .
The Legislature shall prescribe by law
such provisions as shall secure a just
valuation for taxation of such property,
so that every person and corporation
shall pay a tax in proportion to the
value of his, her, or its tangible property, . . . .

3.

Art. I, Sec. 24, Utah Constitution:
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1) (1987):
By May 1 the following property shall be
assessed by the commission at 100% of
fair market value, as valued on January

1
A verbatim presentation of the constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are included in the Addendum at page B-l.
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1,
5.

in

accordance

with

this chapter:

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(2) (1987):
The method for determining the fair market value of productive mining property
is the capitalized net revenue method or
any other valuation method the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's satisfaction , to be reasonably determinative of
the fair market value of the mining
property. . . .
In no event may the
fair market value of the mining property
be less than the fair market value of
the land, improvements, and tangible
personal property upon or appurtenant to
the mining property.

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1987):
(1) If the county assessor uses the
comparable sales or cost appraisal
method in valuing taxable property for
assessment purposes, the assessor is
required to recognize that various fees,
services, closing costs, and other
expenses related to the transaction
lessen the actual amount that may be
received in the transaction. The county
assessor shall, therefore, take 80% of
the value based on comparable sales or
cost appraisal of the property for purposes of assessment under Subsection
59-2-103(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case.

This is a petition for review by Kennecott from an
order of the Utah State Tax Commission issued on March 3, 1992 in
which the Commission refused to reduce the value of Kennecott's
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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centrally-assessed

property, holding that Kennecott's property

had been assessed according to the capitalized net revenue method
in 1988 and that Kennecott's assessment at 100% of its fair market value pursuant to that method was proper, fair, reasonable,
and required by the constitution and laws of the State of Utah,
II.

Course of Proceedings Below.

On April 29, 1988, Kennecott received from the Property
Tax Division of the Commission (the "Division") its Notice of
Assessment assigning the assessed value of Kennecott's mining
properties and associated

facilities as of January

1, 1988.

Kennecott filed a timely Request for Agency Action with the Commission protesting this assessment.

Thereafter, Kennecott filed

an Amended Request for Agency Action.
In its Amended Request for Agency Action, Kennecott
sought a reduction in the assessed value of its real property by
twenty percent (20%), asserting that the Division's failure to
grant this reduction to Kennecott's state-assessed real property,
while having this 20% reduction extended to county-assessed commercial and industrial real property, and other state-assessed
real property,

i.e., railroad

property, violated

Kennecott's

rights under Article XIII, §§2,3 and 4 of the Utah Constitution
as well as Kennecott's rights to equal protection of the law as
guaranteed

by

the

Utah

and

United

States

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Constitutions.

Kennecott also asserted that this failure deprived Kennecott of
its property without due process of law, in violation of the Utah
and United States Constitutions•
Additionally, Kennecott asserted that, as of January 1,
1988, the Commission had reduced the value of railroad real and
personal property from 100% of that property's fair market value
without reducing the value of Kennecott7s real and personal property, and that this action constituted unlawful discrimination in
violation

of

these

same

Utah

and

federal

constitutional

provisions.
On May 10, 1990 the Commission held a formal hearing
respecting Kennecott's Amended Request for Agency Action.

After

the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Amax, issued July 18, 1990,
the Commission issued an Order on October 28, 1991 directing the
parties to submit written briefs addressing the affect of the
Amax decision on Kennecott's Amended Request.

On March 3, 1992,

the Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and

Final Decision

("Final Decision") , a copy

of which is

included in the Addendum at page A-l, denying Kennecott any
reduction in its assessed value as of January 1, 1988.
III. Decision of the Commission.
In

its

Final

Decision,

the

Commission

ruled

that

(1) Kennecott's state-assessed property was assigned an assessed

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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value as of January 1, 1988, using the capitalized net revenue
method; (2) Kennecott did not show that the appraisal methods
used to value Kennecott's state-assessed real property and those
used by the County to value locally-assessed

commercial and

industrial real property were the same; (3) the Commission denied
Kennecott's request to apply the 2 0% reduction set out in Utah
Code Ann. § 59-2-304(1) (1987) (the "20% Statute") to Kennecott's
state-assessed real property as of January 1, 1988 under the Amax
decision; and (4) the Commission refused to grant to Kennecott's
state-assessed property the 14% reduction in value which was
granted by the Commission to the railroads as of January 1, 1988.
IV.

Statement of Facts.

Prior to the hearing, Kennecott, the Division and the
County signed two stipulations which were received into evidence
2
at the hearing.

See Transcript at 5; Record at 203-07.

The

parties stipulated as follows:
(1) As of January 1, 1988, all of Kennecott's
real property, improvements and personal property subject to

2
The record on appeal consists of the record compiled and numbered by the Commission (the
"Record"), the reporter's transcript of the hearing (the "Transcript"), and the depositions of Brent Eyre ("Eyre
Deposition") and Larry Butterfield ("Butterfield Deposition"). The Eyre and Butterfield Depositions were, by
stipulation, accepted into evidence and used in lieu of testimony. Transcript at 4; Eyre Deposition at 4-5;
Butterfield Deposition at 3-5.

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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assessment by the Division was assessed at $617,771,073.

Record

at 205.
(2)

The Division did not apply Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-2-3 04 (1987) to Kennecott's property as of January 1, 1988
and

did

not

discount

or

reduce

Kennecott's

$617,771,073 by 20% or any other percentage.
(3)

assessment

of

Record at 205.

As of January 1, 1988, the Division reduced

the fair market value of all Union Pacific Railroad, Denver and
Rio Grande Railroad and Southern Pacific Railroad property in
Utah by 14%.

This reduction was applied to all the railroads'

state-assessed

taxable property, which

personal property.
(4)

included both real and

Record at 205.
Kennecott, which did not receive a 14% reduc-

tion in the value of its state-assessed property for 1988, and
the railroads, which received a 14% reduction in the value of
their state-assessed property, were both property owners whose
property was assessed by the Division pursuant to the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987).
(5)

Record at 206.

The County agreed that it would not contest

the valuation of Kennecott's property in 1988 by the Division
except to the extent Kennecott sought a reduction in that valuation as a result of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. State Tax

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Commission, 716 F. Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1388), or related theories.
Record at 2 04.
The methods employed by the Division to value Kennecott's property as of January 1, 1988 consisted of (1) a comparable sales, or market value, method for Kennecott's land; (2)
replacement cost new less depreciation method (RCNLD), or cost
method,

for

Kennecott's

buildings

and

other

real

property

improvements, and; (3) historical cost less depreciation for personal property.

This was characterized in the hearing as the

"summation" method of valuing Kennecott's property.

Transcript

at 51.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

KENNECOTT IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
20% STATUTE BECAUSE, AS IN AMAX, KENNECOTT'S
PROPERTY WAS VALUED USING THE SAME METHODS
USED BY COUNTY ASSESSORS, WHO APPLIED THE 20%
STATUTE.
In Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commis-

sion, 796 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990)3, the Court held that since the
Tax Commission used the same methods to value Amax's property
that Tooele County used to value county-assessed property, it
would unconstitutionally violate the uniform and equal requirements of Article XIII, §§ 2 and 3 and the equal protection

A copy of the Amax decision is included in the Addendum at page D-l.
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

requirement of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution not to
apply the 20% Statute4 to Amax's property.
The Commission
refused to apply the Amax decision and analysis to Kennecott's
property because it ruled that Kennecott's property was valued
using the capitalized net revenue method instead of the same
methods employed by county assessors.
Despite the Commission's decision, the evidence at the
hearing established the following: (1) the capitalized net revenue method was not used to arrive at the assessed value of Kennecott's centrally assessed property in 1988; and (2) the appraisal
methods used to value Kennecott's centrally assessed property and
those used by the County to value county-assessed commercial and
industrial property were identical; (3) Kennecott's property was
valued at its full fair market value; and (4) all comparable
County-assessed property, regardless of appraisal methodology,
was valued at full fair market value and then reduced by application of the 20% Statute by County assessors.
Therefore, under Amax, Kennecott is entitled to the
benefit of the 20% Statute in 1988.

The Commission's refusal to

apply the 20% statute ignores Amax and violates the uniform and

4

The statute at issue in Amax was Utah Code Ann. section 59-5-4.5 (1973 & Supp. 1986). In 1987, the
20% Statute was recodified at Utah Code Ann. section 59-2-304(1).

-10-
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equal requirements of the Utah Constitution and the equal protection requirements of the Utah and United States Constitutions.
II.

ALTERNATIVELY, THE TAX COMMISSION
FAILING TO GRANT KENNECOTT THE 14%
IN VALUE WHICH WAS GRANTED TO THE
BY THE TAX COMMISSION AS OF JANUARY

ERRED IN
REDUCTION
RAILROADS
1, 1988.

In Union Pacific v. Utah State Tax Commission, 716 F.
Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988)5 the court held that the 20% Statute
discriminated against the railroads for arbitrary reasons which
violated

the

federal

Railroad

Revitalization

Reform Act of 1976 (the "4-R Act") .

and

Regulatory

Therefore, the railroads,

which like Kennecott are state-assessed property, were granted a
14% reduction by the Commission in the assessed value of their
real and personal property for 1988.
The Commission refused to apply a similar 14% reduction
to Kennecott's property because it claimed (1) that the methods
used to value railroad property are dissimilar from those used by
the counties to value commercial and industrial property and by
the Division to value Kennecott's property, and (2) that the federal 4-R Act does not apply to mining property.
Despite the Commissions holding, Kennecott is entitled
to equal treatment with the railroads under the equal protection
and uniformity guarantees of the federal and Utah constitutions.

A copy of the Union Pacific decision is included in the Addendum at page E-l.
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah's equal protection requirements prohibit arbitrary classifications which discriminate against similarly situated taxpayers•
Federal requirements prohibit the intentional systematic undervaluation of property which is comparable to the taxpayer's property.

Allowing railroad property to be taxed at 86% of its

value, while requiring Kennecott's property to be taxed at 100%
of its value violates both federal and state equal protection
requirements as well as Utah's uniformity requirement.
ARGUMENT
I.

KENNECOTT IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
20% STATUTE BECAUSE, AS IN AMAX, KENNECOTT'S
PROPERTY WAS VALUED USING THE SAME METHODS
USED BY COUNTY ASSESSORS, WHO APPLIED THE 20%
STATUTE.
A.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the Tax Commissions failure to apply the 20% Statute to Amax
was unconstitutional because Amax's property was
valued using the same methods used to value
county-assessed property.

In Amax, the Utah Supreme Court held that Amax Magnesium Corporation ("Amax"), which owned state-assessed property in
Tooele County, was entitled to the same 20% discount in the valuation

of

its

taxable

property

that

was

extended

to

county-assessed property because Amax had shown that its property
had been assessed using valuation methods similar to those used
by county assessors. Amax was in the business of extracting magnesium from the brine waters of the Great Salt Lake and its plant
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was state-assessed as property appurtenant to a mining operation,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1974).

Id. at 1258. Amax

claimed that it should receive the benefit of the 2 0% Statute
because the assessment of its property at 100% of its value,
while county-assessed property was assessed at only 80% of its
value violated the equality and uniformity requirements of Utah
Constitution Article XIII, §§ 2 and 3 and the equal protection
requirement of Article If § 24.

The Utah Supreme Court agreed

with both arguments.
1.

Equality and Uniformity.

The Court acknowledged that in Rio Algom v. San Juan
County, 681 P. 2d 184 (Utah 1984)7 it had upheld the 20% Statute
against a facial constitutional challenge, but it distinguished
Rio Alqom because the Rio Algom plaintiffs had not shown that
their properties were assessed at fair market value or that they
bore a disproportionate
county.

share of the property

taxes

in the

Amax, 796 P.2d at 1259.
Amax, on the other hand, did not challenge the facial

validity of the 20% Statute; rather it established that the statute, as applied to Amax, violated the constitutional requirements

6
Amax's primary argument was that its plant was not appurtenant to a mining operation and should
have been county-assessed property. The Court, however, ruled against that argument. S>ee,id- at 1258-59.

7

A copy of the Rio Algom decision is included in the Addendum at page F-l.
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of equality and uniformity because its property was valued using
similar valuation methods as those used by county assessors. Id.
at 1260.
The Court stated that the purposes of the 20% Statute
were (1) to prevent overvaluation by recognizing transactional
costs which lessen the amounts received by a seller, and (2) to
equalize the tax burden between state and county assessments.
Id. at 1260.
using

the

Since Amax showed that its property was valued

same

cost

and

market

methods

used

to

value

county-assessed property, the Court stated that it:
strains reason to assert that if assessors
using the cost and market appraisal methods
overvalue
county
properties,
the
same
overvaluation would not occur with state
properties appraised by the same methods.
Id.

The Court continued:
Assuming that the legislature was correct in
determining that the market value appraisal
method overvalues property by 20 percent, it
would be unconstitutional to apply [the 2 0%
Statute] to county-assessed properties and
not to state assessed properties.

Id.

Consequently, the Court held that the assessment of Amax's

property at 100% of its value violated Article XIII's equality
and uniformity requirements.
2.

Equal Protection.

In analyzing Amax's equal protection claim, the Court
relied upon the rule set forth in Blue Cross and Blue Shield v.
-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989), that in order to establish a
violation of the Utah Constitutions equal protection requirement, a party must show that the law creates certain classes of
persons and that the law discriminates against a class without a
reasonably related legitimate government purpose.

See, Amax at

Relying on the fact that Amax's property was valued
using the same methods used by county assessors, the Court
stated:
If county properties assessed by the cost
appraisal method receive a 2 0 percent reduction and state properties assessed by the
same method receive no reduction, then [the
20% Statute] has created two classes of properties assessed by the cost appraisal method
and arbitrarily discriminates against one
class merely because it is a state-assessed
property.
Id.

Additionally, the Court noted that the purposes of the 2 0%

Statute, i.e., the equalization of state and county-assessed
property, were not met when the same valuation methods were used
for both state and county assessments.

Instead, application of

the 20% Statute to county-assessed, but not state-assessed property, "aggravates the taxing disparity" between state-assessed
and county-assessed property.

Id. at 1261-62.

8
The Amax Court did not decide the federal constitutional issue, because "if the challenged statute cannot withstand attack under the state constitution, there is no reason to reach the federal question.'' _Id. at 1261.

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Since the Amax Court held that the application of the
2 0% Statute to county-assessed property but not to Amax violated
Articles I and XIII of the Utah Constitution, it remanded the
case to the Commission for revaluing Amax's property pursuant to
the 20% Statute.
B.

Id. at 1262.

As in Amax, the Tax Commissions refusal to apply the
20% Statute to Kennecott is unconstitutional because
Kennecott's property was valued using the same methods
used to value county-assessed property.
The Commission ruled that the Amax decision did not

apply to the valuation of Kennecott's property in 1988. The Commission based this conclusion upon its factual determinations
that

(1) Kennecott's

property

had

been

assessed

using

the

capitalized net revenue method, and (2) that Kennecott did not
show that its property had been assessed using the same methods
used to value county-assessed property.
Neither of these factual determinations, however, are
supported by substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole.
See First National Bank v. County Board of Equalization, 799 P.2d
1163

(Utah 1990) .

Kennecott was

In fact, the record

not valued

clearly shows that

using the capitalized

net revenue

method, but was valued using the same methods used to value
county-assessed property.

Therefore, according to the Amax anal-

ysis, the Commission should be required to apply the 20% Statute
to its valuation of Kennecott's property for 1988.
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.

The Tax Commission erroneously found that Kennecott 's property .as assigned its assessed valu3 as
of January 1, 1988 using the capitalized net revenue method.

In its Findings of Fact, the Commission states:

"Min-

ing properties in Utah are valued using only one method, the
'capitalized net revenue method' as set forth in Utah Code Ann,
§ 59-2-201, which method is more fully set forth by the Rules of
the Tax Commission in Rule R884-24-7P."
Additionally,

the

Commission

states:

Findings of Fact f 9.
"The

assessment

of

Kennecott was not made by using either the comparable sales
method or the cost appraisal method, but was made by using the
capitalized net revenue method."

Findings of Fact f 13.

The Commission's decision should not be upheld because,
although there is substantial evidence to show that Kennecott's
property was not valued using the capitalized net revenue method
in 1988, there is no evidence to support the Commission's finding
that the capitalized net revenue method was used to assign an
assessed value.
Section 4 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution
states:

"All metalliferous mines or mining claims . . . shall be

assessed as the legislature shall provide."

Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-2-201(1)(e) and (f) state that all mines and mining claims,
machinery used in mining, and property or surface improvements
upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims shall be assessed
-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by the Tax Commission at 100% of fair market value.

Utah Code

Ann. § 59-2-201(2) states:
The method for determining the fair market
value of productive mining property is the
capitalized net revenue method or any other
valuation method the Commission believes, or
the taxpayer demonstrates to the Commission's
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative
of the fair market value of the mining property . . . In no event may the fair market
value of the mining property be less than the
fair market value of the land, improvements,
and tangible personal property upon or appurtenant to the mining property
(emphasis
added).
Therefore, Utah's Constitution requires the legislature to specify the method for valuing mining property.

The method the leg-

islature has chosen is the capitalized net revenue method or any
other method that the Commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value
of the mining property.
Brent Eyre, who is responsible for the assessment of
mines and railroads for the Tax Commission, testified that in
1988 the application of the capitalized net revenue method to
Kennecott's property resulted in a valuation that was less than
the fair market value of the property based upon standard valuation methods.

Consequently,

Kennecott's

property

-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was

valued

using a summation of assets approach instead of th* capitalized
9
net revenue method.

Transcript at 50-51.

In arriving at the value of Kennecott's land, the Division looked at values of comparable adjacent commercial/industry
property in the same area.

Transcript at 29-30, 75.

In valuing

Kennecott's improvements to the land, the Commission relied upon
the Marshall & Swift guidelines for determining replacement cost
new less depreciation.

Transcript at 3 0-31, 67.

Therefore,

other methods, i.e. the replacement cost new less depreciation
method and the comparable sales method, were used to value Kennecott's real property, not the capitalized net revenue method.

Q:

[By Mr. Winterhoiler] All right. Now when you ultimately reached a valuation, an assessed
value for Kennecott, which approach was used?

A:

[By Mr. Eyre] The statute states that the value for mining property will be determined by the
capitalized net revenue method. The statute goes on to state that in no event will the value of
mining property be less than the summation of the value of the land, improvements, and tangible property associated with the mine.
In the case of the 1988 assessment of Kennecott, Kennecott was just concluding their major
modernization project, was not in full production as of yet, I believe, on the lien date. And
thus, in our complying with the regulation for the capitalized net revenue method, the five-year
average of Kennecott's net revenue, coupled with the massive capital expenditures that were
allowed to reduce the revenue, made it so that the net revenue approach was less than the
summation of the value of the land, improvements, and tangible property.
So the valuation placed on Kennecott's property was the summation of the physical assets.
-19Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2.

The Commission erred in concluding that Kennecott
did not show that the appraisal methods used to
value Kennecott's state-assessed real property and
those used by the County to value county-assessed
commercial and industrial real property were the
same.

In its Findings of Fact, the Commission states:
During the period
in question, locally
assessed commercial and industrial real property located in Salt Lake County was assessed
by the County using a combination of the comparable sales method, the cost appraisal
method, and the income approach.
Findings of Fact f 4.

Additionally, the Commission states:

The assessment of Kennecott was not made by
using either the comparable sales method or
the cost appraisal method, but was made by
using the capitalized net revenue method.
Findings of Fact 5 13.

Finally, the Commission states:

The petitioner [Kennecott] has not shown that
the appraisal methods used by the Petitioner
and those used by Salt Lake County were the
same.
Conclusions of Law f 15.
(a)

The County
methods.

uses

three

standard

valuation

In his deposition, which by stipulation became part of
the record at the hearing, Larry Butterfield, Chief Appraiser for
the County, testified

that the County uses three methods for

valuing real property on its tax rolls:

the replacement cost new
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less depreciation method, the comparable sales method, and the
income method.

Butterfield Deposition at 22-24.

In describing the cost method employed by the County in
valuing buildings,

Mr. Butterfield testified that the assessor

considers the building's age, construction, composition, square
footage, and condition and then refers to the widely accepted
Marshall & Swift Costing Manual to determine replacement cost and
depreciation.

10

Q.

Mr. Butterfield identified this method as the

[By Mr. Winterholler] It is my understanding, then, that the method employed by your office
in appraising industrial buildings is a replacement cost minus depreciation method?

A.

[By Mr. Butterfield] That is one approach.

Q.
A.

What are the other approaches?
There is the market approach to value which is where the appraiser would probably try to find
similar projects that have been sold and try to compare the market value from the sole [sold]
property to the subject property

A.

Yes. We also use the income approach to value.
* **

Q.

Now, is that a method which is used primarily for industrial property or commercial property
or both?

A.

Of the three approaches to value there is no primary method that we currently use.

Q.

You may use any one?

A.

We may use any one of the three.
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replacement

cost

new

less

depreciation

method

("RCNLD").

Butterfield Deposition at 20-22.
Describing

the

comparable

sales

(or

the

market)

approach to value, Mr. Butterfield stated that the appraiser
would look for similar property that had recently been sold and

Q.

[By Mr. Winterholler] What does he do?

A.

[By Mr. Butterfield] What he does is he goes out on the site, makes a determination or looks
at the property, turns around and starts making notes about what the property is, the condition
of the property, possibly what it's made of, what he could classify it as, and the type of
construction. He probably would try to pick up the year of build on it.
And then the next step would be to measure it to cotne up with square footage of it
***

Q.

Let's assume he knows what the square footage is; he knows what the cubic footage is; he
knows what the general condition of the building is; he knows the years in which it was built;
and he has a general idea of how well it's been maintained. Where does he look after that?

A.

He would go into the Marshall & Swift Manual, costing manual, and see what costs it would
have, replacement costs, and then he would turn around and take the condition and age for
depreciation.

Q.

As I understand it, the method he employs in appraising that building is primarily a Marshall
& Swift replacement cost minus depreciation method.

A.

This is true.
** *

A.

Yes. I really don't know how many there is, but most generally the Marshall & Swift system
everybody uses, because it is quite well-known and quite valid and quite easily accepted by all
appraisers.

Q.

Is it my understanding, then, that the method employed by your office in appraising industrial
buildings is a replacement cost minus depreciation method?

A.

That is one approach.

-22-
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compare them to the subject property.

Butterfield Deposition at

23. 12
Finally,

describing

the

income

approach,

Mr.

Butterfield testified that the assessor would look for similar
property that had recently been leased in order to determine the
economic value of the property. Butterfield Deposition at 23. 13
Thus, the County's assessors use three methods to value
property within the County:

First, the cost method, or RCNLD, in

which the appraiser examines the footage, condition and age of
the building and then refers to the Marshall & Swift costing manual to determine

the

replacement

cost

of

the building and

A.

[By Mr. Butterfield] There is the market approach to value which is where the appraiser
would probably try to find similar projects that had been sold and try to compare the market
value from the sold property to the subject property. There is also -

Q.

[By Mr. Winterholler] Relative to industrial property, can you tell me how many industrial
properties in Salt Lake County are assessed using a market — as I understand, is that the same
thing as a comparable sales method?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So if I use those terms interchangeable, I'm not misleading you.

A.

They are interchangeable.

A.

[By Mr. Butterfield] We also use the income approach to value.

Q.

[By Mr. Winterholler] How do you get that information?

A.

We find comparable properties that have been recently leased or rented out, and then we
would use that and we would develop an economic rent. We would try to arrive at an
economic rent to see what the building would rent, the subject property, would rent for.
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depreciation; second, the market, or comparable sales, method in
which the appraiser

looks

for similar properties

that have

recently sold and compares them with the subject property; and
third, the income approach

in which the appraiser tries to

develop an economic rent for the subject property.
only

methods

employed by the
. . at 24. 14
Butterfield Deposition

County

These are the

Assessor's

Office.

(b) The Division used the same standard methods
used by the County to assess Kennecott's
property in 1988.
Brent Eyre also identified the same three standard
methods which are used by the Division in valuing property, Transcript at 77, and stated that the cost approach and the income
approach were employed in the valuation of mining properties in
1988.

Transcript at 77-78.
In specifically discussing how Kennecott's property was

valued in 1988, Phillip Despain, Manager of Ad Valorem Taxes for
Kennecott, testified that the Division used the comparable sales

Q.

[By Mr. Winterholler] Now, is that a method which is used primarily for industrial property or
commercial property or both?

A.

[By Mr. Butterfield] Of the three approaches to value, there is no primary method that we
currently use.

Q.

You may use any one?

A.

We may use any one of the three.
-24-
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method to value Kennecott's land and the RCNLD method based upon
the Marshall

& Swift manual to value Kennecott's buildings.
15
Transcript at 29-32.
Mr. Despain also testified that the
15

Q.

[By Mr. Winterholler] Mr. Despain, this land value which was assessed by the Property Tax
Division, do you know the method they employed in order to arrive at that assessment?

A.

[By Mr. Despain] Yes. They used what would be called the comparable sales method.

Q.

In order to arrive at the land value?

A.

At the land value.

Q.

What about buildings and improvements by the Property Tax Division? Do you know the
method employed by the Property Tax Division to arrive at that value?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.
A.

Tell me what that method was.
They~they appraisers will come out and inspect the-each building and improvements,
measure for buildings, determine what type of construction and so forth, determine square
footage, and then, as a understand it, they used the recognized publication called Marshall &
Swift, where they can look in this manual and find a particular type of building and get a
replacement cost new less depreciation based on the square footage.
So, in other words, is the cost model you're describing from Marshall & Swift a replacement

Q.

cost minus depreciation model?
A;

That's my understanding, yes.

Q.

You're familiar with the Marshall & Swift manual, are you not?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now, with respect to improvements other than buildings, do you know how the Property Tax
Division values those improvements?
Yes. I do.
How do they do it?

A.
Q.

Footnote continued on next page,
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capitalized net revenue method was not used in 1988 to value
Kennecott's property.

Id.

Therefore, the evidence at the hearing was that there
are three standard methods of valuing property used by both the

Footnote continued from previous page.
A.

Well, they come out, and in their appraisal they'll see retaining walls, concrete, asphalt paving,
roads, and so forth. And then they have another source that lists the construction costs,
current construction costs, to build similar type facilities. For example, asphalt paving, they—it
would tell them how much it costs for a-per square foot. And they measure the asphalt
paving and come up with a replacement cost.

Q.

So it's your understanding that this method of valuing improvements other then buildings by
the Property Tax Division is a replacement cost minus depreciation methods; is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Is that the method that was employed when you testified about replacement costs minus
depreciation for the valuation which is included on Exhibit 5—

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Now, are you familiar with the income approach to value?

A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

Does this Exhibit 5 contain an income approach to value?

A.

No. Not that I'm aware of.

Q.
A.

Why does it not?
Well, we went through the income approach, called the capitalized net income method; and
the values, assessed value using that method is considerable less than the method that was
used to arrive at these numbers. So it was not used.
So you're talking about-you mean that the replacement cost method valued Kennecott's
property higher than the income method would have done?

Q.

A.

Yes.

-26-
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County Assessors and the Division:

the cost approach, the income

approach and the market approach.

In valuing mining property,

both the Commission and the County Assessors use the RCNLD method
as implemented in the Marshall & Swift costing manual.

For valu-

ing land, both the County and the Commission rely primarily on
the market method, looking for sales of comparable land to the
subject property.
mining property

Finally, the income method primarily used for
is the capitalized

net revenue method.

This

method, however, was not used for Kennecott in 1988 because the
resulting value was less than the value of Kennecott's property
computed by other methods.
3.

Kennecott's state-assessed property was assessed
at 100% of its fair market value while all countyassessed property was assessed at 80% of its fair
market value.

That Kennecott7s property was valued at least at 100%
of its fair market value is not in dispute and is clearly established in the record.

Prior to the hearing, the parties stipu-

lated that the Division's valuation of Kennecott's property would
not be contested other than to determine if Kennecott was entitled to a reduction because of the 20% Statute.

See Stipulation

submitted as Exhibit No. 4; Record at 203-04.

At the hearing,
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Brent Eyre testified that Kennecott's property was valued at 100%
of fair market value. Transcript at 82-83.
It is also indisputable that county-assessed property
was

only

valued

at

80%

of

its

fair

market

value.

Larry

Butterfield testified that county-assessed property was assessed
at 100% of fair market value before application of the 20% Statute and that, consequently, county-assessed property was assessed
at only 80% of its fair market value.17 This is consistent with

16

17

Q.

[By Mr. Winterholler] Kennecott's value at $617,771,070, which you've got next to
you, is the value which was arrived at by the Property Tax'Division; isn't that
correct?

A.

[By Mr. Eyre] That's correct.

Q.

And that value is the value which the Property Tax Division considered to be 100
percent of fair market value, isn't it?

A.

If that's our charge and that's what we put on the assessment, yes. We would
stipulate to that fact.

Q.

[By Mr. Winterholler] What do you mean by statutory market value as opposed to
fair market value?

A.

[By Mr. Butterfield] In our tax files within the tax system of Salt Lake County we
call -- the full fair market value is the first value. It's 100 percent. From that we
have taken the 80 percent and then that's called the statutory value.

Q.

Now, the statutory value as opposed to the fair market value, what value was
reported to a tax payer on his tax notice?

A.

The full fair market value.

Q.

Is that the basis upon which that tax payer paid taxes in 1988?

A.

No.

Footnote continued on next page.
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the Court's conclusion in Amax.

See 796 P. 2d at 1259 ("Section

59-5-4.5 allows county assessors to assess property at 80% of its
reasonable fair cash value").

Additionally, Mr. Butterfield tes-

tified that the 2 0% Statute was applied to all
real

property

county-assessed

regardless

of the valuation method used.
Butterfield Deposition at 4118 ; Transcript at 111-12. Therefore,
Kennecott's state-assessed real property was assessed at 100% of

Footnote continued from previous page.
Q.

What's the basis upon which the tax payer paid taxes in 1988? ''

A.

He paid on 80 percent of the full fair market value.

Q.

So, in other words, if I understand you correctly, on commercial and industrial
property which was locally assessed in Salt Lake County in 1988, locally assessed
commercial and industrial property was valued at 80 percent of its full fair market
value?

A.

That is correct.

Butterfield Deposition at 29; see also. Transcript at 106-108.

18

Q.

[Mr. Winterholler] Let me back up. It's true, is it not, that in arriving at the
statutory value of commercial and industrial property in Salt Lake County,
which is locally assessed under 59-2-304, Exhibit No. 1, that you multiply the
fair market value arrived at by either comparable sales or replacement cost
minus depreciation or whatever income approach is used and by 80 percent
to arrive at the statutory value?

A.

[Mr. Butterfield] Yes, this is true.

Q.

And that's applied to all property. It doesn't matter how you achieve the
value.

A.

This is correct.

-29-
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its value while all county-assessed real property was assessed at
only 80% of its value.
4.

The Tax Commissions refusal to apply to 20% Statute to Kennecott's state-assessed property violates the uniform and ecrual assessment and the
equal protection
requirements
of the Utah

Kennecott has shown that (1) its real property was valued by the Division using the same valuation methods used by the
County to assess property; (2) its property was valued by the
Division

at

100%

of

fair

market

value;

and

(3)

all

county-assessed real property, regardless of valuation method,
was valued at only 80% of fair market value.
Therefore, as in Amax, the Tax Commission's refusal to
equalize Kennecott's assessment with county-assessed

property

violates the uniform and equal requirements of Article XIII, §§ 2
and 3 of the Utah Constitution because Kennecott bears a tax burden greater than its pro rata share of the property taxes in the
County, merely because its property is state-assessed.

See Amax

at 1259-60.
Additionally, the Commission's Final Order violates the
equal protection requirements of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution

because

the

against state-assessed

20% Statute

arbitrarily

discriminates

property without a reasonably-related,

legitimate government purpose.

See id. at 1261-62.
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Kennecott's appropriate relief, as stated in Amax, is
as follows:

"If both just value and equal proportionality cannot

be obtained because some assessments are made at a fixed percentage of true value, then equality must prevail so that the fixed
percentage of true value must be uniformly applied."
12 60.

Id. at

Therefore, Kennecott is entitled to a reduction of the

assessed value of its real property in 1988 by 2 0%.
II.

ALTERNATIVELY, THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING
TO GRANT KENNECOTT THE 14% REDUCTION IN VALUE
WHICH WAS GRANTED BY THE COMMISSION TO THE
RAILROADS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1988.
The Commission refused to apply the 14% reduction which

it granted to railroads in 1988 to Kennecott's property for two
reasons:

First, the Commission asserted that the methods used by

the state to value railroad property are dissimilar from those
used by the county to value commercial and industrial property,
and by the Commission to value Kennecott's property.

The Commis-

sion stated that historical cost is used for railroads, replacement cost is used by the county, and the capitalized net revenue
method is used for Kennecott's property.

The Commission also

distinguished the stock and debt approach, distinctive to railroad valuation, from the comparable sales method which is routinely used to value commercial and industrial property.
Second, the Commission asserted that Union Pacific v.
State Tax Commission, 716 F. Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988), has no
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bearing on Kennecott's claim for reduction based upon the 20%
Statute because the federal 4-R Act does not apply to mining
property.

According to the Commission, Kennecott falls into a

different classification from railroads and may not claim the
same relief granted to railroad property.
A.

In Union Pacific, application of the 20% Statute
was held to discriminate against state-assessed
railroad property.

In Union Pacific, three railroad companies sued the
Commission claiming that their 1984 and 1985 property tax assessments discriminated against them in violation of the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (the "4-R Act").
USCA § 11503 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
ination in two ways:

See 49

The railroads claimed discrim-

first, the valuation method employed by the

Commission overvalued their property; and second, the Commission's refusal to apply the 20% Statute made them bear a higher
percentage of taxes than county-assessed taxpayers.

The court

held that the Commission's assessment discriminated against the
railroads in violation of the 4-R Act.
In analyzing the railroads' overvaluation claim, the
court summarized the three standard techniques to assess railroad
property:

the cost approach, which is based on historical costs;

the stock and debt approach, which is a form of the comparable
sales method; and the income approach.

See id. at 547-551.
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The

court considered a variety of valuation methods for railroads,
each promoted by an economic expert.

The court noted that true

market value for purposes of ad valorem taxation is always an
estimate based upon each appraiser's best judgment and that each
appraiser approaches the task of valuation a little differently.
See id. at 554.

The court held, conseguently, that there was no

single correct formula for computing fair market value, and that
the choice of methodology, as long as the chosen methodology has
a rational footing, is not as important as the requirement that
once true market value is determined, the property should not be
taxed discriminatorily.
conclusion, the court

Id. at 556-57, 565-66.
accepted

computing fair market value.

the Commission's
See id. at 563. 19

Based on this
formula for

In addressing the railroads' 20% Statute claim, the
court held (1) the state's and county's valuations before applying the 20% Statute were the figures understood to be fair market
value, id. at 565; (2) even though the methods used to value
railroads were a cost method and a comparable sales method, the
state did not apply the 20% Statute to the valuations, id. ;
(3) the Commission discriminated against the railroads by assessing them at a higher rate than other commercial and industrial

19
Not only did the court accept the Commission's formula as being rational, it recognized that it ma
have been preferable to the other methods presented. See 716 F. Supp. at 557.
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property, jLd. at 566; and (4) the extent of the discrimination
violated the 4-R Act which provided relief to the railroads, id.
B.

Railroad property as of January 1, 1988 was valued
at 100% of its fair market value before application of a 14% discount.

The

Commission

appraisal methodology
property.

overemphasized

the

between Kennecott's

distinctions

in

and the railroad's

As pointed out in Union Pacific, the method used to

arrive at fair market value is not as important for discrimination purposes as how property is taxed once fair market value is
determined.
Brent

Eyre

testified

that

the

railroads

in

1988

received a 14% discount in the value of their "taxable property"
even though no other state-assessed property received any discount from fair market value, and that this 14% discount was a
reduction from the fair market value of the railroads' assessments.
Transcript at 83-84.20
Further, he understood the

20

Q.

[By Mr. Winterholler] Now, your division is in charge of valuing
mining companies, or you are in charge of those divisions in the
Property Tax Division whose responsibility it is to value mining
companies, public utilities, and railroads? Is that correct?

A.

[By Mr. Eyre] That's correct.

Q.

And other state-assessed property, including, say, for example, oil
wells or oil producing properties, is that correct?

Footnote continued on next page.
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Division's statutory and constitutional duty was to assess all
property within its charge at 100% of fair market value, and that
Utah law does not permit the Division to assess any property at a
different percentage of fair market value than others.
See
Transcript at 90-92. 21
Nevertheless, the Division assessed

Footnote continued from previous page.

21

A.

That's correct.

Q.

In 1988 the only classification or the only category--I hesitate to use
the word classification-but the only category of property which
received a discount from 100 percent fair market value under your
division were the railroads; isn't that correct?

A.

In 1988?

Q.

In 1988.

A.

That's correct.

Q.

[By Mr. Winterholler] Your understanding of the statutes relating to the assessment and taxation of centrally assessed property in the state and of the statutes which relate to the assessment of centrally assessed property in the state requires the State Tax Commission, the Property Tax Division, to assess all that property at 100 percent of fair market value, doesn't it?

A.

[Mr. Eyre] That's correct.

Q.

In fact, those statutes and rules do not permit the Tax Commission to assess some property at
80 percent, some at 90 percent, and some at 10 percent, do they?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And yet, in 1988, one category of state-assessed property was assessed at less than 100 percent,
wasn't it?

A.

They were valued at 100 percent. The assessed value that was ultimately used to determine
their tax liability was less than that, the 100 percent of fair market value, that's correct.

Footnote continued on next page.
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railroad property at only 86% of its fair market value in 1988
while it assessed Kennecott's property at 100%.
C.

The allowance of a 14% reduction to state-assessed
railroad
property
but
not
to
Kennecott's
state-assessed property is unconstitutional.

The plaintiffs in Union Pacific were entitled to relief
according to the 4-R Act, which provided statutory relief for
railroads discriminated against by state and local taxing authorities.

Even though Kennecott does not qualify for relief under

the 4-R Act, it is protected from discriminatory taxation by both
the Utah and the United States Constitutions.
In Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634,
22
637 (Utah 1989)

the Court stated that the uniform operation of

laws requirement of the Utah Constitution in Art. I, § 24 was
substantially similar to the federal equal protection clause and
Footnote continued from previous page.
Q.

And that category of state-assessed property upon which that discount was given was railroad
property, wasn't it?

A.

That is correct.
* * *

22

Q.

. . . Is it not your understanding that the statutes of this state require the State Tax Commission to assess all state-assessed property at 100 percent of its fair market value?

A.

That's correct.

A copy of the Blue Cross decision is included in the Addendum at page G-l.
-36-
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that the court's analysis under the Utah Constitution provision
was

at

least

as rigorous

as that

required

by

the

federal

constitution.
The purpose of the uniform operation of laws requirement is to prevent the legislature from "classifying persons in
such a manner that those who are similarly situated with respect
to the purpose of a law are treated differently by that law, to
the detriment of some of those so classified."

Id. at 637,

citing Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d
884, 888 (Utah 1988); see also, Amax, 796 P.2d at 1256.
In this
similarly

situated

instance, Kennecott
because

they

are

and

the railroads are

both

centrally-assessed

taxpayers according to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987).
Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1)

Utah

(1987) requires that all centrally-

assessed property be assessed by the Commission at 100% of fair
market value.

Because of the Commission's reduction of the

assessed value of railroad property in 1988, however, Kennecott
is taxed at 100% of its property's value, while the railroads are
taxed at only 86% of their property's value.
The stated purpose of the 20% Statute, i.e., to account
for transactional costs and to equalize state and local assessments, does not justify this detrimentally different treatment of
Kennecott's property.

Therefore, the Commission's refusal to
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It also stated:
In each case, the constitutional requirement
is the seasonable attainment of a rough
equality and tax treatment of similarly situated property owners.
Id. (emphasis added).
And that:
The States, of course, have broad latitude to
impose and collect taxes. A State may divide
different kinds of property into classes and
assign to each class a different tax burden
so long as those divisions and burdens are
reasonable.
Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
However, the Court concluded:
We have no doubt that petitioners have suffered from such "intentional systematic
undervaluation by state officials" of comparable property in Webster County. Viewed in
isolation, the assessments for petitioners'
property may fully comply with West Virginia
law.
But the fairness of one's allocable
share of the total share of the property tax
burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by
a comparison with the share of others similarly situated relative to their property
holdings.
The relative undervaluation of
comparable property in Webster County over
time therefore denies petitioner the equal
protection of the law.
Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
The Court noted that West Virginia's constitution and
laws required that taxpayers "be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the state according to its estimated market value."
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Id. at

345

T h e Court held that the Webster G ziiii: i t} 's assessmei it j: i: ac-

tices violated t h e federal constitution because:
liiLcntiona*
„•, kernel L .
unaer vaiaat i^^
,:\
srate officials of other taxable property :r
the same class contravenes t h e constitutional
right of one taxed on t h e full value of his
property.. x Citations o m i t t e d ) .
Id.
The h o l d i n g
this

appeal.

«jquntj

property
less,

Utah
to

th>

constitution

Code

A,,,

and l a w s ,

- .
1*

,

property,

: «* .

and

state-assessed

Lv

property,

:

rate,

il

>pe-

,it m i- 1,11,11-fist-v*

value
inci

utnlul.i

i

Virginia's,

°qual

dtll*ct

intentionally
which

ut

lllikH West

eqiiLie^

-0% or
' " ' ,

railroad

i out in i tin

• form

be a s s e s s e s

as Kennecott's

I* 1J I l J I t i t . ' " . 1 I I "

should

'

I'omnns'

iiin-ijervalued
class

Utah's

11, '''ppt* f y "

'ntically,

in A l l e g h e n y

nonethe-

systematically
10

1

>

n<

in c o n t r a v e n t i o n

oi

1 "! 1 11 ,! I il I I l| I l| 1 III I ! II I" | 1 ( l l t :,
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"i.

udo
i Neb

I the
»h,iii
• ax on

railroad and car companies.

The district court had ruled in each

case that the personal property tax was an unfair and discriminatory tax burden according to the 4-R Act.
In

Northern

Natural

Gas,

the

petitioner,

a

state-assessed pipeline company, sought to be equalized with the
railroad and car companies who were also state-assessed.

The

court held that if Nebraska's State Board of Equalization (the
"Board")

had

arbitrarily

undervalued

a

particular

class of

property so as to make another class disproportionately higher,
the court must correct this constitutional inequality.
256.

Id. at

This is so even if the undervaluation is the result of the

Board's involuntary action under compulsion of federal law.

Id.

Otherwise, the Board would violate the equal protection requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id.

The court stated that the preferred correction is to
lower the value of the property of the party who is required to
pay tax on 100% of the property's fair market value in order to
equalize taxes with the property of those who are required to pay
tax on less than 100%.
[T]he right of the taxpayer whose property
alone is taxed at 100 per cent of its true
value is to have his assessment reduced to
the percentage of that value at which others
are taxed even though this is a departure
from the requirement of statute. The conclusion is based on the principle that where it
is impossible to secure both the standard of
the true value, and the uniformity and
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equality required by 'law, the latter requirement is to be preferred a<^ -,----» m s t and ultimate purpose of \aw.
Td. , citing , Sioux Ci'Ly Bridge v

Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441,

446 (1923).
Therefore

order

t:o satisfy

equal pi' " ,JI« ,l , ', , qtn i ' rnpnl'i1 <'"I • h

the

the Utah Constitution, Kennecott should
n

i in

MI

process

and

"nlted States and "till

stitutions, and the uniform and equal assessment

reduut n HI

due

mn

requirement:: "::>i

be granted the same 14%

i.l". ;.tate Hiss^ssed real and

personal

property as was granted the railroads in L988.

CONCLUSION
Based

on

t hp above, Kennecott

.'.O'i red111. I n m
granted

is^e -.aed

in Aroax; nr

assessed value of
to the rail, m a d s

i

am

to,

' 1)

IMI property

in the alternative,

its real

is entitled

(A}

n

as

i i >i.'. ruijuil i ni in

and personal property as was yranted

i i t.'bu 11

M Union Pacific.

DATED this / ^ ^ d a y of ,Tii~~
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A(\n

la*
the
28 ,
the

Property

Tax

Division

for

all

of

the

Centrally

assessed

property of Kennecott located in Utah on January l, 1988, was
$635,570,036.
Request

Kennecott timely appealed that assessment by a

for Agency Action filed

May 31, 1988, and

a

later

Revised Request for Ager.cy Action filed September 9, 1988.
Kennecott and the Property Tax Division entered into a
Stipulation on December 9, 1988 in which they stipulated that
the assessed value should
preliminary

assessment,

be

reduced

to

$617,771,020

but

they

agreed

that

valuation could be higher or

lower

following

the

either

as

a

final
further

negotiations or litigation.
The
proposed
County

affected

reduction
(the

counties

to

were

Kennecott's

county)

objected

and

given

notice

valuation,
filed

and

a

of

the

Salt

Lake

Petition

for

Commencement of Adjudicative Proceedings on January 10, 1989.
Salt Lake County also filed a Motion to Consolidate on January
20,

1989.

Kennecott

objected to the Motion and Petition on

February 6, 1989.
On
issued

an

March
Order

3,
of

1989, the
Approval

Tax Commission executed
in

which

they

approved

and
the

preliminary determination of value at the stipulated amount of
$617,771,020, but the Order of Approval specifically provided
that "the acceptance of the assessed value in no way limits any
other issues relating to the appeal, and such issues shall be
left to further resolution."
On

August

7,

1989,

Petitioner

Amended Request for Agency Action.
Kennecott

raised

the

issues

of

filed

Petitioner's

In that Amended Request,
economic
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should be reduced by 14% to grant to them "the same
percentage reduction of 14% that the state
railroads

received

for

their

taxable

assessed
property"

pursuant to the decision of the United States District
Court

in Union Pacific v. Utah State Tax Commi

.on,

716 F. Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988).
No testimony or evidence was presented at the hearing
to

indicate that the value of Kennecott's property was any

amount other than the amount of $617,771,020 to which Kennecott
and the Property Tax Division stipulated.

Therefore, the only

issues before the Commission at the time of the hearing were
the two issues raised by Kennecott.
At the time of the hearing there were at least two
pending

motions

Commission.

which

had

not

been

ruled

upon

by

the

Kennecott had filed a Motion to Strike, and Salt

Lake County had filed a Motion for Consolidation.
Subsequent

to

the

date

of the formal

hearing, but

prior to the issuance of a final decision on this case, the
Utah

Supreme Court

issued

its decision

in the case of Amax

Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 796 P2d
1256 (Utah 1990) which held that Amax Magnesium was entitled to
the 20% discount in the valuation of its taxable property which
is extended to some county assessed property pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §59-2-304.

That case was decided by the Utah Supreme

Court on July 18, 1990, and on July 20, 1990, the Petitioner
filed with the Tax Commission in this proceeding a copy of the
Amax decision with a Submission of Decision in a Related Case
in which they requested that the principles of the Amax case be

-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Iy

at
and
the

Commission, subject to any changes that might be made through
this proceeding.
4.

During the period

in question, locally assessed

commercial and industrial real property

located in Salt Lake

County was assessed by the county using a combination of
comparable
income

ne

sales method, the cost appraisal method, and the

approach.

property was then

The

value

so

determined

for

such

real

reduced 20% pursuant to the provisions of

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304.

The 20% reduction does not apply to

personal property and was not applied to personal property by
the county.
5.
all

real

As of January 1, 1988, the fair market value of

and

personal

property

of

Union

Pacific

Railroad,

Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, and Southern Pacific Railroad
in Utah was valued by a combination of

the

cost

appraisal

method, the income approach, and the stock and debt approach.
The values determined by each of those

approaches were then

correlated based upon the judgment of the appraiser, and the
final correlated value so determined by the appraiser was then
reduced by 14%, pursuant to a decision of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Utah entered December 29, 1988.

This

reduction was applied to the railroads' state assessed unitary
property which includes both real and personal property.
6.

The

correlation

process

is

not

a

precise

mathematical process, but depends strongly upon the judgment of
the appraiser.

Different appraisers can begin with the same

estimates of value based upon the three different approaches or
methods of valuation, and if they have different opinions of
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, A-fi
may contain errors.
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9.

Mining

Petitioner, are not
railroad

such

in

category

properties

properties.
law

properties,

they

the

or

same

most

as

those
of

commercial

owned

by

properties

and

as

industrial

They have different characteristics and under Utah
are

properties

assessed

in Utah

by

are

different

valued

methodologies.

using

only

one

Mining

method,

the

"capitalized net revenue method" as set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§59-2-201, which method is more fully set forth by the Rules of
the Tax Commission in Rule R884-24-7P.

Under Utah law, that

methodology is exclusive to the assessment of mines.
10.

Kennecott

was

valued

pursuant

to

the

same

methodology and on a uniform and equal basis with all other
mines in the State of Utah.
11.

Kennecott is not valued by the unit approach, and

does not operate as a unit across state lines.
12.

The assessment of Kennecott was not made by the

county assessor, but was made by the Property Tax Division of
the State Tax Commission.
13.
either
method,

the

The assessment of Kennecott was not made by using
comparable

but

was

14.

The

made

sales
by

method

using

or

the

cost

the capitalized

appraisal

net

revenue

method.
capitalized

net

revenue

method

fair market value without any consideration

to

calculates

transactional

costs, i.e., it assumes that the fair market value is available
to the owner without incurring transactional costs.
15.

The ratio of real property to personal property

for Petitioner

is substantially

different

than the ratio of

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ne t-J <

e s t a b l i s h Ui.it

h*s m.r
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»

.

any evidence

to

is d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e

to the amount of p r o p e r t y it uwiio.
'•'
1
_,:.

fc-

"I'lrn,

s:

-NS__OF LAW

,

* ion Article XIII, Section

-vices as follows:
Section 2
i I 'I
All tangible property
m
i Instate, not exempt under the l^ws of the
United States, or under this Constitution,
shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate
in
proportion
to
its
value,
to
be
ascertained as provided by law.
2

"Jit»

! i'"

••»

Constitution,

A r t : .e

X 111

Section 3{i> provides as foi. ws:
Section 3
(J)
"The Legislate* ihall provide by
law a uniform and equal rate of assessment
on all tangible property in the state,
according to its value in money, except as
otherwise provided in Section 2 of this
Article- The Legislature shall prescribe by
law such provisions as shall secure a just
valuation for taxation of such property,
that every person and corporation shall pay
a tax in proportion to the value of his
her, or its tangible
property, providt-d
that the Legislature may determine
~:manner and extent nf raxing livestock
3.
r

Utah ' u"iJ,i> Aim 'i 59-2 201

i |,;n;vitie6

• xlows:

A-9
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By May 1 the following property shall be
assessed by the commission at 100% of fair
market value, as valued on January 1, in
accordance with this chapter:
(a) All property which operates as a unit
across county lines, if the values must be
apportioned among mere than one county or
state; . . . .
(e) All mines and mining claims except in
cases as determined by the commission, where
the mining claims are used for other than
mining purposes, in which case the value of
mining claims used for other than mining
purposes shall be assessed by the assessor
of the county in which the mining claims are
located: and.
(f)
All machinery used in mining, all
property or surface improvements upon or
appurtenant to mines or mining claims. For
the purposes of assessment and taxation, all
processing plants, mills, reduction works,
and smelters which are primarily used by the
owner of
a mine or mining claim for
processing, reducing, or smelting minerals
taken from a mine or mining claim shall be
considered appurtenant to that mine or
mining claim, regardless of actual location.
4.

Utah Code Ann. §59-2-201(2) provides as follows:

The method for determining the fair market
value of productive mining property is the
capitalized net revenue method or any other
valuation method the commission believes, or
the
taxpayer
demonstrates
to
the
commission's satisfaction, to be reasonably
determinative of the fair market value of
the
mining
property.
The
rate
of
capitalization applicable to mines shall be
determined by the commission, consistent
with a fair rate of return expected by an
investor in light of that industry's current
market, financial, and economic conditions.
In no event may the fair market value of the
mining property be less than the fair market
value
of
the
land,
improvements,
and
tangible
personal
property
upon
or
appurtenant
to
the
mining
property.
(Emphasis added)
-10-
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il

mad*-

in i=?
unrf
Hie

determination that when fair market value is calculated by any
other method, such as the capitalized net revenue method, there
are no transaction costs which have been included as part of
the

determined

between

that

value.

There

legislatively

is

a

reasonable

determined

relationship

classification

and

the

purpose of §59-2-304(1), the purpose of which is to equalize
the tax burdens imposed upon the various properties.
9.

The

Legislature

found

no

basis

for

intangible

values or transaction costs for centrally assessed properties
as

is

indicated

by

the

exclusion

of

centrally

assessed

properties from the provisions of §59-2-304, and also by the
express

provisions

of

§59-2-201.

The

Legislature

has

determined that centrally assessed properties, including mine
properties

such

as Petitioner's,

are tcr' be assessed

by

the

Commission using methods other than the comparable sales method
or

the

property

cost

appraisal

valuation

method.

methods,

Those

including

centrally
the

assessed

capitalized

net

revenue method, have been determined to not include transaction
costs in the calculation of fair market value.

The Legislature

has, therefore, specifically excluded properties such as that
which

is

owned

by

the

Petitioner

from

the

operation

of

§59-2-304 because of the difference in methodology.
10.

The

20%

reduction

provided

by

Utah

Code

Ann.

§59-2-304 applies only to real property valued by either the
comparable sales method or the cost appraisal method.

It does

not apply to personal property.
11.

The federal

"4-R" Act does not apply to mining

properties such as the property of Petitioner.
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appeal No. 88-1.
12.

If the property of Petitioner had been valued by

the county pursuant to the capitalized net revenue method, the
values so determined would not have been reduced 20% because of
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304.
13.

Utah

Code

Ann.

§§59-2-1007

and

59-1-210(7)

provide that the Tax Commission may equalize an assessment with
other similarly assessed property, and ensure that assessments
are just, equal and their burden is distributed without favor
or discrimination.
14.
should

It is Petitioner's position that the Commission

equalize the assessment of Petitioner's property with

property

which

is

similarly

assessed.

However,

the

Petitioner's property has not been deemed by the Legislature to
be similarly assessed with properties whi^dh do receive the 20%
or 14% reductions.

The subject property as a mine property is

centrally assessed under the above provisions and also under
section 4 of Article XIII of the Utah State Constitution and
the

relevant

therefore

statutes

in the

same

and

rules

category

of

the

Commission.

It

is

as

other property which is

centrally assessed and all centrally assessed property is taxed
at 100% of fair market value.
15.

The Petitioner has not shown that the appraisal

methods used by the Petitioner
County were the same.

and those used by Salt Lake

Therefore, the decision

of the Utah

Supreme Court in Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax
Commission,

796 P. 2d

1256

govern these proceedings.

(Utah

1990) does

not

control

or

In the present case, although the

methods used by the Respondent and the county may be referred

-i3-
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to by the same names (i.e. income appr
market

Jh, cost approach, and

approach) the techniques and methodologies used within

each of those separate methods are quite different with respect
to the subject property.
16.

In the alte

ative,

Petitioner

asserts

that

should be accorded the 14% reduction allowed to railroads.

it
The

controlling case to this issue is Union Pacific vs. Utah State
Tax Commission, 716 F.Supp. 543 (D. Utah 1988).

As a result of

that case, railroads under the federal "4-R" Act have a 14%
reduction

in

the

assessed

values

subject property, however, is not

of

their

similar

reduction.

to
The

railroad
subject

properties
property

The

a railroad property and is

also not governed by the federal "4-R" Act.
not

property.

is

that

It is therefore,
receive

rehired

by

the

14%

law to be

assessed at 100% of its full market value.
17.
Algom

The Commission

finds

Corp. vs. San Juan County,

further that the case Rio
681 P.2d

184

(Utah

1984)

states the rationale and principles which are controlling in
this case.

The Rio Algom Court found that a "certain degree of

de facto classification is unavoidable" and the Legislature has
a proper amount of discretion in meeting the requirements of
uniformity

mandated

under

the Utah

Constitution.

The court

stated:
Under Article XIII, §3, the property taxes
paid on each property are required to be
uniform and in proportion to the value of
the property.
Although the objective is
easily
stated,
its
attainment
is more
difficult.
Because of the many different
kinds of property and the various factors
that affect their value, the determination
of what constitutes equal "in proportion to
the value of his, her, or its tangible

-i4-
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property," under Article XIII, §3, cannot be
made by application of any single property
formula.
Of primary importance is the determination
of what valuation method should be utilized,
and that depends on the nature of the
properties
to
be
taxed.
Residential,
commercial,
transportation,
mining
and
public utilities, etc., must be treated
differently
because
of
the
economic
conditions
that
give
value
to
such
properties. Rio Algom at 188.
18.
Clause

Petitioner

of

the

United

Petitioner

to

which

accorded

are

claims

be

that

States

treated
the

the

Equal

Constitution

differently
20%

and

than

14%

Protection

does

not

those

allow

properties

reductions.

However,

Petitioner does not fall within the classifications of these
other

properties,

unlawfully

so

treated

within

its

clause

does

Petitioner

differently

classification.
not

mandate

has
than

not
otjaer

Therefore,
a

shown

the

reduction

that

it

is

mines

or

equal

protection

of

the

others

value

of

Petitioner's property.
19.

The distinctions

owned by Petitioner

and other

between property
properties

such as that

in the state is a

reasonable one which has been made by the Legislature
exercise of its proper discretion
capricious.
by

the

The distinctions

Legislature

do

not

in the

and is neither arbitrary nor

and classifications
result

in

an

established

intentional

or

systematic overvaluation of the Petitioner's property from the
valuation of the property of other taxpayers within the same
class.

See

Allegheny

Pittsburgh

Coal

Company

vs.

Webster

County West Virginia, 109 S.Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989).
-15-
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20.

Valuations

of

different

types

of

properties

cannot be determined by the application of a single or uniform
formula.

The

value

of

a

mine

is

not

determined

by

the

application of the same formula or meth~ :>logy as is used to
determ ne the value of a home.

Likewi

neither a mine nor a

home can be determined by the application of the same formula
or methodology as is used to determine the value of a railroad.
21.

The

valuation

mathematical precision.

of

property

is

not

subject

to

Different appraisers can use the same

general methodology such as the income approach, but by making
slightly different

assumptions, such as capitalization rate,

they may arrive at substantially diverse conclusions of fair
market value.

However, each of those determinations of value

may still be a fair and reasonable determination of the fair
market value of the property.
22.

"Market Value" is a term that cannot be applied

in an overly rigid fashion, and is not subject to mathematical
precision.

It cannot be determined to the nearest dollar.

It

is a term which is at best a reasonable approximation based
upon

the

best

evidence

available

experience of the person making

and

the

judgment

and

the determination of value.

While the term has a precise meaning, an appraisal

is not a

wholly fixed, precise, or exact number.
23.

The factual premise of the Legislature was that

properties valued by either the comparable sales method or the
cost

appraisal

method

had

elements

of

transaction

costs

included in those values, and that since those costs were not
included in values determined pursuant to other methods, those
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transaction costs should not be required to bear a portion of
the tax burdens.

It was the Legislature's way of equalizing

taxes as required by the constitution.
presented

at

the

hearing

that

There was no evidence

the premise

assumed

by

the

methods

of

the

Legislature was not correct.
24.

In

Amax,

supra,

the

valuation

Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission were
identical
county.

in all

respects

to

the valuation methods of the

In this proceeding, the

property

of

Petitioner

is

valued using a different method than was used for residences or
railroads.
25.

The Utah Supreme Court in Amax, supra, did not

hold Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304(1), unconstitutional, but it held
that the 20% reduction required by the statue must be applied
to the property of AMAX because it had been valued by exactly
the

same methodology

used

by

the

county

in valuing county

assessed property.
26.

Based

on

the

above, the Commission

determines

that the relief sought by Petitioner cannot be granted.

The

assessment of Petitioner's property at 100% of its fair market
value pursuant to the capitalized net revenue method is proper,
fair, reasonable, and required by the constitution and laws of
the state of Utah, and does not contravene any provision of

-17-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A-17

Appeal No.

88-1. /

federal law or violate any provisions or requirements of the
United States Constitution.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order
of the Utah State Tax Commission that:
1.
and

the

denied.

The Motion to Consolidate filed by the County,

Motion

to

Strike

filed

by

Petitioner

are

hereby

Any other pending motions are also denied.
2.

Petitioner's

The

request

property

is

for

a

hereby

reduction
denied,

in the
and

the

value

of

value

of

Petitioner's property for the lien date of January 1, 1988, is
affirmed at $617,771,020.
DATED this

y

It is so ordered.
day of y//?A<cA^

• 1992.

T

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION-.

(Umi^k.
S. Blaine Willes*
Commissioner

Se B. Pacheco
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1),
63-46b-14(2)(a).
*Since the hearing on this case, Commissioner G. Blaine Davis
has
been
replaced
by
Commissioner
S.
Blaine
Willes.
Commissioner Willes has been duly advised of the ^f^?^V?5d
circumstances regarding this case and is qualified
decision.
GBD/sj/9416w
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
Kennecott Corporation - Utah Copper
c/o Kent Winterholler
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT
84147
Robert L. Yates
Salt Lake County Assessor
2001 South State #N2323
Salt Lake City, UT
84190
Mike
Salt
2001
Salt

Reed
Lake County Auditor
South State Street, #N2200
Lake City, UT
S4190

Karl
Salt
2001
Salt

Hendrickson
Lake County Attorney
South State Street, S3600
Lake City, UT
84108

Anne R. Dunyon
Tooele County Assessor
County Courthouse
Tooele,, UT
84074
Glenn W. Caldwell
Tooele County Auditor
County Courthouse
Tooele,, UT
84074
J. Mike Monson
Director, Property Tax
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Brent Eyre
Assistant Director
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
-19A-19
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L. Brent Gardner
Utah Association of Counties
55 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Bill Thomas Peters
Deputy County Attorney
9 Exchanaa Place #1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Lee Dever
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
DATED this

3

day of

/Jfa^JL.^

, 1992,
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B.

VERBATIM PRESENTATION OF CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS/
STATUTES, AND RULES

Constitution
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article

I, Section 24
VIII, Section
XIII, Section
XIII, Section
XIII, Section
XIII, Section
XIII, Section

3
2(1)
3(1)
2
3
4

B-2
B-3
B-4
B-6
B-4
B-6
B-7

Statutes
Utah Code
Utah Code
Utah Code
Utah Code
Utah Code
49 USCA §

Ann. § 59-2-201 (1987)
Ann. § 59-2-304 (1987)
Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1991)
Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (e) (ii) (1991)
Ann. § 59-5-4.5 (1973 & Supp. 1986)
11503 (1982 & Supp. 1988)

B-8
B-10
B-ll
B-12
B-13
B-14

Rules
Utah Admin. Code § R884-24-7P
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Art. I, § 23

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

DECLARATION OK RIGHTS

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

CD
I

Utah I^aw Review. — The Condemnor's Liability for Damage* Arising Through Institut
ing, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 Utah L Rev 548
Comment. Highway Noise Damage and
Utah Eminent Domain Law, 1972 Utah L Rev
116
City of Oakland v Oakland Raiders Defining the Parameters of Limitless Power. 1983
Utah L Rev 397
Eminent Domain Compensation in Western
States A Critique of the Fair Market Value
Model. 1984 Utah L Rev 429
The Failure of Subdivision Control m the
Western United States A Blueprint for Local
<Government Action. 1988 Utah I. Rev 569
J o u r n a l of Energy U w Mnd Policy.
Comment. The Only Way to Manage a Desert
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8
J Energy L & Poly 95 (1987)
Harvard Law Review. — Constitutionality
of Zoning, 37 Harv L Rev 834
Am. J u r . 2d. — 26 Am J u r 2d Eminent
Domain <*& 7, 13 et seq
C.J.S. - 29A C J S Eminent Domain $ 3
A.L.R. — Building restrictions, an property
right* for taking of which compensation must
bo made, 4 A L R 3d 1137
Restrictive covenant, right to enforcement
thereof us tompeii«ahle property right, 4
A L R 3 d 1137
Deduction of benefits in determining com
Dentation or damages in proceeding involving

opening, widening, or otherwise altering highway, 13 A L R 3 d 1149
Property for exchange for other property required fur public use. condemning. 20 A L R 3d
862
Restrictive covenant, existence of, as element in fixing price of property condemned, 22
A L R 3 d 961
Eminent domain right to enter land for preliminary survey or examination, 29 A L R 3d
1104
Entry upon or exploration of laud before condemnation, 29 A L R 3d 1104
Schools liability of public schools and institutions of higher learning for taking or damaging private properly lor public use. 33 A L R 3d
703
Seuure of property as evidence in criminal
prosecution or investigation as compensable
taking, 44 A L R 4th 366
Validity, construction, and application of
state relocation assistance laws, 49 A L R 4th
491
Inverse condemnation state court class actions. 49 A L R 4 t h 618
Court appointment of attorney to represent,
without compensation, indigent in civil action,
52 A L R 4th 1063
Eminent domain industrial park or similar
development as public use justifying condem
nation of private property 62 A L R 4lh I 183
Key Numbers.
Eminent Domain *~ 3

Sec. 23. (Irrevocable franchises forbidden.)
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, privilege or
immunity.
History: Const. 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Alcoholic beverages
Pioneer Memorial Building
Public purpose
Alcoholic beverages.
h'ortner Liquor Control Act held not unconstitutional as violative of this section Utah
MfrH ' Ass'n v Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P 2d
229 (1933)
State legislature was acting within its power
in enacting former Liquor Control Act. which
in effect revoked previously granted license authorizing the sale of light beer Riggms v Dm
tnct Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 P 2d 645 (19351

Pioneer Memorial Building.
Act pertaining to leasing of portion of state
capitol grounds to Daughters of Utah Pioneers
for erection and maintenance of Pioneer Memorial Building, and amendments thereto
making appropriation** then-fur, us well an ap
propnation of $150,04X1 for that building, did
not violate this section Thomas v Daughters
of Utah Pioneers. 114 Utah 108, 197 P 2d 477
(1948). appeal dismissed for want of a properly
presented substantial federal question. 336
U S 930, 69 S Ct 739. 93 L Ed 1090 (1949)
Public purpose.
Construction and operation of parking facil
ity by city agency as part o( a slum clearance

Art 1, § 24

mutation of urban blight Tribe v Salt I^ake
City Corp, 540 P 2d 499 (Utah 1975)

project did not unconstitutionally grant benefits to private individuals, any benefits were
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J S. - 37 C J S Franchises fe 26
Key N u m b e r s . - Franchises ** 11

Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am J u r 2d Franchises
^ 9 to 23

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation
vate or special laws, Utah Const, Art VI, Sec
26

History: C o n s t 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general
Age of majority
Agent for service of process
Automobile license law
Construction with Art VI, $ 26
Contract carrier permit
Cosmetologists' license law
Criminal actions
— Investigations
— Prosecution
Sentence
Criminal sentence
Disparate lax assessments
Excess revenue relunds
Ciuest statutes
Inheritance Tax Law
Insurance premium tax exemption
Intoxicating liquor
Licenses
Massage parlor ordinance
Municipal employment prerequisites
Notice requirements
Property
— Responsibility for water service
Public employees' retirement system
Public officers' bonds
Public officers' salaries
Road poll tax
School activities
Search warrants
Sunday closing laws
Tax sales
Unfair Practices Act
In general.
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can be enacted State v
Holtgreve. 58 Utah 563, 200 P 894, 26 A L R
696 (1921)
Objects and purposes of law present touch
stone for determining proper and improper

122

classifications State v Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78
P 2d 920, 117 A L R 330 (1938), State v J i l i
R E Walker, hit , 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766
(1941)
One who assails legislative classification as
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such
State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100 Utah
523, 116 P2d 7b6 (1941)
damnification is never unreasonable or arbi
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features BO
long SB there IB Home basis lor differentiation
between classes or subject mutters included, as
computed to those excluded, provided difleren
tialion beurH leasonable relation to purposes of
act State v J R A R E Walker. Inc , 100 Utah
523, 116 P2d 766 11941)
Before legislative enactment can be inter
fered with, court must be able to say that there
is no fair reason for the law that would not
require equally its extension to those which it
leaves untouched State v J H & R E Walker,
Inc, 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2 d 766 11941)
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are, as to the subject matter of the law, in no differentiate class
from those included in its operation, is the law
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis
to differentiate can be found, law must be held
constitutional State v J B & R E Walker,
Inc, 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941)
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas
sification does not render statute unconstilu
tional State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100
Utah 523. l i b P 2d 766 (1941)
In determining whether classification made
by legislature it* unconutitulional, discrimina
tion is very essence of classification and is not
objectionable unless founded upon unreason
able distinctions Crontund v Salt l^ake City,
113 Utah 284. 194 P 2d 464 (1948)
An act is never unconstitutional because of

123
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Art

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

VIII. § 2

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — An Intermediate Ap
peltate Court — DoeH Utah Need One', 1979
Utah L Rev 107
Am. Jur. 2d. — I6A Am J u r 2d Const itu
tional Law ** 306 to 310 Ml Am .lur 2d
Cniiria n oi Mm
'

C J . 8 . — 16 C .J S Constitutional U w
§* 169 to 214
A.L.R. -Judicial power to order discontinu
«nce of life sustaining treatment, 48 A L R 4th
Key Numbers. - Constitutional U w «=* 67
to 7ft. Courts *» 147'/,, 206< !2'/,», States •=» 52

The Supreme Court shall he the highest court and shall consist of at least
five justices The number of justices may he changed by statute, but no change
shall have the effect of removing a justice from office A chief justice shall be
selected from among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided by statute
The chief justice may resign as chief justice without resigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme Court by rule may sit and render final judgment
either en banc or in divisions The court shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the Constitution of the United States, except
on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the Supreme Court If a
justice of the Supreme Court is disqualified or otherwise unable to participate
in a cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief justice is
disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall call an
active judge from an appellate court or the district court to participate in the
cause

W
I
GJ

C'roM-Reference*. - Election following ap
pointment 1 o judicial office, t 20 I 7 7
Siututory provisions, t 78 2 1 et aeq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANAI VSIS
"Disqualification" construed
Effect of syllabus of case
Powers of district judge sitting in place of de
censed just ice
...„
. ,.
.
A
"Disqualification roniitrurd
I he term disqualified as used in Ibis arti
,le is used in its natural and oidinnry se,.«e.
and thus includes illness or a physical disahil
ity or other condition incapacitating a member
of the court and may even include the death of
such member In re Thompson s Estate, 72
Utah 17. 2b» V 101 (1928*
This section negates the idea that if a justice
is temporarily disqualified, there should be an
appointment by the governor The term 'dis
qualified" used therein has been interpreted to
mean not only personal interest in the particular caae on the part of a justice, or that he was
counsel during the trial or prior pro* eedings. or

least a judge de facto, and he may participate
in the case and in the court's decision and the
rehearing therein even after vacancy has been
filled by appointment In re Thompson's Ea
tate, 72 Utah 17, 269 P 103 <1928l

67

Sec. 2. (Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law
unconstitutional — Justice unable to participate.)

History: Const. I89«; L. 1943, S..I R. 2;
I9H4 (2nd 8 8 ) , 8.J.K. I

cancy in his office occurs and the remaining
justices have authority to call in or permit a
district judge to sit with them in a particular
case which is argued before the vacancy is
filled by appointment of the governor and the
appointee qualifies Such district judge is at

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. 20 Am J u r 2d Courts * 87
et seq
CIS
21 C.J S Courts H 291 4»>4 to
48b
A LK.
Disqualification of judge for hav
ing decided difierer.t case against litigant 21
A L R 3 d 1369
Power of successor or substituted judge in
civil case to render decision or enter judgment

Sec. 3. (Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.|
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the
United States The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all
other matters to he exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all
writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
or the complete determination of any cause
History: Const 1896; 1943, S J R 2 ; 1984
(2nd SS.), S.I II I.
Compiler's Notes — Provisions similar to
those in this section were formerly found in
Art VIII. Sec 4

Effect of syllabus of eaae
Where it IH not clear from separate opinions
0 r l n | 1 ( O U r t exactly what the holding is, the
decision of the court should be ascertainable by
reading the syllabus Shields v Utah Light &
Traction Co . 99 Utah 307, 105 P 2d 347 (19401
Power* of district Judge sitting in place of
deceased justice.
Under this section, when a justice dies, a va

Cross References. — Original and appel
late jurisdiction, * 78 2 2

NOTKS TO DECISIONS

Appellate jurisdiction
Appellate jurisdu tion connotes review of the
action of an inferior court rederal courts are
not inferior courts to the Utah Supreme Court
and supreme courts answer to certified ques
tions in a case that originated in or is to he
adjudicated in a federal court is not an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction within the meaning of
this section Holden v N L Indus Inc n29
P2d 428 (Utah I98U

way to the Constitution Carter v West. 38
Utah 381, I M P 1025 (1911)
Where, due to untimeliness, a criminal con
viction was no longer subject to review by the
statutory remedy of appeal, and a habeas cor
pus proceeding which WOM proper I v before the
Supreme Court on uppt nl held that defendant
had l>een deprived of his constitutional right to
an appeal, and the alleged error could not have
lieen corrected on appeal and the defendant
had taken the initiative to Meek an ap|>eal be
foie the time for appeal had passed. Supreme
Court exercised its discretion to issue the com
mon law writ of certiorari to allow defendant a
direct review in the Supreme Court of the al
leged errors in his trial lloggess v Morns, 635
P2d 39 (Utah 1981>

Certiorari.
Under this set tion the Supreme Court, and
not a justice thereof, is authorized to issue a
writ of certiorari, and a statute conferring such
power on a Supreme Court justice must give

Habeas c o r p u s
Matters which have been or could have been
raised on appeal cannot be brought before the
court by hat>ea* corpus Habeas corpus is a
civil matter and the findings of the trial court

ANALYSIS

thai he wa* otherwise disqualified to hear the
cane Sime statehood it has lieen the practice to
call in a district judge when a member of the
Supreme Court IH ill "or otherwise unable to lie
present at hearing of a cause " Accordingly,
* here just ice enter* armed Ion ea of nation as a
reserve officer, a district judge mav be called
m ( r l U h | o w v M o n 8 0 n , 1 0 2 Utah .178. I l l
p ^ ?H4 |lJM2> Kor
e | u> l h | | | t a w w . e
^ ^
^ l ( ) 2 U u h <r>tt
y ^
, ^ ^ | Jj M 2i

on testimony heard by predecessor, 22
A l . l t Id 922
Disqualify iiI ion of judge on ground of being
a witncHs m the cane 22 A LK id 1198
Disqualification of judge (or bias against
counsel for litigant. 2J A L K .1(1 1416
Disqualification of judge because of his or
anothers holding or owning stock in corpora
tion involved in litigation. 25 A L R 3d 1331
Key N u m b e r s
Courts *=» 248

Appellate jurisdiction
Certiorari
Habeas corpus
legislative enlargement or abridgement of
powers

187
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REVENUE AND TAXATION

Art XIII, § 1

Art XIII. § 2

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
NOTES TO DECISIONS

doeH not prevent the state from going into the
liquor buHinesH Kiggimt v DiMtriU Court, H9
Utah I HA, 51 P 2d «45 (1935)

Bond issue.
City ordinance authorizing bond issue for
improvement of waterworks and specifying
that for purpose of servuiug l>onds fist uI year
should continue same as calendar year was not

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah U w Review.
Antitrust Sympo
mum. 1969 Utah 1, Rev 617
The Utah Antitrunt Act of 1979 < Jetting into
the State Antitrunt Busineiut. 1980 Utah L
Rev 7.1
Journal of Energy l*aw and l*ohcy.
An
Economic AnutyHiM of Utility Coal Company
RelationHhipH, 8 J Energy I. & Poly 27 < 1987)
A.L.R. — Divestiture aa available relief under § 16 of Clayton Act (15 USCS * 26) in action by private parties, 77 A L R red 509

Standing of private parly under <) 16 of
Clayton Act 115 USCS * 26) to seek injunction
to prevent merger or acquisition allegedly prohibited under $ 7 ol the Act (15 USCS * 18),
78 A L It red 159
Am. Jur. 2d.
54 Am .lur 2d Monopolies
Restraints of Trade, and Untuir Tiude l*rac
tices i 44J et seq
C.J.S. — 58 V J S Monopolies $ 27
Key Numbers.
Monopolies «-> 10

ARTICLE XIII
REVENUE AND TAXATION

i

Section
1 | Fiscal year |
Value as
2 ITangible property to be taxed
certained
Exemption*
Remittance or abatement of laxes
of poor — Intangible property
- legislature to provide an
nual (ax for stale I
3 | Assessment and taxation of tangible prop
erty — Livestock — I .and used
for agricultural purposes |
|Mines and claims to tie assessed
Basis
and multiple
What to be as
sessed as tangible property |
IIJOCUI authorities to levy local taxes —
Sharing tax and revenues by
political subdivisions I
I Annual statement to be published |
j Repealed I
I Officer not to make profit out of public
moneys I

Section
9 (State expenditure to be kept within revenues I
10 |All property taxable where situated I
11 |Creation of State Tax Commission —
Memltership - (Jovernor to appoint
Terms - Duties
County iMtards
Duties |
12 |Stamp, income, occupation, license or
franchise tax permissible Reference to United States laws
in imposition of income taxes
Income or intangible property
taxes allocated to public school
system |
13 | Revenue from highway user and motor
fuel taxes to l>e used for high
way purposes 1
14 ITangible personal property tax exemption |

Section 1. 1 Fiscal year. I
The fiscal year shall begin on the first day of January, unless changed by
the Legislature
History: Const. 1896.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1980, Senate
Joint Resolution No 6, proposed to amend Ar
tide XIII The proposed amendment was sub
milted to the electors at the general election in

1980 and failed to pass liecause it did not re
ceive the necessary majority
Cross-Reference*.
Fiscal year of state to
commence on first ot July, <J tiJ 1.1 1

invalid an attempting to lix fiscal year other
than that provided hy this section Fjeldsled v
Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P 2d 144 (19331,
Wadsworlh v Saniaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28
I' 2d lol (19 131

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 84 C J S Taxation * 357
Key N u m b e r s .
luxation «-• 318

Sec. 2. ITangible property to be taxed — Value ascertained — Exemptions — Remittance or abatement of taxes of poor — Intangible property —
Legislature to provide annual tax for state. |
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law
(2) The following are property tax exemptions.
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries,
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city,
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to
the ad valorem property tax,
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes,
(d) Places of burial not held or used lor private or corporate benefit, and
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute This
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by
statute
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m , which is
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or otherwise originating within or without the state
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m , held for
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants,
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxation to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for
generating and delivering electrical power, a poition ot which is used for
229
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furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the
state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the extent that such property
is used for such purposes These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may
prescribe.
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in
such manner as niM, '
'*>d by law.
(8) The Legislature m . ,
le by law for the exemption from taxation: of
not to exceed 45*2 of the fair market value of residential property as defined
by law; and nil household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for
himself and family.
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the military service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were
killed in action or died a s a result of such service may be exempted a s the
legislature may provide.
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it
may be taxed a s property in such manner and to such extent as the Legislature may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also
be taxed Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there
be, the legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years
from the final passage of the law creating the debt.

w

I
(j!

History: Const. 1896; L. 1930 (Spec. Seas.),
County service area property exempt.
8.J R. 2; 1946, H J R . 3; 1957. H J R . 7; 1961, ft 17A-2 429
S.J R. 6; 1963, SJ.R. 5; 1967. S.J.R. I; 1982,
Disabled veterans exemption, ftft 59 2 1104.
S.J.R. 3; 1986, H.J.R. 18.
5 9 . 2 n05
Compiler's Notes. - U W B 1959. Senate
Exemptions generally, ft 59 2 1101 et seq .
Joint Resolution No 5 proponed a constituChapter 23 of Title 78
tional amendment to be voted or U the elec
abatement o, deferral of
IfuJ
t
tor* at the general election u. . . .» I he pro„ ftQ 2 . | | 0 7
Uj|e8
5 9 2
posed amendment failed to pass because it did
. . .
• r
•*
J
i
K
.
..
Industrial facilities development property
r
r
r
J
not receive the necessary majority
. . . . .. .
e
The 1979 proponed amendments to this sec** m P l - * " l » ' l 0
M , n e a n d m m m
c , a , m
tion by House Joint Resolutions Nos 23 and 25
«
""Pavements, maL
were repealed and withdrawn by Senate Joint
«""»«* « r structures not exempt, ft 59 5 64
Resolution No 6. Laws 1**80
Privilege tax on possession and use of taxLaw* 1986, Senate Joint R«n Lit ion No 4,
«**mP* properties, ft 51 4-101
proposed to smend Subsection <V . » of this secProperty of higher education institutions ex
em
tion The proposed amendment was submitted
P l . • 63B-20 106
to the electors st the general election in 1986
Property tax relief, ft 59 2 1201 et seq
and failed to pass because it did not receive the
Rate of assessment of property, ft 59-2 103
necessary majority
School property exempt from taxation,
Cross-References. — Armories exempt ft 53A-3-408
from taxation, ft 39 2 1
Tangible personal property held for sale on
Civil Air Patrol equipment exempt, ft 2 1 41
January 1 exempt, ft 59 2 1114

NOTKS TO DECISIONS
its area is wholly matter of legislative discretion, and exercise of such discretion is not subject of judicial investigation or revision
Kimball v C.rantsville City. 19 Utah 368. 57 P
1. 45 L R A 628 (1899>

A N A I YRIR

In general
Banks
Boundaries of taxing districts
Charitable organization's property
Charitable purpose
Charitable use exemption
— Government subsidies
Hospital under construction
— Material reciprocity lest
— Operating expenses
Church property
City property
Co operative corporation property
Corporations for irrigating land
County improvement district contingent tax
Disparity in slate and county assessment
Excess revenue refunds
tabor union property
Mining claims
Property of United States or its instrumental
ity
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane per
sons
Roll back of assessed value
Scientific research institute
Sewer chaiges ngauist city s< hool lioard prop
erty
Special assessments
State colleges
State property
Transfer of property to tax exempt corporation
True market value
— Intentional discrimination
Utah State Retirement Fund property
Value determination by classification
Cited
In general.
State's power of taxation is not within appli
cation of. and is not limited bv. Art I Sec 22.
providing that private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation Kimball v Orantsville ( itv, 19
Utah 368. 57 P 1. 45 Lit A b28 HH«»«)i
Unless tax laws <onf)ict will, Home constitu
tional provision, either exprenMly or by implica
tion, courts have no authority to prevent their
execution Kimball v Orantsville City. 19
Utah 368.

57

P

I. 45

I, R A

628

<I8«I9>

Banks.
All nonexempt local property of national
bank located in state IH within states power
of taxation Common ml Natl Hank v ('ham
hers, 21 Utah 324 61 P 560. 56 LRA 14b
(1900), afTd. 182 U S 556. 21 S CI 8b 1 15 L
Kd 1227 <190D
Boundaries of taxing districts
Fixing of boundaries of taxing district and

Charitable organization's property.
Housing facility operated by nonprofit corporation was not exempt from taxation as a charity where senior citizen residents were paying
lor all the services thev received and rental of
apartments was determined not by need but by
what was required to pay mortgage and opera
tional ex|N>nses rnendship Manor Corp v
Tax Commri. 26 Utah 2d 227. 487 P 2d 1272
(197 It
If charitable organization does not use its
real property and building thereon exclusively
for charitable purposes such property is not exempt lad that oigamzation is exempt from
federal taxation is not determinative, nonprofit
character of organization is essential hut not
determinative Friendship Manor Corp v Tax
Commn. 26 Utah 2d 227. 487 P 2d 1272
i1971i
Where plaintiff applied for exemption from
ad \ulortiii taxation as a nonpiofit organizn
lion with iharitahle piir|H>Ne and where plain
till <aiiie<| on various charitable activities
Isith in building and a way from premises for
which exemption was sought 'exclusive use"
o( lot with building thereon did not require all
chanlahle activity take place in that building,
and lax Commission's refusal of exemption
was reversed Benevolent & Protective Order
of Klks No 85 v Tax Commn. 536 P 2d 1214
(Utah 19751
Fraternal organization's lot and the lodge
building thereon were not entitled to a tax exemption on the basis of charitable use where
the activities conducted in the lodge consisted
chiefly o( drinking < aid playing dancing and
other social rather than fraternal functions,
and t be or^ani/at ion M expenditures on charita
hie objeds amounted to only slightly more
than 2'« ol total expenditures Maker v One
Piece of Improved Real Property 570 1* 2d
1021 (Utah 1977)
It is the use to which the real property is put,
not the natuie of the owning organization,
which is determinative of whether or not the
pro|M»rty is exempt as being used exclusively
for (h.intable purposes Ynrgasnri v County
lid of rquali/alion. 71 t P 2d br> I (Utah 1986)
An apart m< nl building for needy elderly and
handicapped families and individuals is ex
euipt from real property tax where it is used
exclusively for charitable purposes Yorgason
v County Bd of Fajuali/ation. 714 P 2d 653
(Utah I48b>
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Art XIII, ft 2

Scientific research institute.
Exemption it* the exception to the rule, and
properly owner hat* burden of demonstrating
clearly and unequivocally that he lalls within
the exemption, scientific research institute
failed to meet this burden where evidence w a s
that almost half of its efforts were expended fur
the U S Defense Department, its efforts were
tinuiiiHi ritx'd by individual e m p l o y m e n t contracts, and it occasionally restricted disclosure
of its findings at request of a non governmental client, all of which combined to indicate
that the institute w a s benefiting the public
only incidentally and wan therefore not a charitable institution K y n n g Research Inst , Inc
v Tax Comm'n, 6 9 8 P 2d 1348 ( U t a h 19791

pay taxes due University of U t a h v Salt Lake
County, 547 P 2d 207 ( U t a h I97bi
State property.
Where the stale holds title to land in its governmental capacity, the property is exempt
from taxation under the constitutional man
date Duchesne County v S t a l e Tax C o m m i t ,
104 Utah 365, 140 P 2d 335 (I943>
Under this section lands, title to which is
acquired by the s t a l e by foreclosure of mortg a g e or conveyance for the e x t i n g u i s h m e n t of a
debt for money loaned from the s t a l e school
fund, are exempt from taxation T h i s is parity
due to the reason thai t h e property is owned by
the state in its governmental capacity, but according to some of the judges is due solely lo
the fact that such lands come within the meaning of the term "property" in constitutional
provision Duchesne County v S t a t e Tax
Comm'n. 104 Utah 3 0 5 , 140 P 2d 3 3 5 (19431

S e w e r c h a r g e s against city school board
property.
( ' h a i g e s by city levied a g a i n s t board of education for connections to city sewer s y s t e m and
services thereof were mere p a y m e n t s lor services enjoyed by the boaid and were not
"taxes" or "assessments" from which board of
education w a s e x e m p t and a resulting lien
from d e l i n q u e n t p a y m e n t of such c h a r g e s w a s
not an exercise of the city t a x i n g power Murray City v Hoard of Kduc . 16 U t a h 2d 115, 3 9 6
P 2 d 6 2 8 <I9H4>

fcrj
I
Ot

R E V E N U E A N D TAXATION

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Special assessments.
Provision of this section that all property not
exempt under l a w s of U n i t e d S t a t e s or under
state Constitution shall be taxed refers to gen
eral t a x e s and not to special a s s e s s m e n t s , and
hence does not invalidate a statutory provt
sion, which provides that property held by
Imard of education shall Ite exempt from local
a s s e s s m e n t s Wey v Salt Lake i'lty, 35 Utah
504, lOl P 381 (19091
This section does not apply to special assess
ments S t a t e ex rel Lundberg v Green River
Irrigation Dist , 4 0 U t a h 8 3 , 119 P 1039
(1911)
State colleges.
A bond issue by tx>ard of trustees of state
agricultural college in accordance with legists
live e n a c t m e n t for purpose of financing con
struction of s t u d e n t union b u i l d i n g would not
violate this section by creating debt against
state, where bonds showed on their face that
they were special obligations payable solely
from revenue to l>e derived from operation of
union, including proceeds of s t u d e n t fee, and
not obligations of the s t a l e S p e n c e v Utah
State A g i l College, 119 U t a h 104, 2 2 5 P 2d 18
(1950)
"Property of" a s l a t e university m e a n s prop
erty owned by it, where university possessed
equipment leased from corporation which re
tamed title to it. the e q u i p m e n t w a s not ex
empl from county property taxation, and under
the terms of the lease, university w a s l>ouiid to

Transfer of property to tax-exempt corporation.
Where a private corporation conveyed property to a tax exempt municipal corporation
prior to assessment and levy of taxes, the ad
valorem tax on the property w a s erroneously
and illegally levied and collected by the county
e v e n though the corporation owned the property on January 1 w h e n the lien for lax attached, and the corporation's application for a
refund w a s proper U t a h Parks Co v Iron
County. 14 Utah 2d 178. 3 8 0 P 2d 9 2 4 < 19631
True market value.
—Intentional discrimination.
A federal district court is precluded from
probing into the a s s e s s m e n t process lo deter
mine whether the s t a t e h a s accurately determined the "true market value" of a railroad's
property absent a strong s h o w i n g by the railroad that the state h a s purposefully overvalued its property with discriminatory intent
Union Pac R R v S t a t e Tax Comm'ii, 6 3 5 V
Supp 1060 (D U t a h 1986)
To the extent that railroads a l l e g e thai the
s l a t e has intentionally discriminated a g a i n s t
them, they may introduce evidence of their
true market value, a s well a s other probative
evidence, lo establish their prima facie case of
intentional discrimination Union Pac R R v
S t a l e Tax Comm'n, 6 3 5 r Supp 1060 (1) U t a h
1986)
Utah State Retirement Fund property.
Real properly of the U t a h S t a l e Retirement
Fund was "properly of Ihe state" within the
m e a n i n g of this section, and w a s therefore tax
exempt Utah S t a l e Retirement Office v Salt
Lake County, 780 P 2d HI i ( U t a h 1989)
Value determination by classification.
County l»oard of equalization w a s not authorized to determine value by classification of

property and a s s e s s m e n t based thereon w a s in
violation of this section Harmer v S t a l e Tax
Comm'n, 22 U t a h 2d 324, 4 5 2 P 2d 87b (1969)
C i t e d in Sail Lake County v Tax Comm'n
ex rel U t a h Transit Auth , 780 P 2d 1231

Art

XIII, & 3

(Utah 1989), Salt U k e County ex rel County
Bd of Equalization v S t a l e Tax Comm'n ex
rel Kennecott Corp , 7 7 9 P 2d 1131 (Utah
1989)

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
U t a h L a w R e v i e w . — Note. Financing
Modernized and Unmodernized Local Govern
ment in i h e Age of Aquarius, 1971 U t a h L
He V 3 0
Housing in S a l t Lake Counly — A Place to
Live for the Poor ? , 1972 Utah L Rev 193
B r i g h a m Y o u n g Law Review. — A Mumc
ipality's Interest in an Electrical Power Oenera t i n g Facility S o m e Tax Considerations, 1979
B Y U L Rev 125
A m . J u r . 2 d - 71 A m J u r 2d S t a t e and
Local Taxation »ft 194 e l seq . 307 et seq
C . J . 8 . - 84 C J S Taxation ft* 5 2 . 57 et
seq , 2 1 5 et seq

A.L.R.
Oil and g a s royalty a s real or per
sonal property, 5b A L R 4 t h 5 3 9
Properly tax effect of tax exempt lessor's re
versionary interest on valuation of nonexempt
lessee's interest, 57 A L R 4th 9 5 0
Exemption from real property Luxation of
residential facilities m a i n t a i n e d by hospital for
p t t t i e n t a , stall, or others, 61 A L R 4th 1105
p r o p n e t y of federal court's ordering s l a t e or
| o c a | l t t K , n c r e t t H e to eftecluale civil rights de
^
?b A , K
Fed
ft04
; Numbers.
T a x a t i o n ~ 4 9 . 57 et seq ,
^
^

Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property —
Livestock — Land used for agricultural purposes.]
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money,
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article The legislature shall
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the
legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the legislature prescribes,
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the
value it may have for other purposes
H i s t o r y : C o n s t . 1896; N o v . 6, 1900; N o v . 8,
1906; L. 1 9 3 0 ( S S . ) , S . J . R . 2; 1946 ( 1 s t S.S.),
H J . R . 2; 1967, S . J . R . 2; 1982, S . J . R . 3 .
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — T h e 1979 proposed
a m e n d m e n t of this section by House Joint Res

olution No 23 w a s repealed and withdrawn by
S e n a t e Joint Resolution N o 6, l>aws 1980
Cross-References.
—
Uniform
School
Fund, taxes allocated to, S 53A 16 101

N O T E S TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
In general
"According to value in money" construed
Charitable association
Co operative corporation property
County clerk's probate fees
County improvement district contingent tax
Disparity in state and county a s s e s s m e n t
Double taxation
Drainage a s s e s s m e n t s

234

Occupation and license t a x e s
Remission of t a x e s of indigent or i n s a n e per**>"»
Road poll t a x e s
Roll back of assessed value
Special a s s e s s m e n t s
S t a t e property
Telephone license tax
Uniformity and equality
Utility rates
Cited
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Sec. 4. [Mines and claims to be assessed — Basis and multiple — What to bv assessed as tangible property.]
All metalliferous m i n e s or m i n i n g claims, both placer and rock in place,
shall he assessed a s t h e L e g i s l a t u r e shall provide; b u t t h e basis and m u l t i p l e
now used in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e v a l u e of metalliferous m i n e s for t a x a t i o n purposes and the additional . < ssed v a l u e of $5 00 per acre thereof shall not be
changed before J a n u a r y I, 1935, nor t h e r e a f t e r until otherwise provided by
law All other m i n e s or m i n i n g c l a i m s a n d other valuable mineral deposits,
including lands c o n t a i n i n g coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in
m i n i n g and all property or surface i m p r o v e m e n t s upon or a p p u r t e n a n t to
m i n e s or m i n i n g claims, a n d t h e value of any surface use m a d e of m i n i n g
claims, or m i n i n g property for o t h e r than mining purposes, shall be assessed
a s o t h e r tangible property.
History: Const. 1896; Nov. 8, 1908; L. 1930
tS.S.I, S J R . 5; 1982. S.J.R. 3.

Cross-References.
ft 59 2 201.

Statutory provisions.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction and operation of HI ilion.
Drain tunnels
Notice
Unpatented mining claims
Water rights

I

Construction and operation of section.
Classification under this section as it formerly read was not intended to limit phrase
"or other valuable mineral deposits," hut embraced all mineral deposits including gypsum,
and net annual profits from products manufactured therefrom were taxable Nephi Plaster &
Mfg Co v Juab County, 3.'l Utah 114. 93 P.
53, 14 I R A

U I N I 1043 <I907>

Under this section as it once n-.td. ;i blanket
assessment of all coal lands in county could not
he made at a flat or uniform rate Ririe v Randolph, 51 Utah 274. 169 P 941 (1917)
Under this section as it formerly read, it was
held that for purpose of taxing net proceeds of
mines, the cost of mining incurred in any one
year must be considered independently from
the cost incurred in any other year, and only
auch costs as were incurred during year in
which net proceeds were obtained could l>e considered Mammoth Mining Co v J u a b Comity.
51 Utah 316, 170 l» 78 (1918).

Drain tunnels.
Under this section, drain tunnels, used to
drain a mine, may not be separately taxed
where it appears that they have no separate
and independent value, but are inseparably
connected with the operation of the mine.
Ontario Silver Mining Co v llixon. 49 Utah
359. 164 l» 498 U917>
Notice.
Assessment of 'mines was not defective
where notice described property with reasonable certainty as to locality and identity Consolidated Uranium Mines. Inc v. MofTitt, 257
F2d 396 (10th Cir. 1958)
Unpatented mining claims.
A tax imposed under state law upon the possessory right to explore and develop mines located upon unpatented claims located upon
land belonging to the unappropriated public
domain of the United States is not open to challenge upon the ground that it constitutes a tax
against property belonging to the United
States Consolidated Vranium Mines. Inc. v
MofTitt, 257 F2d 396 (10th Cir 1958)
Water rights.
Water rights are taxable whether considered
appurtenant to mine or independent property.
Utah Metal & Tunnel Co v Oroeslieck, 62
Utah 251, 219 P. 248 (1923).

Am. Jur. 2d.
71 Am. J u r 2d State and
I^ocal Taxation § 218

C..J.S.
84 C J S Taxation «i§ 68, 73, 170
Key Numbers.
Taxation *=» 63. 158

Sec. 5. [Local authorities to levy local taxes — Sharing tax
and revenues by political subdivisions.!
T h e L e g i s l a t u r e shall not impose taxes for t h e purpose of a n y county, city,
town or o t h e r municipal corporation, hut may, by law, vest in t h e corporate
a u t h o r i t i e s thereof, respectively, t h e power to assess and collect t a x e s for all
purposes of such corporation. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g a n y t h i n g to t h e c o n t r a r y contained in t h i s Constitution, political subdivisions may s h a r e t h e i r tax and
o t h e r r e v e n u e s with o t h e r political subdivisions a s provided by s t a t u t e .
History: Const. 1896; L. 1982, S.J.R. 3.
Cross-References. — Appropriations and
tax limitation, § 59 17a-101 et seq
City taxing power, Utah Const. Art XI, sec
5.

County taxing power, § 17-4-3.
Revenue sharing between political subdivisions. <) II i;i 10 5

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Corporate authorities" construed.
"Corporate authorities." as used in this section, aie lho.se municipal officers who either
are directly elected by municipality's inhabitants or are appointed in some mode to which
such inhabitants have given their assent State
ex rel Wright v Standford. 24 Utah 148, 06 l»
1001 i1901»

ANALYSIS
Agricultural extension work
Allocation of future tax

"Corporate authorities" construed.
Court fees
Dependent mot hem
Discriminatory tax
Excess revenue refunds
License fees
Purpose of taxation
Utah Neight>orhood Development Act
Water diHtrict
Agricultural extension work.
Statute (Comp Laws 1917, § 52921 authorizing contracts between trustees of stair agricultural college and county commissioners with
respect to agricultural extension woik, and au
thnrizing commissioners to provide funds necessary for the work in their respective coun
ties, was not invalid as imposing a tax for
county purposes by the legislature liailey v
Van Dyke, 06 Utah 184, 240 l» 454 H925>
Allocation of future tax.
The law is well settled that in exert iHing the
powers of the stale, the legislature may require
the revenue of a municipality to l»e applied to
uses other than thai for which the taxes were
levied, thus there was no constitutional transgression in I he allocation of certain expected
tax increments (generated by new const ruction
in an area of urban blight I for repayment of
Redevelopment Agency bonds Tnlie v Sail
take City Corp. 540 P 2d 45*9 (Utah I97f»

238

Court fees.
The provisions of this section were contravened by statute which attempted to fix schedule of county clerks' fees for services in probate
mailers based on sliding scale where fees increased as values of estates increased, since
such attempt was an imposition of taxes without uniformity for counties' use and benefit.
Smith v Carlton Count v. 90 Utah 500. 03 P 2d
259. I OH A L U 51.1 < i 9.10)
Dependent m o t h e r s .
The phrase "foi all purposes of such corporation." is synnnvmous with the phrase, "public
pui|M».ses," and Chapter LI of Title 17 <Public
Aid for l)c|>endcnt Molheisl would be upheld
as "public purpose" Denver & R O R R v
C.rand County. 51 Utah 294. 170 V 74. l\
A L R 1224 (19171
Discriminatory tax.
A citv licensing ordinance which was a reve
nue raising mea^uie and put some of the husi
nesses aflettcd on <i fl.it fee basts with only
about one twelfth as muih lax as other busi
nesses which p.ud on a sales tax basis was un
tonstilulionnllv disci iminalory Orem City v
I'yne, 10 Utah 2d 155. 401 l» 2d 1HJ Il905»
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59-2-104

PROPERTY TAX ACT

R E V E N U E A N D TAXATION

H i s t o r y : C . 1953, 5 9 2 104, e n a c t e d by L.
1»87, c h . 4, ft 5 1 .
Compiler'** N o t e s . - Former $ 59-4-1, aa
last a m e n d e d by Laws 19.15. ch Ml, ft I, con
turned provisions similar to this section
Effective Dates
Laws I9H7. ch 4. $ .'MM
m a k e s the act effective on February <», I9M7.

R e t r o s p e c t i v e O p e r a t i o n . - Laws 19H7,
ch. 4, % 307 provides. "This act h a s retrospective operation lo J a n u a r y 1, 19H7, except for
Sections 59 2 2 0 1 , 59 2 205, and 5 9 2 2 0 7 ,
which take effect January 1, 19HH."
CroHH-KeferencoM.
Properly
taxable
where situated. Utah Const Art XIII, $ 10

Boundaries of t a x i n g district.
lx>cation of property.
Property of foreign corporations.
Rolling stock of railroads.
Unity of use doctrine.
Water rights.

03
I
00

Property of foreign corporations.
N e i t h e r tangible nor intangible property
owned and used by foreign corporation in
s t a l e s other t h a n Utah w a s taxable in Utah
county tn which corporation's principal office
w a s situated U t a h Idaho Sugar Co. v Salt
L.ike Count v. 6 0 Utah -191. 210 P MHi, 27
A L.R 871 i 1922»

A m . J u r . 2 d . — 71 Am Jur. 2d State and
Local Taxation ftft 6 4 8 to 6 5 1 .
C . J . S . — 84 C.J.S. Taxation ftft 113. 115
ALU.
Validity of municipal ordinance

imposing income tax or license upon nonresi
dents employed in t a x i n g jurisdiction (commuter lax*. 48 A L R 3d 3 4 3
Key N u m b e r s .
Taxation * - 98

Public utilities, and bridges and ferries not public utilities, when operated
wholly in one county, and electric light lines and similar improvements, canals, ditches, and flumes when separately taxable, shall be listed and assessed
in the county in which the property is located.

ANALYSIS

I^ocation o f p r o p e r t y .
Term "owned," a s used in Utah Const Art.
XIII, $ 10, which provides that all persons in
state shall he subject to taxation on real and
personal property "owned" or used by them
w i t h i n territorial l i m i t s of authority levying
tax, h a s reference to place where property is,
and not to where owner may reside; therefore,
s h e e p were not a s s e s s a b l e in certain city where
none of t h e m had been within territorial limits
of city at a n y t i m e during period for which
t a x e s were assessed. Murdock v. Murdock, 38
U t a h 3 7 3 . 113 P 3 3 0 (19101
With respect to personal property of a tangible and corporeal nature and capable of having
a s i t u s of its o w n , residence of owner is generally i m m a t e r i a l , a n d property is taxable where
it is found. H a m i l t o n & Oleason Co. v. Finery
County. 75 U t a h 40h\ 2 8 5 P. 1006 (1930) See
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 18
U t a h 3 7 8 , 55 P. 6 3 9 , 4 8 L.R.A. 7 9 0 (1898),
aird, 177 U.S. 149, 2 0 S Ct. 6 3 1 , 44 L Ed 708
(1900)

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S

59-2-105. Situs of public utilities, bridges, ferries, and canals.

N O T E S TO DECISIONS

B o u n d a r i e s of taxing district.
F i x i n g of boundaries of t a x i n g district and
its area is wholly matter of legislative discretion, and exercise of such discretion is not subject of judicial investigation or revision.
Kimball v. ( i r a n t s v i l l e City, 19 Utah 368, 57 IV
1, 45 L R A. 6 2 8 (18991.

59-2-201

Rolling stock of railroads.
A s against contention of foreign corporation
that taxation of its refrigerator cars in U t a h
w a s forbidden by U.S. Constitution because
such cars had no s i t u s in U t a h for purpose of
taxation and tax on t h e m would impose burden
on interstate commerce, held that cars were
taxable in Utah on basis of a v e r a g e n u m b e r
thereof used and employed by their o w n e r in
Utah during year for which a s s e s s m e n t w a s
made. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Lynch, 177 U.S. 149, 2 0 S Ct 6 3 1 , 44 L Ed
7 0 8 ilfKMIt.
Unity of use d o c t r i n e .
The doctrine of unity of u«e for purpose of
determining a s s e s s m e n t for taxation cannot he
applied to manufacturing or other s i m i l a r
plants or industries which may be under common ownership but used or o|>erated in different states. Utah Idaho S u g a r Co. v S a l t Lake
County, 6 0 Utah 4 9 1 , 2 1 0 P 106, 27 A.L.R. 8 7 4
(1922).
Water rights.
Where flow of percolating waters w a s developed in process of m i n i n g operations, which
water was piped and sold to another company
which took such water in another county and
through its own pipes conducted it so its o w n
mine, water righlt* were properly a s s e s s e d
against mining company selling such water in
county in which it* o|M'rution* were conducted
and in county where water was transferred and
tax apportioned Itetween such counties. U t a h
Metal & Tunnel Co v. Croehheck, 6 2 U t a h 2 5 1 ,
219 P. 248 11923».

H i s t o r y : C. 1963, 59-2-106, e n a c t e d b y L.
1987, c h . 4, S 6 2 .
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — Former § 59-4-2, as
last amended by U w e 1931, ch 53, § I, con
t a m e d provisions similar to this section
E f f e c t i v e D a t e s . — Laws 1987, ch 4, § 3 0 8
m a k e s the act effective on February 6, 1987

R e t r o s p e c t i v e O p e r a t i o n . - Laws 1987,
ch 4, § 307 provides: "This act h a s retrospeclive operation to J a n u a r y I. 1987, except for
Sections 59 2 2 0 1 , 59 2-205, and 59 2 207,
which take effect J a n u a r y I, 1 9 8 8 "
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Property
taxable
where situated, U t a h Const Art XIII, 8 10

N O T E S TO DECISIONS
Railroad rolling stock.
A s a g a i n s t contention of foreign corporation
t h a t taxation of its refrigerator cars in Utah
w a s forbidden by U S Constitution because
such cars had no situs in Utah for purpose of
taxation and tax on them would impose burden
on interstate commerce, held that cars were

taxable in Utah on basis of a v e r a g e number
thereof used and employed by their owner in
U t a h during year for which a s s e s s m e n t was
made
Union Refrigerator Transit Co v
Lynch. 177 U S 149, 2 0 S Cl. 6 3 1 , 44 L Ed
7Qg (liHNM

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
A m . J u r . 2 d . — 71 A m J u r 2d S t a t e and
Local T a x a t i o n $ 652.

C . J . S . — 84 C.J.S. T a x a t i o n H 3 3 9 to 348
K e y N u m b e r s . - T a x a t i o n •-» 9 8 .

PART 2
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY
58-2-201. Assessment by commission — Determination of
value of mining property — Notification of assessment — Property assessed by the unitary
method which is locally assessed.
(1) By May 1 the following property shall be assessed by the commission at
100% of fair market value, as valued on January I, in accordance with this
chapter:
(a) all property which operates as a unit across county lines, if the
values must be apportioned among more than one county or state;
(b) all property of public utilities;
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(c) all mines and mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits;
(d) all machinery used in mining, all property or surface improvements
upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims, and the value of any
surface use made of mining claims or mining property for other than
mining purposes For the purposes of assessment and taxation, all processing pi ' i
ills, red in tion works, and smelters which are primarily
used by IL»
or of a t"><> or mining claim for processing, reducing, or
smelting minerals taken l> t.« a mine or mining claim, shall be considered
appurtenant to that mine or mining claim, regardless of actual location;
and
(e) in all cases where the surface of lands is owned by one person and
the mineral underlying those lands is owned hy another, the property
rights shall be separately assessed to the respective owners. If the surface
is used for other than mining purposes, the value of the surface shall be
assessed by the assessor of the county in which the property is located.
(2) The method for determining the fair market value of productive mining
property is the capitalized net revenue method or any other valuation method
the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value of the
mining property. The rate of capitalization applicable to mines shall be determined by the commission, consistent with a fair rate of return expected by an
investor in light of that industry's current market, financial, and economic
conditions In no event may the fair market value of the mining property be
less than the fair market value of the land, improvements, and tangible personal property upon or appurtenant to the mining property.
(3) Immediately following the assessment, the owner or operator of the
assessed property shall be notified of the assessment. The assessor of the
county in which the property is located shall also be immediately notified of

W
^

the assessment.
(4) Property assessed by the unitary method, which is not necessary to the
conduct and does not contribute to the income of the business as determined
by I he commission, shall IH» assessed separately by the local county assessor.

VD

HiHtory: O 1853, 59 2 201. enacted by L.
1987, rh 4. ft 53.
Compiler's Notes. — Former ft 59 2 52, as
amended hy Lawn 1983, ch 76. ft I. contained
provisions similar to thie section
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch 4. ft 308
make* the act effective on February 6, 1987

Retrospective Operation.
Laws 1987,
ch 4, ft 307 provides "Thin act has retrospeclive operation to January I, 1987, except for
Sections 59-2-201. 59 2 205, and 59 2 207,
which take effect January 1, 1988"
Cross-References. — Taxation of mines,
Utah Const Art XIII. ft 4

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Challenging assessment
Hv county
Intentional discrimination
COM I landH
Date of assessment
Life tenant and remainderman.
I<ocation of property
Mineral land
"Mines "
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Notice of assessment
Public utilities
Separate assessment
Challenging assessment.
—By county.
Since underassessment of mining property
can cause a distinct and palpable iniuiy to a
county by limiting its lax base, a county has
standing to sue the tax commiHsion on the
ground that NIKII property was underassessed
Kennecott Corp v Salt Lake County. 702 P 2d
451 (Utah 1985»
—Intentional discrimination.
A federal district court is precluded from
probing into the assessment process to deter
mine whether the state has accurately determined the "true market value" of a railroad's
property absent a strong showing by the railroad that the state has purposefully overval
ued its property with discriminatory intent
Union Pat RH v State Tax Coinm'n, 635 F
Supp 1060 (I) Utah 19H6)
Coal lands.
A blanket assessment of all coal lands in
county could not he made at a flat or uniform
rate Rine v Randolph. 51 Utah 274. 169 P
941 (1917)
Date of assessment.
Property not within city on January 1st is
not liable for payment of city taxes for those
years Plutus Mining Co v Orme, 76 Utah
286. 289 P 132 (I930»
Life tenant and remainderman.
A life tenant should be assessed as owner
during the continuume of the life estate
Sheppuk v Sheppuk. 44 Utah III l.iH |»
1169 (1914)
Location of property.
Property of electric company operating in
only one county was assessable in county in
which properly was located although electric
company was owned hy company operating in
several counties Telluride Power Co v dates,
61 Utah 337, 211 P 175 (1923)
Mineral land.
Until there is proof that land has Inst its
character as mineral or mining property, it is
assessable by State Tax Commission Crystal
Lime & Cement Co v Hohhins, 116 Utah 314.
209 P 2 d 739 tPMMi
Where title to land is derived from federal
government through isHiionie of a patent as
mining prnfierty there is a piesuinplion that it
is pro|M>rty of that < haunter Until it is pioved
otherwise Crystal I line A Cement Co v Koh
bins, 116 Utah 314. 209 P 2d 739 (IM49»
"Mines."
The terms "mines' and "mineral

are not
?>?>
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limited to mere subterranean excavations or
wot kings or to the metals or metalliferous deposits whether contained in veins that have
well defined walls or in beds or deposits that
are irregular and are found at or near the surface or otherwise Nephi (Master & Mfg Co v
Juab County, 3 1 Utah 114. 93 P 53, 14 L R A
(n s » 104 1 <14<i7l
Notice of assessment.
Ass< sHrnent of mines was not defective
where notice described property with reason
able certainty as to locality and identity Consolidated Uranium Mines. Inc v Moffitt, 257
F2d 396 (10th O r 1958)
Public utilities.
This section confers no authority upon tax
commission to assess car companies which are
not public utilities Crystal Car Line v State
Tax Coinm'n, 110 Utah 426. 174 P 2d 984
(19461
Separate assessment.
A person in adverse possession of the surface
ground of a mining claim, who has been assessed with su< h surface area and has paid
taxes thereon, may claim adverse possession to
such surface, although owner of mining claim
has paid the taxes thereon Utah Copper Co v
Kckman. 47 Utah 165, 152 P 178 (1915)
Where there is common ownership of both
the surface and mineral rights in land used for
mining purposes, and no request is made that
the surface be taxed on its valuation separately
from (be mines mid mineral rights it IH pro|M*r
foi tbeioiinly otln nils to nggn gale the valua
(ions of both surface and mineral rights in up
plving the tax levy and in all proceedings subsequent thereto Telonis v Staley, 104 Utah
517. 144 P2d 513 (194J)
When the surface and mineral estates of a
mining claim are owned by the same person,
only one tax is assessed on the claim This is
because the statute provides for separate assessment of the surface only when the surface
and mineral estates are owned by different
owners The statute makes no otbei provision
for separate assessment of the two estates
Therefore, separate taxation of surface and
miner.ii interests does not constitute double
taxation because the separate taxes would he
on diflennt property interests United Park
O l v M i m s C n v rsliiii'iif O i g g . 7 17 P2d 173
(Ui.ih I^H/.
I In assessment of the value of tin* surface
iisi ol piopeitv us* d for mining is in addition to
th< pir acre assessment of the mining claim,
and the additional assessment is required
whether the surface is owned by the same

PROPERTY TAX ACT

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.
|)llli«t.H III' HNHfMHOr i l l l d t a X p l i y i ' l S .
E l l e c t o f 4TIOIU-OHM USHeHSUM'Ilt

Natui<* of lax dtlil
Nonresident's property.
Owner's obligation to pay tax
Transfer ol property to tax-exempt cor|M»rution.
Constitutionality.
Section ia not HO vague and uncertain as to
be unconstitutional. Norville v. Stale Tax
Cumin.. 98 Utah 170, 97 IV2d 937, 126 A L R
1318 (1940)
Dutiea of assessor and taxpayers.
It ia duty of assessor to assess all properly at
its value, and it ia likewise duty of every person and corporation having taxable pro|a*rly to
list same for taxation Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v.
Salt l.ake County. tiO Utah 491. 210 IV HNi. 27
A L It. H74 119221
Effect of erroneous asNCNMment.
Failure to assess taxes to owner did not in
validate assessment. Jonea v. Hox Elder
County, 52 F 2d 340 (10th Cir 19311. cert iivn
285 U S . 555. 52 S Ct 45«i. 76 L Kd. 944
119321
Where property is not assessed lo the real
owner, and it IM siild under such assessment, a
tax deed iaaued in purauance thereof has no
binding effect as againat real owner Salt Lake
lnv Co. v. Oregon Short Line It It , 46 Utah
203. 148 IV 4.19 (1915). a (I'd. 246 U S 446. .18
S Ct 348, 62 L. Ed 823 (1918)
Nature of tax debt.
Thia aection aeemn to make the tax a debt
aganiMl the individual owning the pro|ieily
and a lien on bin property, rather than a

charge againat the pm|ieily alone llayea v.
Oihhs, 110 Utah 54. Mill IV2d 781, I6H A L It
513 (1946)
Nonresident's property.
Property brought into this Htate by a nonresident company and uae«l in construction work
for an indefinite period is auhject to taxation in
county where uwd, under Utah Const Art.
XIII. $ 10 Hamilton & Uh-ason Co v. Emery
County. 75 Utah 406. 285 IV 1006 (193(0
Owner'a obligation to pay tax.
Net ord owners of real |»IO|M-I ty on January I,
1964, were ohllguled to pay Ihe 1964 property
tax; if .lanuary I record owner transfers Ins
interest in the property and does not want to be
held liable for the tax, it is his obligation to
make arrungemenls for payment by his transferee. Dillnian v rosier. 656 I* 2d 974 (Utah
I982»
Transfer of property to tax-exempt corporation.
Where a private corporation conveyed property to a tax-exempt municipal corporation
prior lo assessment and levy of taxes under
thia section, the ad valorem lax on the property
was erroneously and illegally levied and collected by the county Utah Parks Co. v. Iron
County. 14 Utah 2d I7H, 380 IV2d 924 (1963)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Personal Obligation
to Pay Real Property Taxes in Utah: Dillman
v hosier, 1983 Utah L Rev H45

59-2-304.
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C.J.S.
84 C.J.S. Tuxutioii ft 376
Key Numbera.
Taxation «-• 310 el seq

Recognition of e x p e n s e s in using comparable
sales or cost appraisal method — Implementation
of n e w program.

(1) If t h e county assessor uses the comparable sales or cost a p p r a i s a l
method in v a l u i n g t a x a b l e properly for assessment purposes, the assessor is
required to recognize t h a t various fees, services, closing costs, and o t h e r expenses related to the transaction lessen the actual a m o u n t t h a t may he received in the t r a n s a c t i o n T h e county assessor shall, therefore, t a k e HiV'A of t h e

v a l u e based on c o m p a r a b l e sales or cost appraisal of t h e property for purposes
of a s s e s s m e n t u n d e r Subsection 59-2-103(1).
(2) (a) Prior to J a n u a r y 1, 1989, t h e commission shall develop a n d implem e n t c o m p a r a b l e sales or cost appraisal methods in v a l u i n g t a x a b l e prope r t y for a s s e s s m e n t purposes which provide t h a t t h e v a r i o u s fees, services, closing costs, and other expenses related to t h e s a l e s t r a n s a c t i o n
and o t h e r i n t a n g i b l e values a r e not included as p a r t of t h e fair m a r k e t
v a l u e for purposes of taxation.
(b) Beginning J a n u a r y 1, 1989, the provisions of S u b s e c t i o n (1) do not
apply. B e g i n n i n g J a n u a r y 1, 1989, t h e commission s h a l l , by r u l e , order
county assessors to use the comparable sales or cost a p p r a i s a l m e t h o d s
which a r e r e q u i r e d to be developed and i m p l e m e n t e d in S u b s e c t i o n (2)(a)
in place of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of Subsection (1).
History: C. 1953, 50 2 304, enacted by L.
1087, ch. 4, ft 72; 1087, ch. 160,ftI.
Amendment Note*. — The 1987 amendment by Chapter 150, effective April 27, 1987,
substituted "1989" lor "1988" in Subsections
(2><a> and (2Kb!
Compiler's Notes.
Former ft 59-5-4 5, as
amended by Laws 1986, ch 115, ft 1, contained
proviaiona similar lo this aection.

Effective Dates.
Laws 1987, ch 4,ft308
makes the act effective on February 6, 1987.
Retrospective O p e r a t i o n . — Laws 1987,
ch. 4, ft 307 provides: "This act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1987, except for
Sections 59 2 201, 59 2 205, and 59 2 207,
which take effect January 1, 1988."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
The provision that reduces by 20'% the value
of county assessed property by comparable
sales or cost materials is constitutional under
Article Xlll of the Utah Constitution and does

not violate the equal protection provisions of
the Utah or United Slates Constitutions Rio
Algom Corp v San Juan County, 681 I' 2d 184
(Utah 1984)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1985 Utah L Rev 131, 207

59-2-305.

Listing property in taxing districts.

T h e county assessor shall list all property in each t a x i n g d i s t r i c t in t h e
county by identifier a n d value. T h e commission m a y prescribe procedures and
formats, after c o n s u l t a t i o n with affected s t a t e a g e n c i e s a n d county assessors,
which will provide reasonable uniformity and reduced costs in listing property.
Retrospective Operation. - Laws 1987,
History: C. 1953, 59-2-905. enacted by L.
ch 4, ft 307 provides: "This act haa retrospec1987, ch. 4.ft73.
tive operation to Junuary 1, 1987, except for
Compiler's No tea.
Former ft 59-5 5. as Sections 59 2 201, 59-2-205, and 59 2 207,
amended by Laws 1982, ch 71,ft23, contained which lake effect January 1, 1988."
provisions similar lo this section
Effective Dates. - Laws 1987, ch 4.ft308
makes the act effective on February 6. 1987

69
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63-46b-16

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

STATE AFFAIRS IN (iENEKAL

(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by 1*
1987, ch. 101, $ 271; 1988, ch. 72, $ 25.
Amendment Notes. —• Tbe 1988 amendment, effective April 25. 1988. deleted "except
that final agency action from informal adjudicative proceedings based on a record shall lie
reviewed by tbe district courts on the record

according to the standards of Subsection
6.1 4*il> Mi.4> at tbe end in Subsection diiui
and made minor stylistic changes
Effective Dates.
Laws 1987. ch 161,
g :i|ft makes tbe mt i-IUtlive on .lanuary I,
|U88

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Section 63-46b-)6(l> provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will Ite reviewed by tbe Utab Supieme Court or Court of Appeals Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as in
termediate appellate court except lo review mformal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to Subsection (I Ma) of this section In re
Topik, 7fil I'2d .12 (Utah Ct App 1988)

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
<b) The appellate rules ol the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
i'.\) The contents, I .
ittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adju<l.<
a- proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c> the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring tesolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(el the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;

63-46b-17

(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63 46b 16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (21(a), and nub
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, ii 26.
stituted "app< Hate rulea of the appropriate apAmendment Notea. — The I9H8 amendpellale couit" (or "Utah Rules ol Appellate Proinent, effective April 25, 1988, auhslituted "Aa icdure" in Subsections <2>«a» and t2Nbl
provided by htalulr. the Supreme Court or tbe
Effective Datea.
Lawa 1987, cb 161,
Court of Appeals" for The Supieme Court or $ ; n f t m a k e H t | l e ttCl e fl e ctive on January 1,
other appellate court designated by statute" in |O,HM
Subsection (1), inserted "with the appropriate
NOTKS TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Subsection (I) provides that all final agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals Therefore, the dia-

trict court will no lunger function as intermediale appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
& 63-46b I5< lHai In re Topik, 761 P 2d 32
(Utab Ct App 1988>

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by I,.
1987, ch. 161, $ 273.
Effective Oaten.
Laws 1987, cb 161.

$ 315 makeb tbe act effective on January I,
I9H8
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78-2-1.5

JUDICIAL CODE

History: L. 1951, ch. 60, I I; C. 1943,
Supp., 104 2 1; L. IM9. ch. 247, ft I; 1986, ch.
47, I 40; 1988, ch. 348, ft 4; 1990. ch. 80. ft 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988. in Subsection
(2>, rewrote the second sentence which read
'Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the
Supreme Court is ten years and until his successor is appointed and approved in accordance
with Section 20 1-7T* and. in Subsection (6),
substituted "determines" for "decides" at the
end of the fourth sentence
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23.
1990. deleted "next" affer ".January" and made
punctuation changes in Subjection (2>; deleted
"not" following "chief justice may" in the third
sentence of Subsection (3); deleted additional"
before "duties" in Subsection (5); deleted

SUPKKMK COURT

"where not inconsistent with the law" following "chief justice** and added "as consistent
with the law" at the end of Subsection <6).
Cross*References. — Chief justice. Utah
Const. Art VIII. Sec 2.
Disqualification in particular case. Utah
Const. Art VIII, Sec 2.
Judicial
nomination
and
selection,
ft 20-1-7 1 et seq.
Membership on state law library board,
ft 371-1.
Proceedings
unaffected
by
vacancy.
ft 78-7-21.
Qualifications of justices. Utah Const., Art.
VIII, Sec 7.
Retirement, Utah Const., Art VIII, Sec. 15;
ft 49-6-101 et seq.. ftft 78 7 29, 78 7-30.
Salary. Utah Const, Art VIII. Sec. 14.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Courts
Jud
• - I. 7 to 12.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
Sft 67. 68
C.J 8.
21 C J S Courts ft 111 et seq ; 48A
( M S Judges ftft 3. 7. 8, 21 to 25, 85.

78 2-1.5, 78-2-1.6.

101

248:

Repealed.

Hepeals - Section 78 2 1.5 (L 1969. ch.
225. ft 21. relating to salaries of Supreme Court
justices, WAS repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182,
ft 4

Section 78 2 I 6<L 1979, ch 134. ft 1; 1981.
ch. 156, ft 1), relating to salaries of justices,
was repealed by Laws 1981. ch 267. ft 2, effective July 1. 1982.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
< I) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
<bl cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
<c> discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(hi) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) (he Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
( 0 final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);

78-2-2

(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(0 taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (0.
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
vict ions", substituted "<f»" for "i\\" at the end of
Subsection (4><g); and made minor stylistic
changes
Cross-References.
Appeals from juve
mle courts, ft 78 3a-51
Appeals in criminal cases, U R Cr I' 26.
Chief justice to preside over impeuchment of
governor, & 77-5 2
Klectioit
contest
appeals. ft<i 20-3-35,
20-15-14
ICxtraordmary writs, Utah Const Art VIII,
Sec 3. U K C P 65B
Industrial commission orders, review of.
ft 35 I 36
Jurisdiction. Utah Const , Art VIII. Sec 3
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of
disciplinary orders, ftft 78 51 14. 78 51 19
Unemployment compensation decisions, leview of, ft 35 4 10

History: C. 1953, 78 2-2, enacted by L.
1986. ch. 47, ft 41; 1987, ch. 161. ft 30.1; 1988,
ch. 248. ft 5; 1989, ch. 67, ft I.
Repeal* and Keenactmenta.
UWH 1986,
rh 47. ft 41 repeals former ft 78-2-2. as enacted
by Laws 1951. ch f>8. ft I, relating to original
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and
enac(8 the above section
Amendment Note*. -- The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "formal adjudicative proceedings" for "canes" in
Subsection <3»(e); added Suhsection <3l<0; redesignated former Subsections t.'lMf) to (3MH accordingly; substituted "<i»" for "lhi" at the end
of Subsection <4Mgl; and made minor stylistic
changes
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24.
1989. added "and Forestry" at the end of Subsection (.iHeHiu), rewrote Subsection (4Ma)
which read "first degree and capital felony con-
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oi an oraer 01 occupancy or me execution of a right
of entry agreement, bears to the taxable year
mi
Article 2. Assessment by C o u n t y Assessor
59-5-4. General duties of covnty assessor - Assessing
interstate earners.
59-5-4.5. Recognition of expenses in using comparable
sales or cost appraisal method.
59-5-5. Listing properly ia cities, towns, school districts
and special taxing 6lstrk\s.
59-5-6. Repon of valuation of properly <o coantv
auditor « Transmittal by auditor to governing bodies •
Certified tax rate.
59-5-7 Listing property brought into county after
January I • Duties of assessor.
59-5-7 1. Transitory personal property brought from
outside state • Assessment • Proration of tas Properly tax in another state • Claims for rebates and
adjust menu.
59-5-4. Statements by taxpayers.
59-5-9. Power of assessors respecting statements •
Oetkt of taxpayer • Penalty.
59-5-10. Assessor to estimate value where taxpayer
refuses to give statement.
59-5-11. Assessor to report information gained to other
counties.
59-5-12. In name of owner, mandatory, if known • If

unknown.
59-5-13. Assessment in name of representative Designation.
59-5-14. Assessment of property of decedents.
59-5-15. Assessment of property in litigation.
59-5-16. Assessment of concealed property - Penally.
59-5-17. Properly escaping assessment • Five-year
limitation period on assessment • Duties of assessor.
59-5- I t . Assessment in name of claimant as well as
owner.

59-5-4. General duties of county assessor Assessing interstate earners.
The county assessor shall, before May 15 of each
year, ascertain the names of all taxable inhabitants
and ail property in the county subject to taxation
except that assessed by the State Tax Commission
and shall assess the property to the person by whom
it was owned or claimed, or in whose possession or
control it was, at 12 o'clock m. of January 1 next
preceding, and at its value on that date, unless a
subsequent conveyance of ownership of the real
property has been duly recorded in the office of the
county recorder more than 14 calendar days before
the date of mailing of the tax notice, in which case
the tax notice may be mailed to the new owner. No
mistake in the name of the owner or supposed
owner of property renders the assessment invalid.
Assessors shall become fully acquainted with all
property in their respective counties, and, either in
person or by deputy, shall annually visit each separate distnet and establish the values of the property
they are required to assess. When assessing contract,
private, and exempt earners covenng interstate
routes, the county assessor shall apportion the assessment for the rolling stock used in interstate
commerce at the same percentage ratio that has been
filed with the Prorate Department of the Motor
Vehicle Division of the tax commission for determining the proration of registration fees.
in*
59-5-4.5. Recognition of expenses In using
comparable sales or cost appraisal method.

(1) When the county assessor uses the comparable
sales or cost appraisal method in valuing taxable
property for assessment purposes, the assessor is
required to recognize that various fees, services,
closing costs, and other expenses related to the transaction lessen the actual amount that may be recCode o Co
Pro«o. t t a *

eived m the transaction. The county assessor shall,
therefore, take 80**i of the value based on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the propeny as its
reasonable fair cash value for purposes of assessment.
(2Ma) Prior to January I, 1988. the State Tax
Commission shall develop and implement comparable sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing
taxable propeny for assessment purposes which
provide that the various fees, services, closing costs,
and other expenses related to the sales transaction
and other intangible values are not included as part
of the reasonable fair cash value for purposes of
assessment.
(b) Beginning January 1, 1988, the provisions
of Subsection (U do not apply to county assessors
using the sales or cost appraisal method in valuing
taxable propeny for assessment purposes. For assessments beginning January 1, 1988, the State Tax
Commission shall by rule order county assessors to
use the comparable sales or cost appraisal methods
which are required to be developed and implemented
in Subsection (2Xa) in place of the requirement of
Subsection (1).
its*
59-5*5. Listing property in cities, towns, school
districts and special taxing districts

The list of the propeny in each city, town, school
distnet, and special taxing district in his county, arid
the valuation thereof, shall be so made by the
county assessor that the propeny in each and the
valuation thereof can be separately shown.
\m
59-5-6. Report of valuation of property to county
auditor • Transmittal by auditor to governing
bodies - Certified tax rate.

[\) Before June \ of each year, the county assessor of each county shall deliver to the county
auditor a statement showing the aggregate valuation
of all taxable propeny in each taxing district, together with a statement showing the assessed valuation
of any additional personal propeny estimated by the
county assessor to be subject to taxation in the
cunent tax year. The county auditor shall, on or
before June I, transmit this statement together with
the certified tax rate and all forms necessary to
submit a tax levy request, to the governing body of
each taxing district.
(2Xa) The 'certified tax rate" means a tax rate
that will provide the same ad valorem propeny tax
revenue for each taxing distnet as was charged for
the pnor year by that taxing entity, except in the
case of the minimum school levy established under
Section 53-7-18 and any debt service voted on by
the public under Section 53-7-8.1, in which case
the certified tax rate shall be the actual levy imposed
by those sections. The certified tax rate shall be
established in accordance with Section 59-9-8.
For new taxing districts, the certified tax rate shall
be zero.
(b) For the purpose of calculating the certified
tax rate the county auditor shall use the taxable roll,
exclusive of new growth. New growth is the increase
in value of the taxing district from the previous
calendar year to the current year less the amount oi
increase to locally assessed real propeny values resulting from factoring, reappraisal, or any othei
adjustments.
(c) As used in this chapter, 'taxing distnet"
means any county, city, town, school distnet,
special taxing distnet, or any other political subdivision of the state with the authonty to levy a tax
on propeny.
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chapter" arc omitted a* unnecessary in
view of the restatement. The words "in
the enforcement or administration of
any provision of this chapter" in
49:305(f) are omitted at unnecessary in
view of the restatement
The words
"and safety" in 49:303(0 are omitted as
being transferred 10 the Secretary of
Transportation.
In subsection (b). the words "When an
investigation under this subtitle" are substituted for "Whenever In any Investlga
tlon under the provisions of this chapter.
or in any investigation Instituted upon
petition oT for clarity. The words "providing transportation or service subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission
under subchapter I or IV of chapter 105
of this title" are Inserted for clarity. The
words "Is about a" are etabetituted for

§

11503.

"shall be brought In Issue" for clarity
The words "made or imposed by" arc
omitted as surplus. The words "dispoting o T are substituted for "proceeding to
hear and dispose oT for clarity and at
being more inclusive,
In subsection (c). the words "subchapter
I I I of chapter 105" are used to
•»•*« , h * •ubsecilon apply to water
carriers since the words "under the provisions of this section" require thai re
auh In view of 4V.I30) The words "in
cases pending before the Commission*
are omitted m» unnecessary In view of
the restatement. The words "may be
given" are substituted for "shall receive"
for clarity The words "may determine"
are substituted for "shall provide" for
clarity

T a x d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t r a i l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n property

(a) In this section—
(1) "assessment" means valuation for a property lax levied by
a taxing district.
(2) "assessment jurisdiction" means a geographical area in a
State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad
valorem taxation.
(J) M rail transportation property" means property, as defined
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, owned or used by a
rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission under subchapter 1 of chapter 105 of this
title.
\
(4) "commercial and industrial property" means property,
other than transportation property and land used primarily for
agricultural purposes or limber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy.
(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate
against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or
authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any
of them:

(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate
applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same
assessment jurisdiction.
(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission under subchapter 1 of chapter 105 of this title.
(c) Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 and without regard to
the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district
court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other
jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to prevent
a violation of subsection (b) of this section. Relief may be granted
under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true
market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at least 5
percent, the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other
commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. The burden of proof in determining assessed value and
true market value is governed by State law. If the ratio of the
assessed value of other commercial and industrial propeity in the
assessment jurisdiction to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property cannot be determined to the satisfaction of the district court through the random sampling method
known as a sales assessment ratio study (to be carried out under
statistical principles applicable to such a study), the court shall find,
as a violation of this section—
(1) an assessment of the rail transpoi tation property at a
value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail
transportation property than the assessed value of all other
property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of all other commercial
and industrial property; and
(2) the collection of an ad valotcin property tax on the rail
transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the lax ratio
rate applicable to taxable property in the taxing district.
(Pub L. 95-^73, Oct. 17. 1978. 92 Stat 1445 )
Historical and Statutory Notes

(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a
Revised Section
Source (U.S.Code)
Source (Statutes at Large)
higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation
property than the ratio that the assessed value of other com11503
49.26c
l-cb 4, 1887. ch 104. 24 Slat 379.
mercial and industrial property in the same assessment juris$ 28. added Feb 5. 1976.
Pub I 94-210. § 306. 90 Stat
diction has to the true market value of the other commercial
54. Oct
19. 1976. Pub L
and industrial property.
94-555. % 220(o). 90 Stat 2630
(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be
made under clause (1) of this subsection.
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7 Motor vehicle salesman:
(a) application for license;

RSS4-24-SP. Abaumeat or Deferral of Property
Taxes of ladigeat Persoea Purssmat to Utah Code
A M . SecrJoas 59-2-1107 through 59-2-1109

(b) salesman bond as prescribed m Utah Code
\nn. Section 41-3-17;
A. All sources of cash income shall be included in
(c) picture of the applicant; and
arnvuif at annual gross income, including net rents,
(d) the fee required by law.
interest, retirement income, welfare, social security,
3 Distributor factory branch, distributor branch
etc.
representative:
B. Absence from the residence due to vacation,
<tf / iwUcattoa for license; ia4
/ confinement to hespttii, or other juni/ar temporary
(b) the fee required by law.
situation shall not be deducted from the time requi9 New applicants may also be required to attend
rement of ten-month's residency.
in orientation class on motor vehicle laws and mocor
C. Written notification %h^il be given to any appvehicle business laws before their license is issued.
licant whose application for abatement or deferral is
l*r
41-1-4. 41-3-5. 41-3-Q, 41.3-27. 41-3-21. 41-3denied.
J . 41-34, 41-3-4. 41-3-12

R884. Property Tax
RSS4-24. Property Tat

R884-24. Property Tax
RSS4-24-5P. Abatement or Deferral of Property Tait*
of ladigeat Persoat Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa.
Sectlooj 59-2-1107 through 59-2-1109
R8S4-24-7P. Assessneat of Miaiag Propertka Pursuit
to Utah Code A M . Sectioa 59-2-201
RSS4-24-SP. Property Tax Withholding For Uraaiaai
aod Vtaadiuai Mlaes Parsaaat to Utah Code Aaa.
Sectioa 59-2-210 tad 59-2-211
RSS4-24-10P. Tixatioa of Uadergroaad RJfbts la L a * *
That Coataias Deposits of Oil or Gas Parsaaat to Utah

CAO> A»B. Setitom S*2-2*h 59-2-2)1 MM* $*2-211
RSS4-24-14P. Historic Pmerratioa Easeneats Parsaatj
to Utab Code Aaa. Sectfoas 63-UA-l throagb *
Rgg4-24-16P. AssessoKat of Interlocal Cooperadoa A «
Proiect Eatity Properties Pamaat to Utah Code A * * .
Sectioa 11-13-25(4)
RSS4.24-17P. Reappraisal of Real Property by Coaaty
Assessors Parsaaat to Utah Coastitutioa, Ankle Xlrj,
Sabseetioas 2 too 11, tad t u b Code Aaa. Sectioa* 592-lt3, 59-2-302, aad 59-2-704.
RS04-24-19P. Appraiser CeriifkatkNi Profraai Pars*a«t
to t u b Code Aaa. SecHoas 59-2-701 aad 59-2-702
RSS4-24-20P. CoastracHoa Work ia Progress Parsaaat
to Utah Coast. Ait. XUI. Sectioa 2; Utah Code Aa%.
Sectioa 59-1-1; tad Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-51.
RtS4-U.24P. For* for Notice of Property Valaadoa
aad Tax Caaagrs Pirsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa
59-2-919
RSS4-24.25P. Procedure for Abeyaacc of 190* Property
Tax Excaipdoa fleariafs For Noaproflt Hospitals a**
Nanlaf HOOKS Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Scctio*
59-l-21t
RtS4-24-2oT. Reqairtaeats of tbc Fanaiaad AssessBMat
Act of 19#9 Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Seetloas So.
2-5*1 throagb 59-2-515
RU4-24-27P. Staadards for Assesssaeat Level
Perfonaaace Parsaaat to t u b Code Aaa. Sectioa So,
RH4-24-2SP. Reportlat Reqaireaeatt For Leased or
Reated Persoaal Property, Parsaaat to Utab Code \ « m #
Sectioa 59-1.219
RSS4-24-29P. Taxable HoaatboM Faraishiags Parsaaat
to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-103
RgS4-24-32P. Leasehold (Teaaat) Isaproveacats
Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-102
Rg*4-24-33P. Persoaal Properly Valnatloa Galdes aad
Schedules Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59*1.
210
RIS4-24-34P. Use of Appraisal lafortaadoa Gathered \m
Coa|aactioa With Assessmeat/SaJes Rado Studies
Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-704

RSS4-24-7P. Assessment of Vflniag Properties
Parsaaat to Utab Code Aaa. Sectioa 59-2-201
A. Definitions.
1. 'Mining property' means afl taxable interests in
real property, improvements, and tangible persoaal
property owned or used in mining, processing, or
transportation of the product to the customary point
of sak or to the implied point of sale in the case of a
self-consumed mineral for both metalliferous and
nonmetalliferous mines.
2. 'Gross income' means actual receipts, plus the
fair value of self-consumed minerals.
a. The fair value of self-consumed mmer^is is
determined annually by the Property Tax Division to
be either:
(1) allowable costs, plus an amount equal to allowable costs times the capitalization rate. Where the
taxpayer has outside sales and self-consumed,
minerals, the allowable costs shall be allocated
I between the two on the basts of the respective units
of measure in each category; or
J2) value based upon representative sales price per
ton or other standard unit of measure of a like
mineral.
b. The method approved cannot be changed from
year to year uniess approved by the Tax Commission.
3. "Allowable costs" means costs deductible in the
respective year, limited to the following:
a. management salaries;
b. labor;
c. payroll taxes and benefits;
d. workers' compensation insurance;
e. general insurance;
f. taxes;
g. supplies and tods;
h. power;
i. maintenance and repairs;
j. office and accounting;
k. engineering;
1. sampling and assaying;
m. treatment;
n. legal fees;
o. royalties;
p. development expense;

q. tnospotwum;
r. miscellaneous; and
s. capital expenditures.
(I) No deduction is allowed for interest or mine
exploration costs.
4. "Net revenue* means gross income minus allowable costs.
5. "Capital expenditure' means the total cost of
purchasing an asset used in the mining operation and
includes:
a. purchase price,
b. transportation costs.
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c transportation costs,

d. installation charges, and
c sales tax
6 "Nonproducing mine" means a mine that has
been ciosed for a continuous 12-month period, or
land held in reserve under a mineral lease not reasonably necessary, indispensable, or needed tn the
actual mining and extraction process in the current
tax year
B The capitalization rate shall be determined by
the Tax Commission using methods such as:
1 the summation method;
2 the weighted cost of capital
a The cost of debt should consider current market
yields.
b The cost of equity shall be determined by the
capital asset pricing model, nsk premium model,
discounted cash flow, or a combination thereof or
any other accepted methodology.
C. The income indicator of value shall be computed as follows:
1. annual net revenue, both net losses and net
gams, from the mining property for each of the
immediate past Ave yean (or years in operation if
less than five years), shall be adjusted by an appropriate index of inflation;
2. average annual net revenue is the sum of the
values obtained above divided by the number of
yean; i.e., five or less;
3. the average annual net revenue is divided by the
capitalization rate.
D. Reporting shall be on a calendar or fiscal year
basis consistently followed, with Tax Commission
approval.
RSS4-244P. Property Tax Withholding For
Uranium and Vanadium Mines Pursuant to Utah
Code Ana. Section 59-2-210 and 5*-2-211
A. A list of mine owners and operaton who have
made lump sum security deposits with the Tax
Commission wii) be furnished annually by the Commission to any person, mill, buying station, or other
legal entity receiving uranium or vanadium ore
mined, produced, or received from within Utah.
B. If not on the Tax Commission's original, or
subsequently updated list, the security deposit shall
be obtained through withholding as provided below:
1. Any person, mill, buying station, or other legal
entity receiving uranium or vanadium ore mined,
produced, or received from within Utah shall withheld 4 percent (or such higher amount as determined
by the Tax Commission) of the gross proceeds due to
the mine operaton or owners.
2. All amounts withheld shall be remitted to the
Tax Commission by the last days of April, July,
October, and January for the immediately preceding
calendar quarter, on forms and in a manner as set
forth by the Tax Commission.
3. Not later than the last day of February, the
ownen or operaton of each uranium and vanadium
mine shall be provided with a statement from the
Tax Commission showing all security deposit
amounts withheld from their gross proceeds during
the previous calendar year.
4. The Tax Commission shall provide the county
treasurers with a list of all uranium and vanadium
producers who have had security deposit amounts
withheld. The county treasurers shall then forward to
the Tax Commission an accounting of the amount of
taxes due from each taxpayer on the Tax Commission's list.
5. Once all county treasuren have responded, the

Tax Commission shall forward to each county treasurer the taxes due, or the pro rata portion thereof,
to the extent said taxes have been withheld and
remitted to the Tax Commission
a Any amount withheld in excess of the total taxes
due to all counties shall be refunded to the appropriate producer by the Tax Commission.
b If the amount withheld is not sufficient to pav
the full amount of taxes due, the county treasurers
shall collect the balance of said taxes directly from
the producers
RSS4-24-10P. Taxation of Underground Rights In
Land That Contains Deposits of Oil or Gas
Punuant to t u b Code \an. Sections 59-2-201,
59-2-210, aad 59-2-211
A. Definitions.
1. 'Person* as defined in Utah Code Ann. Section
6&-3-12.
2. 'Unit' as defined in Utah Code Ann. Section 59*
2-2KX3XF).
3. "Working interest owner' as defined in Utah
Code Ann. Section 59-2-210.
4. "Unit operator' means a person who operates
all of the producing wells in a unit.
5 "Independent operator* means a person operating an oil or gas producing property not in a unit.
6 One person can, at the same tune, be a unit
operator, a working interest owner, and an independent operator and must comply with all requirements of this rule based upon his status in the various
situations.
B. Assessment Procedures.
1. Underground rights in lands containing deposits
of oil or gas and tangible property used in the operation of such rights, are subject to assessment by the
Tax Commission.
S
2. These rights and the tangible property used
therewith shall be assessed in the name of the unit
operator, the independent operator or other person
as the facts may warrant.
3. The taxable value of the underground oil rights
shall be 400 percent of the proceeds from the sale of
od production from each such property during the
calendar year prior to the date of assessment, less
applicable exempt federal, state, Indian royalties, and
windfall profits tax.
4. The taxable value of the underground gas rights
shall be 400 percent of the proceeds from the sale of
gas production from each such property during the
calendar year pnor to the date of assessment, less
applicable exempt federal, state, and Indian royalties.
5. The reasonable taxable value of productive
underground oil and gas rights shall be determined
by the method described in Subsections B.l. or B.2.
of this rule or such other valuation method that the
Tax Commission believes to be reasonably determinative of the property's fair market value.
6. All other tangible property shall be valued at
fair market value as determined by the Tax Commission.
C. Assessment Credits Greater Aitamont/Bluebell
Field
1. Oil properties in the Greater Aitamont/Bluebell
field shall receive a credit of 20 percent. All qualified
property shall therefore be valued at 80 percent of
the taxable value. This credit does not apply to gas
production.
2. The Greater Altamont/Bluebefl field is actually
comprised of three separate fields. These include
Aitamont field. Bluebell field, and Cedar Rim field
as recorded by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and
CoofCo
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AMAX MAGNLSIUM CORP. v TAX COM'N

PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SKKIKS

AMAX MAGNESIUM
CORPORATION. Petitioner.
v.
UTAH STATK TAX
COMMISSION. Respondent.
No. 880251.
Supreme Court of Utah
July 18, 1990

Taxpayer sought review of decision of
the Tax Commission The Supreme Court,
Hall, C J , held that (1) taxpayer's plant at
which magnesium was extracted from
brine waters of the Great Salt l*ake was
subject to assessment by the state, rather
than county, as a facility appurtenant to a
mining operation, but (2) it was not consti
tutionally permissible for state to assess
property of HM>7< of its value while county
assessed property at 80/# of the value
Reversed and remanded
Stewart, J , filed an opinion concurring
in the result in which Howe, Associate C J ,
concurred

I

Taxation «=M93.8
When reviewing final decisions of the
Tux (Commission, Supreme (Court shows no
deference to the Commission's conclusions
as to the legality or constitutionality of tax
statutes, as those are conclusions of law
2. Constitutional Law *»48<4>
In any challenge to the constitutional!
ty of a tax statute, petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating its unconstitution
ality
3. Statutes <*=»205
Principal rule of statutory construction
is that the terms of a statute should not be
interpreted in a piecemeal fashion, but as a
u hole
4 Statute* e=>189
Statute must be read according to its
literal wording, unless it would be unrea
sonahly confusing or inoperable

Utah
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5. Statutes «=2I2
It is presumed that a statute is valid
and that words and phrases were chosen
carefully and advisedly
6. Taxation «=>I58
Taxpayer's plant which extracted mag
neaium from brine waters in evaporation
ponds owned by the state and the federal
government fell within the category of "all
pro|ierty or surface improvements upon or
appurtenant to mines or mining claims,"
for purposes of statute subjecting mines
and appurtenant property to property taxa
tton by the state rather than the county
Const Art 13, § 4 , U ('A 1953, 59-5-3
(Repealed)
7. Taxation «=»347
Property must be assessed at its just
value and owners of property must bear an
equal proportion of the tax burden in pro
portion to the amount of property owned
8. Taxation *=»4<M8)
If both just value and equal propor
tionality cannot be obtained because some
assessments are made at a fixed percent
age of true value, equality must prevail so
that fixed percentage of true value is uni
formly applied
9. Taxation «=»4u<8)
Assuming that legislature was correct
in determining that market value appraisal
method overvalues property by 20'^, it
would be unconstitutional to apply statute
reducing overall assessment by 20VG to
properties which were assessed by counties
but not to properties assessed by the state
U C A 1 9 5 3 , 59-5-4 5 (Repealed), Const
Art 13, §$ 2, 3
10 Constitutional Law <£=>209
Constitutional provision requiring that
all laws of a general nature have uniform
operation is Utah's equal protection clause
Const Art 1, § 24

been expensed rather than included as a
capital investment
The Tax Commission
confirmed all other aspects of the property
tax division's assessment and refused to
appl> section 59 5-4 5 to reduce Amax's
assessment by 20 percent
Amax filed a
petition for reconsideration, which the Tax
Commission denied by order dated May 31,
1988 Amax then filed a petition for a writ
of review with this court on June 29, 1988
Amax is a company the mam function of
which is to extract magnesium from the
brine waters of the Great Salt l^ake
Amax is the fee owner of approximately
Mark K Buchi, David K Detton, Richard
seven square miles of land in Tooele Coun
G Wilkins, Salt I>ake City, for petitioner
ty, Utah, and maintains improvements on
the real property in the form of various
R Paul Van ham, Stephen G Schwendi
man, L A Dever, Salt I,ake City, and Ron
buildings and facilities (collectively re
aid L Klton, Tooele, for respondent
ferred to as the "plant") designed to aid m
the extraction of magnesium from the
James R l * e , Kent W Winterholler, Salt
brine
I>ake City, for amicus Utah Mm Ass'n

12 Taxation <s=*40<8)
Assuming that legislatively created
classifications of state assessed property
and county assessed property are legit
imate with regard to county properties as
sessed bv, comparable sales or cost apprais
al methods and state properties assessed
by other methods, classifications would not
be valid where the state and counties prop
erties are both assessed by the comparable
sales or cost appraisal met hod, but count \
values are reduced by 20'/.
U C A 1953,
59-5-4 5 (Repealed), Const Art 1. § 24

Bill Thomas Peters, Harriet E Styler,
Salt l<ake City, for amicus Utah Ass'n of
Counties
HALL, Chief Justice
This case is before the court on a writ of
review from a Utah State Tax Commission
("Tax Commission") decision determining
the 1986 assessed value of petitioner Amax
Magnesium Corporation's ("Amax") real
and |iersonal property located in Tooele
County, Utah
The Tax Commission originally assessed
the value of Amax's property as of January
1, 1986, at $84,332,150 After an informal
hearing held on August 25, 1986, the Tax
Commission reduced the assessed value of
Amax's property to $78,312,895
The Tax Commission thereafter held a
plenary formal hearing to determine the
fair market cash value of Amax's property
Amax sought a 20 percent redu( lion of the
assessed fair market cash value of its prop
erties pursuant to Utah Code Ann
§ 5 9 - 5 - 1 5 (1953 & Supp 1986) On Decern
ber 21, 1987, the Tax Commission issued a
final decision further reducing the assessed
value of Amax's property by approximately
$6,000,000 based upon the Commission s
finding that dike maintenance should have

11 Constitutional Law e»!6<l>
If challenged statute cannot withstand
attack under State Constitution, there is no
reason to reach federal equal protection
question
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Amax obtains its concentrated brine solu
tion principally from a series of evapo
ration ponds located along the shores of
the Great Salt I^ake and close to the plant
Although Amax owns the plant, the evapo
ration ponds are located on land owned by
the state of Utah and the federal govern
ment Amax pays a royalty to the state of
Utah for the nonexclusive right to extract
minerals from the Great Salt l^ake
The Tax Commission assessed Amax as a
mining operation pursuant to Utah Code
Ann §& 59-5-3 and 59-5^-1 (1953 & Supp
1986) at 100 percent of its fair market cash
value On appeal, Amax asserts that (1) it
is not a mine and therefore not subject to
assessment by the stale pursuant to sec
Hon 59 5-3, (2) it should be assessed by
Tooele County and receive a 20 percent
reduction in the assessment for fair market
cash value pursuant to Utah Code Ann
§ 59-5 4 5 (1986), and (3) even if Amax is
assessed by the state and not Tooele Coun
ty, it would violate the equal protection
guarantees of the Utah Constitution and
the United States Constitution for the state
not to apply section 59 5-4 5 to Amax's
assessment in the same manner as if Amax
were assessed bv, 'looele County

Cite a» 746 P 2d l2Vt (Utah

11,2) When reviewing the final decision
>f the Tax Commission, this court shows no
leference to the Tax Commission's conelulion as to the legality or constitutionality
>f tax statutes because they are conclulions of law ' In any challenge to the
onstitutinnality of a tax statute, the petiloner has the hunlen of demonstrating its
jnconst itutionality }
1 TAX ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Anmx's first contention is that it is nether a mine nor a mining operation and its
aeilitics should not he "deemed appurtelant" to a mining operation, subjecting it
o assessment hy the Tax Commission 3
pursuant to section 59-5-3. Section 5 9 - 5 - 3
cads in pertinent part:
|A|I1 other mines and mining claims and
other valuable deposits, .
nil machinery used in mining and all pro|M»rty or
surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims . .. must
he assessed by the State Tax Commission
For the purposes of taxation
all mills, reduction works, and smelters
used exclusively for the pnipo •• of reducing or smelting the ores from a mine
or mining claim hy the owner thereof
shall lie deemed to lie appurtenant to
such mine or mining claim though the
same is not upon such mine or mining
claim

metalliferous or nonmetalliferous valuable
mineral." Although the Tax Commission
found that Amax, by its processes, "is obtaining metal products from the brine and,
therefore, is effectively 'mining,'" the
Commission focused its conclusion of law
on the determination that Amax's plant
should he "deemed appurtenant" to a mining operation pursuant to section 59-5-3.
The issue here is not whether the Amax
plant is a mine or mining operation, hut
rather whether it is "deemed appurtenant
to such mine or mining claim.
"'
|31 A principal rule of statutory construction is that the terms of a statute
should not be interpreted in a piecemeal
fashion, but as a whole.'* The plant and the
evaporation ponds function as a unit, and
the plant is generally dependent upon the
ponds for the magnesium it produces.*
|4,5|
A second rule of statutory construction mandates that a statute be read
according to its literal wording unless it
would be unreasonably confusing or inoperable. 7 It is presumed that a statute is valid
and that the words and phrases used were
chosen carefully and advisedly."

Amax argues that it is neither a mine nor
a mining claim as defined in Utah Code
Ann. § 59-;t-l(K) (Supp. 198ft), which states:
" 'Mine' means a natural deposit of either

( 6 | The integration of the plant and the
eva|M>ration |K>nds (mine) in the magnesium
extracting process and the practical interpretation and literal wording of the statute
make it clear that the Amax plant falls
under the category of "all proj>erty or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to
mines or mining claims"
Hecause the
Amax plant is property or a surface im-

1.

5.

County Bd of Equalization of Salt Iake County
i Nupeao AWK*,
77« P 2d 11*8. 1139 (Utah
l*>8<>). Hurley v. Hoard of Review of the Indus.
Cormn'n. 767 l» 2d *24. S27 (Utah 1988). Kenne
ton Corp v Salt lake County. 702 V 2d 4SI, 4SS
(lliah IQ8S)

2.

Rio Algom Corp v San Juan County. 681 I* 2d
184. 191 (Ulah 1984).

3.

I h r Utah Const Million lequires all mine* lo be
assessed b \ i he Male At licit* XIII vet m m II
Males ' l i t e Slale lax Commission shall atlitiin
isiei and stqieivise l In- lax laws ol I he Slale ll
shall assess mines and public utilities and atlpist
and equalize the valuation and assessment of
pi o p e n v among the several counties"

4.

Utah ( o d e Ann § S9-S-1 (Stipp 1986)

Peav r Hoard of Education of Provo
S<hcH>h, 377 P.2d 490, 492 (1962).

City

6.

The record reflet Is I hat bet a use of the 1983
flood waters and I he lising level of l he (ileal
Sail Lake for subsequent vcais. Amax was required lo puichase a portion of Us hi me fiom
outside suppliers.

7.

Home v Home, 1M P 2d 244. 247 (Utah 1987);
anord (lord v Sail Isike Cm: 434 V 2d 449. 4S|
(lliah 1967)

8.

Mest lordon v Morrison, 6S6 P 2i\ 44S. 446
(Ulah 1982). see genet ally Mills MUSH, hu v.
Snyder, 469 U S I S3. I0S S O 638, %\ L bd.2d
SS6 (I98S)

provement upon or appurtenant to the mine
or mining operation, Amax is properly assessed hy the Tax Commission pursuant to
the Utah Constitution article XIII, § 4 and
Utah Code Ann § 59 5-.1
II.

MEASUREMENT OE TAXABLE
CASH VALUE OE PROPERTY

Amax also contends that even if it should
be centrally assessed by the Tax Commission, it should be assessed at the same
taxable cash value at which Tooele County
would assess
Section 59-5-4 5 allows
county assessors to assess property at NO
percent of its reasonable fair cash value 9
Even though section 59-5-4 5 allows county-assessed property to be assessed at HO
percent of its reasonable fair cash value,
section 59-5-1 requires that all centrally
assessed or state assessed property be as
sessed at KM) percent of its reasonable fair
cash value '•
Specifically, Amax argues that by requiring the state to assess property at KM)
percent of value ami the county to assess
property at 80 percent of value, tin* legisla
lure has created a law that violates sections 2 and II of article XIII of the Utah
Constitution, which require equality and
uniformity in assessing all real and personal property in the state '• Amax also argues that the apparently unequal state and
county assessments violate the equal pro9.

Set lion S9 S-4 S< I) (Stipp 1986) leads m peili
nenl pan
When lite connl\ assessor uses the t o m p a i a
hie sales 01 t osi appiaisal method in valuing
taxable propcitv lot assessment pui poses, the
assessor is requited lo t e i o g m / e ilia! vanous
fees. sei\Kes. t losing <os|s. and oilier ex
penses iflated lo the It ansae lion lessen the
a« lual amount that ma\ be teieived in I he
liausatliou
I he oninlv assessoi shall, theic
foie. take 80° •» til the value based on compaia
hie sales 01 cost appiaisal of the piopeilv as
Us reasonable Ian i ash value lot pui poses ol
assessment

10. Ulah ( o d e Ann § S9 S - | ( l ) ( a ) (Simp 1986)
Males "All lax.idle piojieilv. extept as ollu i
wise piovided l>v law. shall h« assess* <| .it 100" «•
o( its teasou.ihlc lau * ash value
11. Utah Constitution a i l u l e XIII. seiiiou 2(1)
(as amended 1982) teads "All tangible piopeits
in I he stale, nol exempt undei the laws ol ihe
United Slates, oi nuclei this Constitution, shall

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IW0)

tectum of the laws as guaranteed hy the
Utah ('onstitution u
A Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3
Amax's first contention is that the application of section 59-5-4.5 to county assessed properties hut not to Amax's property is a violation of article XIII, sections 2
and A of the Utah Constitution
In Rw
Alyom, we upheld section 59-5-4.5 against
a challenge that it violated the tax uniformity requirement of article XIII, section 3 of
the Utah ('onstitution. The plaintiffs in
Rio Alyom claimed that since section 59-54 5 reduced the tax assessment to county
properties by 20 percent, it caused state-assessed properties to bear the burden of
greater taxes to compensate for the reduced taxes paid by county assessed property owners We held that absent a showing by the plaintiffs (I) that their own
properties were assessed at market value,
(2) that they bear a tax burden greater
than their pro rata share of the property
taxes in the county, and (A) that the "deduction of transaction costs' from comparable sales figures or estimates of cost as
permitted b> section 59-5 4 5 defeats the
constitutional objective of establishing 'a
valuation (that is J fair and equitable in
comparison with and commensurate with
the valuation of other kinds of property,' "
the constitutionality of the statute will be
upheld"
be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in propor
turn to its \aiue. lo he asceilamed as piovided
bv lavs " (I inphasis added ) Ulah Constitution
a i l u l e XIII. seition 3(1) (as amended 1982)
leads in peitinenl pai t
Ihe legislature shall provide hv law a uni
form and equal rale of assessment on all tangible property in the state, a t t o i d i n g lo its value
in money, exit pi .is otherwise piovided in
Set lion 2 ol this Ailule
the I egislaluie
shall p i e s t n b e h\ law such piovisioiis as shall
Miiiic a jusl valuation loi taxation of such
piopeilv. so lhal eveiv person and torpoia
lion shall pav a lax m piopoition to the value
ol his. hei. oi its tangible piopeilv
(I inphasis .uld<d )
12.

Ail

I. <* ? l

Is. Rut Alcorn. 681 P 2d at 192 (quoting United
Slates Smelting.
Refining A Mining Co v
Havnes. I l l Ulah 172. 181. 176 P 2d 622. 627
(|sM7))
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The present case is distinguishable from
Rio Alyom because it involves similar valu
ation processes used by the state and conn
ty assessors and yet results in different
out(OIIM'S and bc»ause Amax is not dial
lenguig the facial validity of the statute,
but only its validity as applied to Amax In
Rio Alyom, the county assessor used the
"comparable sales" method of valuation
that is very sensitive to inflation, while the
Tax Commission used income or other valuation methods that gave very little effect to
the impact of inflation "
An additional distinguishing factor is
that the premise of section 59-5-4 5, that
state assessments and county assessments
are not uniform, was not attacked in Rio
Algom iS The very essence of Amax's ar
gument is that the nonuniformity between
similarly assessed state and county pro|>er
ties engendered by section 59-5-4 5 vio
lates the uniformity clauses of article XIJ I,
sections 2 and .'t of the Utah Constitution
Y
f^j

One of the pur|M>ses for section 59-5-4 5
was a legislative determination that certain
transactional costs actually lessen the
amount received by a seller under the mar
ket value evaluation and, therefore, the
true value of the property to the seller is
less than the assessment '* Another pur
pose for section 59-5-4 5 was a legislative
attempt to equalize the tax burden between
state and county assessments Section 5 9 5-4 5 was initially passed because inflation
caused county assessed properties to tie as
sessed significantly higher than state prop
erties " The remedy contained in section
59-5-4 5 was to reduce the overall county
assessment by 20 percent
| 7 . 8 | Two principles govern the law of
taxation (1) that property be assessed at
its just value, and (2) that the owners of
14

Rio Ai/iom

15

Id .n I'M

681 I* 2d al 189 90

16 Section S9 S 4 S ( | )
l'2d .H 193
17

Rio Aluotn

AMAX MACNESUIM CORP. v. TAX ( O W N

796 PACIFIC KKPOKTKK. 2d SKKIKS

SLC> alu, Ku> AlK„n,

property bear an equal portion of the tax
burden in proportion to the amount of prop
ertv owned ,K If both just value and equal
proportionality cannot be olitaimd because
some assessments are made at a fixed \n r
centage of true value, then equality must
prevail so that the fixed percentage of true
value must be uniformly applud'*
In the present case, the record reflects
that the Tax Commission admits that it
assessed Amax at 100 percent of the cur
rent fair cash value and that its assessor
used the same market value method of
assessment used by county assessors The
only reason Amax's property is assessed at
100 percent of value rather than at K0
percent is that Amax's pro|>erty is required
by the Utah Constitution ** and by stat
ute *' to be taxed as state assessed proper
ty
19J It strains reason to assert that if
assessors using the cost and market ap
praisal methods overvalue county pro|>er
ties, the same overvaluation would not oc
cur with state pro|>erties appraised by the
same methods Assuming that the legisla
ture was correct in determining that the
market value appraisal method overvalues
proj>erty by 20 percent, it would be uncon
stitutional to apply section 59-5-4 5 to
county assessed pro|>erties and not to state
assessed properties
Applying section 5 9 5-4 5 to the facts of this case, we hold that
it would be in violation of the constitutional
mandate of article XIII, sections 2 and 3
that all property be taxed in a uniform and
equal manner if section 59-5-4 5 is not
applied to Amax's property
B

Kqual Protection

110) Our holding that section 59-5-4 5
is unconstitutional as applied to Amax need
19 Hto Almoin 681 I'2d al 194
liKhl to
219 A 2d al 714

681

681 V 2d M 193

18 Id al 194 kitteiy lieu I ight ( a t Assessors
of the losxtt of Kittery. 219 A 2d 728 734 (Me
1966)

20
21

Kiliery

UeU

Ail XIII * I I

Illali Code Aim
1986)

Utah
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I) S4 S \ (IVS) & Supp

not be based solely upon a violation of
article XIII, sections 2 and 'A of the Utah
Constitution, but may also be based upon a
violation of equal protection
In Hlue
( MISS ami Him Shu hi i Statt l~ wt held
that in order to establish a violation of the
equal protection component of the Utah
Constitution i J with regard to taxation, a
party must demonstrate that a law creates
certain classes of persons and that the law
is applied differently to each classification
without a reasonably related legitimate
government purpose l%
( I I I Also in Hlue Cross, we concluded
that the principles and concepts embodied
in the federal equal protection clause " and
the state uniform operation of the laws
provision are substantially similar, but as
we stated in Hlue (Voss
[Ojur examination into the reasonable
ness of economic legislation under article
I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
[the uniform operation of the laws provi
sionj is at least as vigorous as that re
quired bv the federal equal protection
clause, ami piobahly
more so
There
fore, if the statutes under attack can
withstand scrutiny under article 1, sec
tion 24, they will not be found to violate
the federal equal protection clause '*
(Citations omitted, emphasis added ) Con
versely, if the challenged statute cannot
withstand attack under the state constitu
tion, there is no reason to reach the federal
question
Such appears to be the case
here, hence, we do not reach the federal
question
(121 Assuming that the legislatively
created classifications of state assessed
property and county assessed property are
legitimate with regard to county properties
22

779 P2d 634 (Utah 1989)

23. Utah Constitution aiticle I section 24 slates
'All laws ol a general nalttic shall havt uniloim
opcialion
I Ins section ails as tltalis equal
piolcctmn clause
See Hlue ( M>\\ utul Hlue
Siueld i N/ait 779 |» 2d 634 (Utah 1989) AUnoi
tarn tuel Suppls i o i Salt lake Cil\ ( orp 7S2
I'2d 884 (Utah 1988) lhompu>n i Salt Ijike
Lav Li>rp 724 I* 2d 9S8 (Utah 1986). Malatt i
Unt* 693 I'2d 661 (Utah 1984) Johnston i
Stoker 68S »» 2d 539 (Utah 1984) Huker »
Maihaon
607 School,
l» 2d 233BYU.
(Utah 1979)
Reuben
Clark Law
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assessed by the comparable sales or cost
appraisal methods and state properties as
sessed by other methods, the classifications
would not be valid where the state and
tount\ prop* i ties .ire both assessed b\ the
(omparahh sail s or cost appraisal ineth
otls Tin state assessor testified that he
used the cost appraisal method of evalua
tion for Amax's personal property and that
it did not differ in basic theory from the
cost appraisal method used by county as
sessors
The very purpose of section 59-5-4 5 was
to allow a 20 percent reduction where the
comparable bales or cost appraisal methods
of evaluation were used because the legis
lature found that those methods typically
overvalued property by not taking into ac
count transaction costs and other intangi
bles If county properties assessed by the
cost appraisal method receive a 20 percent
reduction and state properties assessed by
the same method receive no reduc Hon, then
section 59-5-4 5 has created two classes of
properties assessed by the cost appraisal
method
and
arbitrarily
discriminated
against one class merely because It is a
state assessed property
Thi& disparity
does not pass the constitutional muster set
out in Hlue (*ro$s
Indeed, there is no
reasonable basis for the classification of
county properties assessed by the cost ap
praisal method versus state assessed prop
erties assessed by similar methods
The
objectives of section 59-5-4 5 are not met
when the same method is used for both
state and county assessments
Finally, there is no reasonable relation
ship between the classification and the pur
pose of the statute, which is to equalize the
tax burdens
In fact, when the same as
24

Blue C ross and Hlue Shield, 779 P 2d al 637

25

Amendment XIV section 1 stales
No stale shall make 01 cnfoicc any taw whlih
s h a l l a h i lil(*e the p i i v l l c g c s 01 i n i l i i u n l l H s of

«. I(I/I ns ol the United Slate* noi shall au\
Stale tic pi i ve an> (Rison ol hlc hbeilN or
piopeilv without the due pun ess ol la* noi
deny to any pcison within its |uiisdielioii the
equal piolection ol the laws
26

Hlue Cross and Hlue Shield. 779 I* 2d al 637

sessnient method is used by the s t a t e as is
used by the county, section 59-5-4.5 merely a g g r a v a t e s the taxing disparity unless
the 20 percent reduction is applied to all
s t a t e properties assessed by the compara
hie sales or cost appraisal methods.
CONCLUSION
Although Amax itself might not be
deemed a mine or a mining o|»cration, its
property
and
facilities
are
properly
"deemed a p p u r t e n a n t " to a mine or mining
o|»eration under A m a x ' s c o n t n ! making
Amax subject to central a s s e s ;
<i by the
Tax Commission
As applied to Amax, section 59-5-4.5 is
not only an unconstitutional violation of
article XIII, sections 2 and tt, but also a
violation of article I, section 24 of the Utah
Constitution. We reverse and remand to
the Tax Commission for the purpose of
calculating the reasonable fair cash value
of Amax's real and personal property purs u a n t to the formula set out in Utah Cx>de
Ann. § 59-5-4.5.
HOWE, Associate C.I., and DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, .I.J , concur.
0
Pfc

STEWART. Justice, concurring in the
result.
Rio A/go HI Cor/i. r Son Juan
County,
f>Kl I'2d I HI (Utah 1984). held that
§ 59-5-4.5, as applied to county assessed
properties, was constitutional, even t h o u g h
,,
that section provides for a va*
i a t is
20 |>ercent less than the " g v
market
value of a property. The constitutionality
of that s t a t u t e rested on the premise t h a t
the reduction in the a s s e s s m e n t r a t e of
county-assessed property was necessary to
effectuate tax uniformity between inflated
county assessed properties and s t a t e as-

sessed properties. The basic cause of the
disparity was that s t a t e assessments were
made on the basis of formulae that were
less responsive to inflation than the formulae used by county assessors.
The Amax proj>erties in the instant case
a r e state -assessed; however, they are not
assessed on the basis of the net proceeds
formula used to assess mines, but on the
basis of a formula typically used by county
assessors. As stated, the crux of Rio Algom was the fact that state assessed properties did not shoulder a fair s h a r e of the
tax burden vis-a-vis the county assessed
properties. That may or may not continue
to be the case. Suffice it to say t h a t the
forties have not addressed the issue.
Nevertheless, I a g r e e that whether an assessment is made by a s t a t e a s s e s s o r instead of a county assessor cannot by itself
justify a different assessment. Since the
disparity between state-assessed and county assessed properties arose because of the
different formulae used by s t a t e a s s e s s o r s
for mines, utilities, railroads, etc., and per
haps t>eeause of administrative and enforcement reasons, it cannot now !>e demonstrated that the value of the petitioner's
parcels should be assessed at a higher rate
than county assessed parcels when they
are valued on a market or cost-of replacement method For that reason, I concur in
the result reached by the majority.
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in the
concurring opinion of STEWART, J.
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Chris DEMOPOLIS, Petitioner,
v.
Dale C A L V I N , T r u s t e e , et al ,
Respondents.
No. 57128-7.
Supreme Court of Washington.
July 2. 1990.
Prior Report: 57 Wash App 47, 7Ko P.2d
804.
O R D E R C.RANTINO MOTION FOR EX
T E N S I O N OF TIME TO FILE PETI
TION FOR REVIEW AND DENYING
PETITION FOR REVIEW
This m a t t e r came before Department I of
the Court on its July 2, 1990, Motion Calendar on Petitioner's Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review. Department I having considered the motion and
the files herein;

ijeuerai coiiuaciwi
i-uunu-n.iau.iv.. »^.
breach of contract and claimed the withheld retainage as a setoff. The Superior
Court, Spokane County, Harold D. Clarke,
.1., granted summary j u d g m e n t to subcontractor and dismissed c o n t r a c t o r ' s counter
claim without prejudice.
Contractor ap
pealed
The Court of Appeals, 5tJ Wash.
App. 74, 782 P.2d 222, affirmed, ami con
tractor's petition review w a s g r a n t e d . The
Supreme Court, Dolliver, J., held that contingent unliquidated counterclaim may be
pleaded as a setoff unless plaintiff can
show prejudice or court finds counterclaim
would make proceedings unwieldy.
Reversed and remanded.

1. C o u r t s <S=>97( I >
Where state and federal rules are the
same and there is little or no authoritative
guidance for s t a t e rule, c o u r t s may look to
decisions and analysis u n d e r federal rule.

Now, therefore, it is hereby

2. Set-Off a n d C o u n t e r c l a i m <3=\%r»< 1), 37

ORDERED:

Contingent unliquidated counterclaim
may be pleaded as a setoff unless plaintiff
can show prejudice or court finds counter
claim would make proceedings unwieldy.
CR i:«h).

That Petitioner's Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review is granted
and the Petition for Review is denied on
the merits.

115 Wash 2d 211
j £ „ W A R R E N . L I T T L E & LUND. INC.,
a Washington corporation.
Respondent,

IJJ-jWinston <Sr Cashatt, Carl E. Huel»er,
Lynden O. Rasmussen, Spokane, for petitioner
Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole,
P.S., l^eslie R. Weatherhead, Spokane, for
respondent.

v.

f If V NUMMC mi!M>

MAX J. KUNEY COMPANY, a
Washington corporation.
Petitioner.
No. 568HMV.
Supreme Court of Washington,
En Ranc.
Sept

i:», 1990.

Reconsideration Denied Nov. 5, 1990
Subcontractor brought suit to recover
retainage withheld by general contractor.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

DOLLIVER, Justice
This case arises from the construction of
two county jails, one in Yakima County and
one in Spokane County. Max J Kuney
Company (Kuney) was the general contractor for both jails; Warren, Little & Lund,
Inc. (WLL) was the mechanical subcontractor.
The parties contracted for the construe
tion of the Yakima County jail in October
1981. After completion, and despite some
problems with the jail, the Hoard of Yaki

TabE
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conflicting affidavits are to be construed in
ICA's favor Behagen v Amateur Basket
ball Association of the United States, 744
F 2d 731, 733 (10th Cir 1984). cert denied,
471 U S 1010, 105 SCt 1879, 85 L Ed 2d
171 (1985)
In determining personal jurisdiction
questions in diversity cases, a two-step
analysis is applied The court must decide
whether the defendants have sufficient
contacts with the forum state so that the
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with
the constitutional requirements of due process See Keeton v Hustler Magazine,
Inc, 465 U S 770, 104 SCt 1473, 79
LEd2d 790 (1984) (the minimum contacts
requirement extends to federal courts sit
ting with diversity jurisdiction) Addition
ally, we must determine whether the law of
the forum state authorizes the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendants See Yar
brough v Elmer Bunker & Associates,
669 F2d 614. 616 (10th ( ir 1982). see also
Hoffman, 575 FSupp at 1469 (stating that
the constitutional minimum contacts test
and the state's jurisdictional statute must
be satisfied)
Initially, we focus on the law of Kansas
ICA asserts that jurisdiction in this case is
proper under subsection 5 of the Kansas
long arm statute, K S A 60-308(b) The
long arm statute provides as follows
(b) Any person, whether or not a citizen
or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent or instrumentality does
any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits the person and, if an
individual, the individual's personal rep
resentative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any cause of
action arising from the doing of any of
these acts
(5) entering into an express or im
plied contract, by mail or otherwise,
with a resident of this state to be per
formed in whole or in part by either
party in this state
K S A 60-308(bM5)
In the instant action, the requirements of
K S A b0-308(bM5) are met ICA and the
defendants entered into a contract for the
installation of an insulation system Under
the contract, ICA installed in the defen
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the [defendants] to defend the particular
[diversity] suit which is brought [in the
federal district court of the forum state]"
International Shoe, 326 U S at 317, 66
S Ct at 158 In making the reasonableness
inquiry, the court must consider several
factore,including
the burden on the defendants], the inter
ests of the forum state, and the plain
tiff's interest in obtaining relief It must
also weigh in its determination "the in
terstate judicial system's interest in ob
taming the most efficient resolution of
controversies, and the shared interest of
the several States in furthering funda
mental substantive social policies '
Asaht Metal Industry Co v Superior
Court, 480 U S 102, 113, 107 SCt 1026,
1034, 94 L Ed 2d 92 (1987) (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U S at 292, 100
S Ct at 564) The court must examine the
quality and the nature of the defendants'
contacts with the forum state to determine
if it is reasonable to hale the defendants
into court in the forum state Kulko v
Superior Court of California, 436 U S 84,
92, 98 SCt 1690, 1696, 56 L Ed 2d 132
(1978)
In the instant action, the defendants en
tered into a contract with ICA, a Kansas
corporation In connection with the con
tract, the defendants made telephone calls
to ICA in Kansas Although they assert
that they did not know the destination of
their calls to the toll free, "1-300" number,
the assertion is not plausible in light of the
fact that they had received literature with
numerous indications that ICA was a Kan
Second, the defendants must "purpose
sas corporation Moreover, Kessler told
fully [avail themselves] of the privilege of
the defendants that ICA was located in
conducting activities within the forum
Kansas Additionally, at least part of the
State " Hanson v Denckla, 357 U S 235,
contract (ICA's design, fabrication, and
253, 78 SCt 1228, 1240, 2 L Ed 2d 1283
partial assembly of the insulation system)
(1958) The purposeful availment requirewas to be performed in Kansas Again,
ment "ensures that [defendants] will not be
the defendants should have been aware
haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
that the contract would be partially per
'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' con
formed in Kansas because of Kessler's
tacts or of the 'unilateral activity of anoth
statements and the literature that they re
er party or a third person ' " Burger King
ceived Given these facts, we find that
Corp v Rudzeuncz, 471 U S 462, 474-75,
asserting jurisdiction over the defendants
105 S Ct 2174, 2183, 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985)
is consistent with the principles of four
Third, the exercise of jurisdiction over
tee nth amendment due process They had
the defendants must be reasonable It
minimum contacts with the state of Kan
must be ' reasonable, in the context of our
sas, and these contacts were the result of
by theto
Howard
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
federal system ofDigitized
government
require
and pursuant to their decision to enter into
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.with a Kansas corporation to be
a contract
dants' New Jersey sports facility an insula
tion system which was designed, fabricated, and partially assembled in Kansas
Thus, the contract was performed in part
by ICA in Kansas, and the conditions of the
long arm statute are satisfied
Next, we address the constitutional requirement of due process The Tenth Cir
cult has endorsed a three prong analysis
for use when considenng due process in
the context of personal jurisdiction See
Rambo v American Southern Insurance
Co, 839 F 2d 1415, 1419 n 6 (10th Cir 1988)
(adopting the three-stage analysis set forth
by the Ninth Circuit in Data Disc, Inc v
Systems Technology Associates, Inc, 557
F 2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir 1977)) As indi
cated in the discussion below, clear bound
aries do not separate the three prongs
First, the defendants must have mini
mum contacts with the forum state In
International Shoe Co v Washington,
326 U S 310, 66 SCt 154, 90 L Ed 95
(1945), and its progeny, the Supreme Court
set forth the minimum contacts test, which
requires that defendants in a state court
action have sufficient contacts with the forum state such that the suit "does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice "' World-Wide Volks
wagen Corp v Woodson, 444 U S 286,
293, 100 SCt 659, 565, 62 L Ed 2d 490
(1980) (quoting International Shoe, 326
U S at 316, 66 S Ct at 158 (quoting Milhk
en v Meyer, 311 U S 457, 463, 61 S Ct 339,
343, 85 L Ed 278 (1940)))

partially performed in Kansas
As the
Tenth Circuit recognized in Continental
American Corp v Camera
Controls
C orp, 692 r 2d 1309 (10th Cir 1982), "mod
ern commercial transactions often involve
little contact with the forum beyond that of
mail and telephone communications, and
defending a suit in a foreign jurtsdic
tion is not as burdensome as in the past"
Id at U14 (citation omitted) Thus, this
court's assertion of jurisdiction does not
offend due process standards
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the
motion of the defendants Sportsplex, Inc ,
and Sportsplex Associates to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction is denied
(o f «IVNUNM*lttTIM>

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah corporation, and the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company, a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH
and State of Utah, Defendants,
and
Salt Lake County, et a l , Defendants
in Intervention
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY. Plaintiff,
v
STATE OF UTAH, et a l , Defendants,
and
Salt Lake ( ounty, et a l , Defendants
in Intervention
Nos C-84-4)839J, C-84-0840J
and 82-C-099KJ
United States District Court
I) Utah, ( D
Dec 19, 1988
Railroads brought action challenging
ad valorem property tax assessments by
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Utah on grounds that assessmenU discriminated against them in violation of Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
The District Court, Jenkins, Chief Judge,
held that Utah discriminated against rail
roads in ita assessments of their ad valorem property tax for two years
Judgment for plaintiff
1 Taxation <s»39<M2)
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act does not require district court
to make state apply a particular evaluation
methodology in determining whether ad valorem property tax assessments discnmi
nate against railroads
49 U S C A
§ 11503
2 Taxation «=»39<X2)
Evidence established that Utah's use
of stock and debt approach to valuing railroads' property, for purposes of ad valorem
taxation, had a rational basis and was not
chosen for discriminatory purpose, therefore, district court would not second guess
state's choice of method in determining
whether ad valorem property tax assess
ments discriminated against railroads in vi
olation of Railroad Revitalization and Reg
ulatory Reform Act 49 U S C A § 11503
3. Taxation *»390<2)
As long as state's methodology for va
luing railroad's property, for purposes of
ad valorem taxation, has a rational basis
and was not chosen for a discriminatory
purpose, district court will not disturb that
choice in determining whether property tax
assessment discriminated against railroad
in violation of Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act
49 U S C A
§ 11503
4 Taxation «=»39<M2)
Utah's application of its valuation
methods, for purposes of valuing railroads'
property for ad valorem taxation, was not
improper, it could not be said that rail
roads Utah chose to compare with com
plaining railroads were not comparable and
any mismatch Utah created by using cur
rent earnings price ratio and applying it to
projected earnings was insignificant

5. Taxation <*=>390(2)
Application to railroad property of
Utah statute, which discounts assessed value of real property an additional 20%, discriminated against railroads under Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
with respect to property values for pur
poses of ad valorem taxation by artificially
increasing ratio for other commercial and
industrial property 49 U S C A § 11503,
U C A 1958, 59-5-4 5
t. Taxation *»390<2)
In determining whether Utah's ad valorem property tax assessments for railroads
discriminates against railroads in violation
of Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act, district court must consider
value of locally assessed real property before Utah statute discounting assessed val
ue of real property in state an additional
20% is applied
49 U S C A § 11503,
U C A 1953, 59-5-4 5
7. Taxation *»39(H2)
Utah discriminated against railroads in
ad valorem property tax assessments in
that it assessed railroad property at higher
rate than it assessed all other commercial
and industrial property within state for
same period 49 U S C A * 11503

& RG) and Southern Pacific (SP)—brought
these consolidated actions to challenge
their ad valorem property tax assessments
for 1984 and 1985 on the grounds that the
assessments discriminated against them in
violation of section 306 of the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
of 1976 (the 4R Act), Pub L No 94-210,
ft 306, 90 Stat 31 54 (1976) The cases
were tried to the court beginning on Febru
ary 9, 1988, and ending on March 17, 1988,
with some brief respites in between The
court heard closing arguments on March
30, 1988 Robert A Peterson and Eric C
Olson represented the plaintiffs UP and D
& RG L Ridd Larson and William A
Marshall represented plaintiff SP Rex E
Madsen, Reed L Martineau and Maxwell
A Miller represented the defendants, and
Bill Thomas Peters represented the defen
dants in intervention, some twenty Utah
counties * There were 788 exhibits, some
of great complexity After digesting the
evidence and the arguments of counsel, the
court now enters this memorandum opinion
and order, which, under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a), shall constitute the
court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law
I

Leonard J Lewis, Robert A Peterson
and Eric C Olson, VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, for
Union Pacific R Co
L Ridd Larson and William A Marshal,
Salt Lake City, Utah, and Wm E Saul, San
Francisco, Cal, for Southern Pacific
Transp
Stephen G Schwendiman and Maxwell A
Miller, Asst Attys Gen, Bill Thomas Pe
ters and Gary Thorup, Sp Asst Atty Gen,
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler, Salt Lake
City, Utah, for defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
JENKINS, Chief Judge
The plaintiff railroads—Union Pacific
(UP), the Denver & Rio Grande Western (D

THE STATUTE
In 1976, in part to "restore the financial
stability of the railway system of the Unit
ed States," Pub L No 94-210, § 101(a), 90
1

The intervening counties are Box Flder
Cache Carbon Davis Emerv Grand Iron
Juab Millard Morgan Piute Salt l-ake San
pete, Sevier Summit Tooele Utah Wasatch
Washington and Weber

2.

The wording and structure of section 306 were
changed when the section was recodified as part
of the revised Inteistate Commerce Act See Act
Assessed value of rail transpoitaiion
property

?

SUt 31, 33 (1976), Congress passed me *n
Act Section 306 of the act, codified at 49
U S C § 11603, prohibits states and local
taxing authorities from discriminating
against railroad property
That section
makes it unlawful for a state to assess
railroad
transportation property at a value which
bears a higher ratio to the true market
value of such trans|>ortation property
than the ratio which the assessed value
of all other commercial and industrial
property in the same assessment junsdic
tion bears to the true market value of all
such other commercial and industrial
property
Id § 306(1 )(a), 90 Stat at 54 f A railroad
that thinks it has been treated unfairly
may bring an action in federal district court
for injunctive and declaratory relief Id
§ 306(2) The court is then required to
compare two ratios the ratio of the as
sessed value of rail transportation property
to its true market value, and the ratio of
the assessed value of all other commercial
and industrial property in the same assess
ment jurisdiction to its true market value
The court may grant relief to the railroad
only if the ratio of assessed value to true
market value for rail transportation proper
ty "exceeds by at least 5 per centum the
ratio of assessed value to true market val
ue, with respect to all other commercial
and industrial property in the same assess
ment jurisdiction" (in this case, the state of
Utah) Id § 306(2Kc)s
of Oct 17 1978 Pub I No 9S-473 § 11503 92
Slat 1337 1445-46 Because the recodification
was not mr ml to change the substantive law
see id § 3(a) 92 Stat at 1466 this court will use
the original language of section 306 for conve
nience and clarity
3

The court s analysis can be expressed by a
simple equation

Assessed value of all other commer
cial and industrial
property
y 105

True market value of rati iranspor
tatton property

At the time of the assessments at issue in this
case Utah law required that all taxable property
in the state not specifically exempt fiom taxa
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True market value of all other com
rnerual and industrial property
tion be assessed at 20% of its reasonable fair
cash value
See Utah Code Ann § 59-5-1
(Supp 1985) see also infra note 6 ( reasonable
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The plaintiff railroads claimed that Utah
had discriminated against them in two
ways by overvaluing their property and
by denying them a twenty percent discount
in their assessed value that was available
to locally assessed commercial and industrial real property under Utah law, Utah Code
Ann § 59-5-4 5 (Supp 1986) Plaintiff SP
settled its valuation claim with the state
before trial
At the trial, the parties
presented the court with a stipulation set
ting forth two alternatives for the ratio of
assessed value to true market value for all
other commercial and industrial pro|>erty in
Utah—one ratio if the court upholds the
twenty percent discount statute and auoth
er if the court strikes down the twenty per
cent discount statute * Because the rail
roads' assessed value is given, see infra
note 48 and accompanying text, the only
issues for the court to decide are the true
market value of the UP and D & RG as of
the assessment dates (January 1, 1984, and
January 1, 1985) and the allegedly discrimi
natory effect of the twenty percent dis
count statute
The court will consider
these issues in order
II
THE PLAINTIFFS'
VALUATION CLAIMS
Plaintiffs UP and D & RG claim that
Utah has discriminated against them by

overvaluing their rail transportation property for the assessment years 1984 and
1985 § To determine whether that is so,
the court must determine the plaintiffs'
true market value and then compare that
figure to the state's assessed value, which
was baaed on the state's determination of
the plaintiffs' true market value* Under
Utah law, the plaintiffs' assessed value for
assessment years 1984 and 1985 should
be 20 of their true market value See
supra note 3 If it is greater, then the
state has overvalued the railroads, regard
less of any equalisation cluim they may
have
The court's task is complicated by the
fact that the defendants concede that the
plaintiffs' initial assessed values for 1984
and 1985 were not based on their true
market value In May 1984 the state assessed UP based on a true market value of
$3,875,000,000 On June 4, 1984, the state
issued a revised assessment for UP based
on a true market value of $3,600,000,000
The state has since become convinced that
the methods it used to arrive at those fig
ures were wrong and has abandoned those
appraisals
See Transcript [hereinafter
T r ] at 341, 345-46, 350-51 For trial the
state relies on a new appraisal for UP
based on a different approach, which places

fair cash value" is synonymous with true mar
ket value ) Thus, the ratio for both rail trans
port at ion property and all other commercial
and industrial property for the years in question
should be 20
In 1985 the statute w a s amended to make the
assessed value the same a s "reasonable fair cash
value
However, the statute did not take effect
until January 1, 1986 See 1985 Utah Laws ch
165. § 64
4

3
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In other words the parties have stipulated to
the right half of the equation set forth in foot
note 3 supra
Which stipulated value the court
will ultimately apply depends on the c o u r t s
holding on the plaintiffs claim of de jure dis
crimination under the equalization aspect of
this case See infra p a n 111
Originally UP took the position that it was
foreclosed from challenging the stale s valuation
of its property by the Tenth Circuit s decision in
Burlmgton Northern Railroad Company v l^en
nen 715 F 2d 494 (10th Cir 1983) cert
denied,
467 U S 1230 104 S C t 2690 81 I Ed 2d 884
(1984)
See Union Pac R Co v State Tax

Commn. 635 F S u p p 1060. 1063 (D Utah 1986)
However, the Supreme Court opened the door
for UP to assert its valuation claims in this case
by its decision in Burlington Northern
Railroad
Company v Oklahoma
Tax Commission.
481
U S 454 107 S C t 1855. 95 1 bd 2d 404 (1987)
Ironically SP, which had asserted that Lennen
did not preclude it from challenging the state s
valuation, see 635 F S u p p at 1065-66. is no
longer asserting a valuation claim, it having
settled its valuation dispute with the state
6

Utah law requires that taxable property within
the state be assessed on the basis of its "reason
able fair cash v a l u e " See Utah Code Ann
§ 59-5-1, see also supra note 3
Reasonable
fair cash value is equivalent to "market value "
Kennecott Copper Corp v Salt Lake County 122
Utah 431 250 P 2d 938 939-40 (1952)
For
simplicity unless otherwise indicated the court
shall use the terms value and true market
value to refer to both "reasonable fair cash
value and true market value
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the value of UP for assessment year 1984
at $3,700,000,000 The state followed a
similar approach for UP for assessment
year 1985 and for the I) & RG for 1984 and
1985, with similar results 7 Thus, the de
fendants concede that the plaintiffs were
assessed at rates that were not based on
their true market value for assessment
years 1984 and 1985 To determine how
much the plaintiffs' newly determined val
ues differ from their "true market value,"
if at all, the court must still determine their
true market value as of January 1, 1984,
and January 1, 1985
hi deciding the valuation question, the
court has the advantage of expert help
The plaintiffs have presented the apprais
als of their expert witness, Dr Arthur
Schoenwald, a financial consultant special
izing in railroad and utility ratemaking and
valuation See common exhibits 30 & 33,
36 & 39 The defendants rely on the newly
prepared appraisals of Mr Ekhardt Praw
ltt, the utility and railroad valuation man
ager for the Property Tax Division of the
Utah State Tax Commission See common
exhibits 32, 35, 38 & 41 However, to
bolster Mr Prawitt's appraisals, the defen
dants also offered appraisals prepared
jointly by Mr Michael Goodwin, an inde
pendent appraiser specializing in the valua
tion of public utilities, railroads and other
multistate corporations, and Dr James If
flander, an assistant professor of finance
at Arizona State University See common
exhibits 31, 34, 37 & 40 The plaintiffs and
intervenors also offered the testimony of
various experts retained to critique or com
ment on the competing appraisals

laid end to end, they would not reach a
conclusion " The operative word here is
a", for, after listening to seventeen full
days of expert testimony spread over six
weeks, the court suffers from no lack of
conclusions The problem is that the prof
fered expert conclusions differ from one
another by over a billion dollars in the case
of UP and by a like order of magnitude in
the case of the D & RG • Fortunately, the
parties do agree on some things To that
extent the court can begin on common
ground
The parties agree, for example, that the
proper approuch for valuing a rutlroad for
taxution purposes is the so called unitary
approach Under that approach, the state
determines the value of the entire railroad
as a unit, even though its assets may be
located in several states, and then allocates
a portion of that total value to the taxing
state (in this case, Utah) based on such
factors as the percentage of the railroad's
total trackage that runs through the taxing
state The parties also agree on the per*
centage of the total value of each railroad's
property that should be allocated to Utah
See infra note 47 and accompanying text,
lr at 13-14 Finally, the parties agree in
principle on the three standard methods for
valuing a railroad the cost approach, the
income approach and the stock and debt
approach It is in applying the three Stan
dard approaches to reach a conclusion as to
true market value that the parties part
ways

Unfortunately, all these expert opinions
may only verify George Bernard Shaw's
observation that, "[i]f all economists were

At the risk of oversimplification,* the
court can summarize the three basic approaches as follows

7

The slate s original assessment for UP for as
scssment year 198S was based on a true market
value of $4 billion In this proceeding the state
relies on a new appraisal which places the
value of UP for 1985 at $3 4 billion
The state initially valued the D & K O based on
a true market value of $370 million for assess
ment year 1984
In June 1984 it revised its
valuation based on a value of $340 million In
this proceeding u relics on a new appraisal
placing the true market value of the D & RG at
$320 million Similarly it initially valued the D
&
RG for
1985Law
at $375
million
and now iclies
Reuben
Clark
School,
BYU.
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A

Overview of Valuation

Approaches

on a new appraisal placing the true market
value at $320 million
8

The results of the various appraisals are sum
marued in appendix A

9

Cf Louis L Jaffe Was Brandos an Activist?
The Search for Intermediate Premises 80 Harv
I Rev 986 991 (1967) ( It is of course one of
the risks of subjecting complex controversies to
judicial determination that the rules evolved
compel arbitrary simplification )
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The Cost Approach. The coat approach
values a railroad based on historical
costa—that is, how much it actually coat to
produce the assets initially. From historical cost is deducted accumulated depreciation to get net book value. Then, from net
book value an amount is de<'
t to reflect
obsolescence The final figure is the cost
indicator of value. All the parties agree
that the cost indicator is the least accurate
indicator of true market value.19

|-rj
I
**"

The Stork and Debt Approach.
The
stock and debt approach is a substitute
market approach. Because of the infrequent sales of railroad properties, the absence of an organized market for such
properties and the lack of accurate, current
information about sales of railroad properties as such, appraisers must look to a
substitute source for accurate information.
There is an organized market for the purchase and sale of fractional ownership interests in railroad properties; shares or
ownership interests in debt, bonds and such
are bought and sold with some regularity.
A specialist in dealing with such shares on
an organized exchange "makes a market"
for them. He offers to buy. He offers to
sell He can thus respond to offers to buy
and sell. An appraiser uses such market
information as some indication of value.
Those who use such data assume that
the "market" has depth as of a particular
moment in time and that multiplying the
market value of the fractional share by the
number of outstanding shares will produce
a figure equal to the whole market value,
which, when added to outstanding debt,
will produce an approximation of true market value of company assets subject to ad
valorem taxation. The argument is that
the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, a
conservative position, one could argue, in
today's era of leveraged buyouts. It does
not factor in the element of control or the
break-up value frequently perceived by
some to be hidden in the assets of a target
company
10. Although he calculates a cost indicator of
value, Dr Schoenwald gives it no weight in
determining the final value of the railroads

Often the outstanding shares of a railroad ar*» held in their entirety by a holding
complin) The organized market to which
an appraiser looks for data ia in the shares
of the holding company—not in the shares
of the railroad. Thus, the data to which
the appraiser looks for an indication of
value is two steps removed from the actual
assets appraised. The appraiser must determine in some appropriate fashion what
fraction of the market value attributed to
the shares of the holding company is represented by the holding company's ownership, through its railroad subsidiary, of
railroad assets.
In applying the stock-and debt approach,
there is relatively little disagreement
among the parties as to the value of the
plaintiff companies' debt. See, e.g., Tr. at
1243. The main disagreement is over the
companies' equity value and specifically
over how to determine what portion of the
holding company's gross equity is attributable to railroad property.
The state of Utah uses basically two
approaches for attributing a portion of the
holding company's equity to the railroad.
Both use various multipliers. In the first
approach, the state compares the subject
railroad to other railroads in the industry.
It calculates an industry multiplier based
on the ratio of various railroads' stock
prices to their cash flows and earnings. It
then applies those price/cash flow and
price/earnings ratios or multipliers to the
subject railroad's cash flow and earnings to
get estimates of the value of the railroad's
stock. In its second approach, the state
compares the subject railroad to its holding
company. The state calculates multipliers
based on the ratio of the railroad's net
profit, revenues, income and assets to the
holding company's net profit, revenues, income and assets and applies the multipliers
to the company's total equity value to determine the equity value of the railroad
See, e.g., common ex 32 at S/2.
On the other hand, Dr. Schoenwald, the
railroads' expert, calculates the equity val-

ue of each of the nonrail assets of the
holding company and deducts those values
from the holding company's total equity
value. What's left over, he concludes, is
the equity value of the railroad.
The Income Approach. The theory behind the income approach is that anyone
who buys a railroad buys it only for the
income the railroad will generate The ba
sic principle is that the present value of a
company is equal to the value of all future
benefits to be derived from ownership of
the company, discounted to their present
value (expressed in dollars) Since the fu
ture benefits to be derived from ownership
of a company are simply the income one
can expect to receive from the company,
the income approach tries to project the
income from the railroad's operations over
a period of time and then places a present
value on that income n The present value
of future income is expressed by the fol
lowing formula:
v

° - (i / D1 + (l »2 v *

4

n~rV

where V0 is the value at time zero, I) is the
income for year 1, and i is an interest rate
or discount rate.
Obviously, this basic valuation formula is
almost impossible to apply accurately because one can't know precisely the value of
all the variables It is impossible to predict
11. The court uses the term "income" loosely
More precisely, what the appraiser tries to value
is net cash flow, which Dr Schoenwald defined
as net operating income plus depreciation and
deferred income taxes (where applicable) less
capital expenditures See pltffs' ex 73 Be
cause capital expenditures for railroads in re
cent years have generally exceeded depreciation
and deferred taxes, Dr Schoenwald has used
net railroad operating income (NROI)—which
he characterizes as a "generous" measure of net
cash flows—as his income stream to capitalize
12. All of the experts also basically agree on
another variation of the basic model, the divi
dend model See, eg, pltffs' ex 54, Tr at
108S-69 The dividend model uses dividends
paid out in year 1 as the income to be capital
ized and is expressed by the following equation

Thc other appraisers give it some weight but
less than they give the other indicators of value
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accurately the income for each future year
for the life of the railroad, to know how
long the railroad will continue to produce
income and to predict the appropriate interest rate for future years. Thus, each of
the appraisers in this case simplifies the
basic formula based on certain assumptions
All the experts essentially agree on at
least one simplification of the basic formula, namely,

V -S&
where CF| represents the net cash flow in
period 1, k represents the cost of capital,
and g represents the growth rate See
pltffs' ex 358 (Dr Schoenwald), Tr at
1088 (Dr Ifflander) & 1455 (Dr Pettit) "
This approach to income valuation, which
tries to estimate future cash flows over a
period of time and discount them to their
present value, is called yield capitalization
or a "discounted cash flow" (DCF) model
and is widely used (in one form or another)
by appraisers and financial analysts to value income-producing property. See, eg.,
Tr at 1348-49 (testimony of Dr Ifflander),
1491 (testimony of Dr Pettit), 1728 (testimony of Mr Van Drimmelen, a real estate
appraiser), 2077 (testimony of Mr Fitzgerald) »»
where Dj is the dividends at year 1 and g is the
growth rate
The basic formula was also sometimes recast
to include another variable, b, which represents
the percentage of the firm's earnings that it
retains to reinvest
Vn
V

-

<> -

E

|(»- b >
k-t

where E{ is the earnings in period I SeeTr at
I4S5, intervenors' ex 6
13 Mr Goodwin and Dr Ifflander used (or mis
used, from the plaintiffs' perspective) a standard
yield capitalization or DCF model for their appraisal of UP for 1984, in which they projected
the railroad s cash flows for the next five years,
discounted them to present value and added a
terminal value, representing the present value
of all the cash flows after the five year period
See common ex 31 at 76-102 For all of the
years in question, they also use a direct capitali
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The standard simplifications of the basic
formula used in a yield capitalization model
assume that k, g and b (the retention rate,
see supra note 12) are constant and are all
equally influenced by inflation They also
assume that the growth rate, g, is equal to
b times r, the marginal rate of return on
new investment See Tr at 1455
The plaintiffs' appraiser, Or Schoen
wald on the other hand, starts from the
basic formula but makes a different as
sumption, namely, that r (the rate of return
on new investment) equals k (the cost of
capital) Using this assumption, he simpli
fies the basic formula to

where NCF, is the net cash flow for year
1 u In essence, he has eliminated growth
from the equation He is able to do this
because, given his assumption that r equals
k, any growth in the company's future
earnings is merely expansion growth and
not real growth, thus, according to the
witness it does not add anything to present
value " Hence, Or Ifflander has called
l)r Schoenwald s income valuation model
an expansion model, a term the court will
use at times to distinguish it from the
standard yield capitalization model AI
though Dr Schoenwald's model is in theory
zalion method simitar lo the stale*
p 550

See infra

14 Di Schoenwald further assumes thai net rail
road operating income (NROl) is a generous
estimate of net cash flow, see supra note II, so
he substitutes NROl for NCI- in the equation
For his projected net railroad operating income
for year 1 he uses an average of the railroads
NROl for the five previous years
15 According to Dr Schoenwald a company
may grow through new additional investment
but if the returns on new investment are not
greater than the cost of capital—that is, if the
cost of the growth offsets any gain from the new
investment—then there is no actual or net
growth Net growth occurs when the company
earns nioic than the cost of its additional capi
tal and only net growth—as opposed to gross or
expansion giowlli—increases net present value
A company that only c a m s its cost ol capital
may grow and that growth may make the com
pany worth more five years d o w n the road but
that futuie growth adds nothing to the compa

a yield capitalization model, it proceeds
from a very different assumption than the
standard yield capitalization models described by the other experts ••
The state uses another method to value
the railroads based on their projected in
come, called direct capitalization In the
direct capitalization method, the appraiser
determines a company's value by multiply
ing its accounting earnings by a price/earn
ings ratio or by dividing the earnings by
the earnings/price ratio The ratios are
derived from stock market data for compa
rable companies
Under the state's direct capitalization
method, value at time zero (V0) is equal to
earnings for time 1 (E,) divided by the
earnings pnee ratio (E/P), or, expressing
the relationship algebraically,
V

° =E7t

Although not directly derived from the
basic valuation formula,17 the direct capital
ization method proceeds from the assumption that the price of a company's stock will
represent the consensus of investors' opin
ions about a company s future cash flows,
cost of capital and growth prospects In
other words, it uses the stock market as
the best evidence of willing buyers' and
sellers' opinions of value, which presum
ny s value today because it will cost the compa
ny as much as it will add lo its value in the
future See Tr at 33-39. pltffs ex 54
16 The court has spared the reader the mathe
malical manipulations by which one gets f i o m
one formula to another Suffice it to say that
the various formulae appear to be mathematt
cally correct and internally consistent if one
accepts the underlying assumptions It is a sim
pic matter of applying mathematical principles
to the basic formula
In making that applica
lion however one should bear in mind Robert
lleilbroners observation that
(m]alhematics
has given economics rigor but alas also mor
lis
The simplified formulae are no better than
the basic formula and the experts assumptions
17 While recognizing that ditect capitalization is
not merely a variation of the yield capitalization
model by making certain assumptions Dr if
llander showed how one might conclude that
Dr Schoenwald s expansion model also uses an
earnings/price ratio for us capitalization rate
(k) See Tr at 1107-09

ibly are based on their own yield capitaliza
Lion analyses
For its earnings figure, the state uses a
five year weighted average of the rail
road's net operating income, adjusted for
inflation, in which income for more recent
years is weighted more heavily than income
for earlier years
Obviously, the two basic questions in applying the income approach are, How do
you define the income stream to be capital
ized7 and What capitalization rate do you
use 7 Although the parties disagree somewhat about what constitutes the proper
income stream to capitalize, their most fun
damental disagreement is over the capitali
zation rate As one can see from the basic
valuation formulae, since the capitalization
rate is a fraction that appears in the denominator, a small change in the capitaliza
tion rate can produce a big difference in
computed value '•
The plaintiffs argue that the state's capi
tahzation rates, which vary from 8 28 to
11 98 percent, see appendix A, are clearly
wrong since all the experts agreed that the
driving force behind the capitalization rate,
however expressed, namely, the cost of
capital (debt and equity), was no less than
13 percent and closer to 15 percent during
the relevant periods See, e g, intervenors'
exs la through Id at 2 However, that
argument overlooks the fundamental dif
ferences between yield capitalization and
direct capitalization
The capitalization
rate for yield capitalization is based directly on k, the cost of capital, and therefore
should be on the order of 15 percent The
capitalization rate for direct capitalization,
on the other hand, is based on price-earn
ings ratios taken from stock market data
It is not based directly on the cost of capi
tal Because there is no direct relationship
18. For example Dr Schoenwald calculated an
income indicator of value for UP for 1984 of
$2 198 981 000 based on earnings of $338 643
000 and a capitalization rate of 15 4 H
See
c o m m o n ex 30 & 33 al 89 Lowering the capi
talization rate just 1%, to 14 4% increases the
value of UP by almost 7H to $2 351 687 500
19 Were the court to undertake its o w n indc
pendent appraisal its choice of methods would
enjoy undue sanction and the application of its
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between the cost of capital and P/E or E/P
ratios, the fact that a direct cap rate or
E/P ratio may be less than the coat of
capital (k) is of no moment
Although
there was wide disagreement among the
experts about the price-earnings ratios to
be used and their importance in the process the evidence suggested that the state
values were well within the very broad
range of possible ratios Thus, the plain
tiffs' argument has merit only if the state
was required to use a yield capitalization
method as opposed to a direct capitalization
method in arriving at an approximation of
value
B

Choice of Method
The parties do not disagree so much over
the proper application of each other's meth
odology as they do over the choice of meth
od in the first place
Technically, methodology is not the issue
in this case—discrimination is But die
crimination under the 4R Act must be mea
sured in terms of "true market value"—the
congressionally mandated measure—and
one's conclusion as to true market value
depends on the path one takes to reach the
conclusion
One problem with subjecting complex is
sues like valuation to judicial determination
is that the court generally must choose
among the competing claims of experts
Unless the court performs its own apprais
al—a task it is not inclined to undertake lf—the court must hold either for the
plaintiff or the defendant, when often the
truth—or at least a more exact picture of
reality—lies somewhere in between The
court, of course, may adjust an expert's
appraisal up or down baaed on other ex
perts' critiques of the appraisal," but the
starting point for judicial determination is
methods would be subject to many of the same
types of criticisms that the parties appraisals
are subject to but without the same opportunity
the parties have had to critique each o t h e r s
appraisals
20 The c o u r t s task is complicated by the fact
that often as here the experts themselves can
not always agree whether the appraisals were
properly performed or not
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always one appraisal or another, and each
appraisal is based on a particular methodology that, to a large extent, predetermines
the result Thus, implicit in the court's
holding is a decision as to method
For example, if the court were to hold
for the plaintiff and accept Dr Schoenwald's valuations, it would in effect be
saying that Dr Schoenwald's methodology
produces the correct result, and any meth
odology that produces a different result
must be wrong Given that hypothetical
premise, it naturally follows that, if the
state must tax the plaintiffs in proportion
to their true market value, which it must
under the 4R Act, then the state should
apply Dr Schoenwald's methodology in va
luing the railroads, since that is the only
methodology that will consistently produce
the right result31
Thus, although the plaintiffs argue that
the court need not dictate to the state a
particular methodology, some choice of
methodology is inescapable The court's
decision on valuation must recognize (at
least implicitly) one valuation method at the
expense of other methods That in no
sense determines that one is right and the
others are wrong
The defendants suggest that the court
should simply defer to their current choice
of methodology However, the plaintiffs
were initially assessed based on a methodology that even the state now concedes was
flawed The question, then, is whether the
state's new appraisals, based on a new
methodology, are entitled to the same def
erence
The plaintiffs argue that they are not **
They argue that the court should determine
the valuation question based on which
method it finds the most reasonable They
further contend that Dr Schoenwald s val
21

None of the experts in this case suggest that
all roads lead to Rome Rather the testimony
was that two different methods will pioduce the
same result only by coincidence
As one can
see from appendix A the varying methods the
three sets of appraisers used produced widely
varying results

22 The plaintiffs suggest that if anything the
state should have the burden of proving the
validity of its new appraisals See infra note 29

UINIUIN f A l i r i l

uation method is more reasonable than the
state's, best reflects reality and leads to
the actual or correct true market value
The evidence suggested that yield capitalization is generally preferred to direct
capitalization because it is directly denved
from basic value theory, is more sophisticated than direct capitalization and generally produces a better result However,
the evidence also showed that both approaches were widely used to value rail
roads and other properties The question,
then, 18 whether the state is free to choose
among accepted valuation methods or
whether the 4R Act compels the use of one
particular method
[1] In the Burlington Northern case
the Supreme Court expressly left open the
question "whether a railroad may, in an
action under [the 4R Act], challenge in the
district court the appropriateness of the
accounting methods by which the State de
termtned the railroad's value, or is instead
restricted to challenging the factual deter
minations to which the State's preferred
accounting methods were applied " Burlington N RR Co v Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 481 U S 454, 107 S Ct 1855, 1861
n 5, 95 L Ed 2d 404 (1987) Although the
question may be an open one, this court
has found nothing in the 4R Act itself or in
its legislative history that requires this
court to make the state apply a particular
valuation methodology
Indeed, the legislative history of the 4R
Act suggests just the opposite The com
mittee report on Senate Bill 927, one of
several precursors to the 4R Act,1' stated
that the bill
does not suggest or require a State to
change its assessment standards, assess
ment practices, or the assessments them
23 It n well settled that the legislative history of
precursor* to a statute are relevant in constru
ing the statute See Burlington Northern Rail
road Company v Lennen 573 F S u p p 1155.
1160 n 5 (D Kan 1982), affd. 715 F 2d 494 497
(10th Cir 1983). cert dented. 467 U S 1230-31.
104 S Ct 2690 81 L Ed 2d 884 (1984). and cases
cited therein

K I U V » IAIIU I A A IUI*1 W U r
Cite M 716 F Supp S4J (D Uuh 1988)
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selves It merely provides a single stan
was not chosen for a discriminatory pur
dard against which all affected assess
pose M
ments must be measured in order to de
The plaintiffs argue, however, that the
termine their relationship to each other
statute itself requires this court to choose
It is not a standard for determining val
the correct valuation method from among
ue, it is a standard to which values that the competing methods They argue that
have already been determined must be the statute requires the court to determine
compared
their "true market value" and that the only
S Rep No 1483, 90th Cong , 2d Sess app
way the court can do that is by determining
B (1968), quoted m Burlington
Northern which method gives the "true" true market
Railroad
Company
v Lennen,
573 value That method is the one that is most
FSupp 1155, 1161 (D Kan 1982) (emphasis reasonable and most accurate and hence
omitted), affd, 715 F 2d 494 (10th Cir 1983), arrives at the most correct result They
further argue that Dr Schoenwald's methcert denied, 467 U S 123a 31, 104 S Ct
odology and data are the most reasonable
2690, 81 LEd2d 884 (1984)"
and most accurate and can be applied most
In subsequent legislative proposals Con
consistently and hence give the best mdica
gress reaffirmed its position that it did not
tion of true market value See Tr at 1151intend to dictate state valuation methods
52
See Unnen, 573 FSupp at 1163-^4 For
The court declines the plaintiffs' invita
example, in hearings on House Bill 16245.
another forerunner of the 4R Act, Philip M tion to adopt Dr Schoenwald's method
learner, a railroad representative, testified ology as the only correct methodology for
that the bill "would not deal with valuation determining true market value
being standard The standards and meth
Each expert asserts that his method
ods of valuation that any State wishes to ology results in a value that most closely
use would be totally unaffected by this corresponds to reality However, absent a
legislation " Hearing Before the Subcom
willing buyer and a willing seller, there is
mittee on Transportation and Aeronautics no absolute way to test the assertions of
of the Committee on Interstate and For
competing valuations or competing claims
eign Commerce on H R 16245, 91st Cong , of correspondence to "true market value,"
1st Sess 138 (1970), quoted in 573 FSupp
if such a thing exists in the order of things
at 1163 (emphasis omitted) Thus, the leg
From the beginning of this case, the
islative history suggests that the statute court was willing to assume that there was
was not meant to dictate a state's choice of such a thing as "true market value" that
methodology, at least as long as the meth
could be determined objectively from evi
odology chosen had a rational basis and dence much the same way a court can
24 The quoted passage from appendix B to Sen
ate Report 1483 appears to have been taken
from the testimony of James N Ogden VicePresident and General Counsel of the Gulf Mobile and Ohio Railioad Company during hear
ings on Senate Rill 927
See Burlington
North
em, 573 F S u p p at 1161-62
29 To the extent lennen coin hided from the
legislative history thai the whole valuation ques
lion was essentially off limits to federal courts
see 573 h Supp at 1164 ( the issue of the appro
priate irue market value of a railroad is genrr
ally not to be an issue in a Section 306 case ) it
has since been overruled
See Burlington N
R R to v Oklahoma
Tax Commn
481 U S
454 107 SCt 1855 95 I Ed 2d 404 (1987)
However this court agrees with Judge Rogers s
conclusion that Congress did not intend for the
federal couits to become involved in establish

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing
procedures for the stales in the valuing
of railroads
573 F S u p p at 1164 It is one
thing to say that the 4R Act allows federal
courts to review railroads claims of overvalua
tion
It is quite another to say that the Act
dictates a stale s choice of valuation methods
The 4R Act may provide relief if a state over
values a railroad by misapplying its chosen
methodology or by using a methodology that
has no rational basis or is chosen for the pur
pose of overvaluing railroads See, eg
Burling
ton N 107 S C t at 1859 (the railroads only
claim of discriminatory taxation was that the
state had misapplied its o w n valuation method
ology)
But this court believes the Act does
not necessarily provide relief just because the
slate s chosen methodology results in higher val
ues than some other method the state could
have chosen
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determine a wrongfully discharged employee's back wages from evidence See Unton Pac R R Co v State Tax Cotnm 'n,
686 F Supp 1060, 1067 at n 10 (D Utah
1986) Indeed, the approach of the 4R Act
presupposes that, like Plato's ideal, there is
in fact a "true market value," that it exists,
that it can be pointed to, pictured, recognized and can be used as the standard
against which valuation figures may be
compared Success in valuation would be
indicated by the correspondence of the valuation figures with the ideal
From the six weeks of testimony in this
case, however, certain things became apparent First, valuation is an art, not a
science It is a function of judgment, not
of natural law Try as it might, even Congress is incapable of enacting either a natu
ral law of the market or Plato's ideal
"True market value," then, must needs
mean something else Absent a miracle of
time, place and circumstance—willing buy
er, willing seller, high noon, January 1,
1984, for example—true market value for
purposes of ad valorem taxation is always
an estimate, always an expression of judg
ment, always a result built on a foundation
of suppositions about knowledgeable and
willing buyers and sellers endowed with
money and desire, whose desires are said to
converge in a dollar description of the as
set All of this is simply a sophisticated
effort at "let's pretend ' or "modeling," in
modern jargon, and all of it involves judg
ment Not natural law, not science-judg
ment

The appraisals in this case generally ton
tain two or three estimates of value, which,
within the same appraisal, may vary by as
much as 100 percent or more See, eg,
common ex 30 & 34 at 75 & 83, see also
appendix A Thus, the same appraiser may
come to vastly different conclusions as to
the value of the same railroad for the same
assessment date, depending on the method
he uses Moreover, each method requires
2 6 The court is reminded of the old story of the
economist m a i o o n c d with a companion on a
deserl island A (an of food washed up on I he
beach
The e c o n o m i s t s starving companion
asked him how they could open the can lo

various estimates and calculations, small
variations in any of which may lead to
large differences in value See, e g, supra
note 18 Absent evidence of an actual sale,
the term "true market value" is at best a
rational fiction Conclusions as to true
market value are based on each appraiser's
beat judgment, and each appraiser approaches the task of valuation a little differently, with his own assumptions and theones as to what mythical buyers and sellera consider (or should consider) in arriving
at an agreed-on price Perhaps Clifford
FiUgerald, a corporate finance expert who
testified on behalf of the plaintiffs, said it
best "There is not one universal concept
of value " Tr at 2006 Nor is there "any
one perfectly correct method " Id. at
2110-11 See also id at 1718 (testimony of
Mr Voytko that there is no standard approach to value)
Mr Goodwin described Dr Schoenwald's
methodology as "assumption driven " The
epithet was apparently meant disparaging
| y a n d w a g contrasted with his own meth
<,&*, which, he claimed, were "market dnv
| n t r u t h | however, each appraiser's
en »
methodology is assumption driven u The
assumption may be r equals k or that
K r o w t n m constant, or the assumption may
^ t h | | t l n e p r l c e o f tt company's stock is
t h e ^ s t indicator of the value of IU asset*
(Pre 8uma bly that is what Mr Goodwin
m e a n t w h e n he 8aid h|g m o d e | w a 8 -market
d r | v e n »} T h e , a t t e r ^gumption, of course,
m a y oversimplify matters by not account
ing for the effect of other variables on the
stock market—economic and otherwise
(perhaps even including the conference of
the Super Bowl winner) See, e g, Tr at
1337-39, 1421 (testimony of Dr Ifflander
that stock market prices do not always
accurately reflect value), id at 1607-10
(Dr Pettit's attempt to explain the stock
market crash of 1987 based on various
factors unrelated to a company s true mar
ket value)"
which the economist blithely replied
can openei

Assume a

27 The vagai les of the stock market once
prompted a member of the Council of k c o n o m
ic Advisors to suggest that maiket behavior

[2] From all the evidence presented it is
clear that there is more than one way to
value a railroad See, eg, Tr at 1718,
2110-11
Each method may represent
what some buyers and sellers actually do **
All the methods may be equally rational
given their underlying assumptions And
they are all irrational if pressed to ex
tremes For example, using the income
approach, one would be forced to conclude
that a company with a net loss for the year
or over a period of years actually had a
negative value—a skewed and discordant
picture of reality See, eg,Tr at 2201-03
Or, using the stock and debt approach, one
might be forced to conclude that over 20
percent of the value of a company evaporated in the few short hours between the
opening and closing of the New York Stock
Exchange on October 19, 1987, despite the
fact that the company's functioning assets
remained virtually unchanged over that pe
nod Each method or theory depends on
certain assumptions that cannot ultimately
be proved or disproved by reason alone nor
replicated in experience Thus, this court
cannot say that any one method is neces
sanly more rational than any other Nor
can the court say that one method alone
arrives at the railroad's "true market val
ue" Rather, the evidence suggests that
the term "true market value" "is a judg
ment not subject to mathematical precision
that is based on a wide variety of factors"
and "is at best an approximation " Rio
Algom Corp v San Juan County, 681

P 2d 184, 192 (Utah 1984) From all the
evidence in this case, the court cannot say
that the state's judgment as to the plaintiffs' true market value is wrong"
The state suggests that its methods have
the advantage that they are used consistently to value all centrally assessed property, so if the method produces any error in
valuations, the effect is not to discriminate
against the railroad Presumably, if application of the same method overvalues or
undervalues all commercial and industrial
property in the state equally, there is no
discrimination against railroads However,
the state concedes that it did not treat all
centrally assessed property equally for the
assessment years in question For 1984
and 1985 it assessed all centrally assessed
property using its discarded methodology
If one of the 350 centrally assessed property owners appealed, the state prepared a
new assessment based on its new method
ology, as it did in this case Thus, the state
did not treat all centrally assessed property
equally in 1984 and 1985

could be explained not so much by market
analysis but by psychoanalysis

that its new assessment is correct and they
note the slate has already admitted its original
assessments were wrong But see Utah Power e\
Light Co v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 590 P 2d
332 335 (Utah 1979) (if the taxpayer claims
error in a proceeding before the lax commission "it has an obligation not only to show
substantial error or impropiicty in the assessment but also to provide a sound evidentiary
basis upon which the Commission could adopt a
tower valuation ) (citations omitted) Even assuming that the plaintiffs argument is correct,
given the court s decision that the state was free
to adopt the method of its choice the court
concludes that the state has met the burden of
proving the correctness of its new assessments
by a preponderance of the evidence

28. Indeed, perhaps the best evidence of the rail
roads true market value is not any single appraisal but assuming that each appraiser has
performed his work accurately and in good
faith the average of all the appraisers judg
ments concerning true market value
29 In a 4R Act case "the burden of proof with
respect to the determination of assessed value
and true market value shall be that declared by
the applicable State law
Pub 1 No 94-210
| 306(2)(d) 90 Stat at 55 (1976) The plaintiffs
argue that the burden of proof should be on the
state to prove its assessment is correct
They
cite the court to no authority for this proposi
tion Rather they argue that under Utah law
once it is shown that a states assessment is
wrong the burden shifts to the stale to prove
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Moreover, even if the state did treat all
centrally assessed property equally (as it
claims to do now), it may still have violated
the 4R Act if its uniform method has the
effect of overvaluing railroads It is no
defense under the 4R Act "to say that the
state may also be discriminating against
other companies " Louisville St Nashville RR Co v Louisiana Tax Comm'n,
498 FSupp 418, 422 ( M D U 1980)M

30 Although it may not be a defense to say that
all centrally assessed properties are overvalued
as a result of the states choice of methodology
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Nevertheless, the state's argument may
have some force If the court were to
require the state to use Dr Schoenwald's
valuation methods, the state would have to
apply the methods to all centrally assessed
property so that the discriminatory effect
of the state's valuations could be properly
measured The court has found no evi
dence that Congress intended the 4R Act to
dictate how a state must value non railroad
property If, as it appears from the record,
all centrally assessed properties are now
appraised using the methods the state used
in its current appraisals of the plaintiff
railroads, that may be reason to give those
appraisals greater weight
But the court believes that it should not
disturb the state's choice of methodology
for other reasons as well Prom the testimony of the state's witnesses, the court
concludes that the state's appraisers sin
cerely seek to arrive at what t*.ey consider
to be the railroads' true market value and
that, to that end, they constantly reevalu
ate their methods and change them when
they become convinced that they are
wrong *' The state's witnesses also testi
fied that appraisal methods and philosophy
are continually changing, presumably for
if in fact they are it is likely thai i»>geiher all the
owners of centrally assessed properly will have
sufficient political power to force the state to
change its valuation methods After all it is not
every property owner that can achieve benefi
cial legislation such as the 4R Act As Auberon
Herbert once observed "It is the small owner
w h o offers the only really profitable and red
able material for taxation
He is made for
taxation
fHje has less skill and ingenuity
as regards escape, and he still has a large supply of ignorant patience of taxation '"
Quoted
tn F Coffield A Popular History of Taxation,
quoted m A Dictionary of ijegal Quotations 165
(S James L C Stebbings c o m p 1987)
The
court however does not base its conclusions as
to discrimination o n the states relative treat
ment of centrally assessed properties but o n its
conclusion as to the railroads true market val
ue
91
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Indeed of all the appraisers in this case the
court was most impressed with the credibility of
the slate appraiser Mr Prawilt and of his su
per visor Mr Monson
Of all the appraisers
Mr Piawttl seemed the only one w h o was not
out to achieve a particular predetermined re
suit
Indeed he testified that he prepared his
appraisals without even looking at the states

^
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the better, and that they try to keep current on new developments in the field without regard for the source, that is, whether
the developments be from other state appraisers or from industry experts Were
this court to conclude that the 4R Act
codified the Schoenwald method of valua
tion, it would prevent states from critically
examining their appraisal methods and
would discourage them from adopting new
and better methods as they become accepted by the appraisal profession
For all of these reasons, the court con
eludes that the 4R Act no more enacts the
Schoenwald method of valuation than the
fourteenth amendment enacts Herbert
Spencer's "Social Statics " Cf Lochner v
New York, 198 U S 45, 75, 25 S Ct 539,
546, 49 LEd 987 (1905) (Holmes, J , dis
Renting)
(3) All parties must remember that the
purpose of producing a figure as to value,
whether we label it "fair cash value" or
"true market value," is to provide a figure
against which one may then apply the tax
percentage to arrive at what is due and
owing by the taxpayer to the taxing unit
If one has a choice of methods and chooses
a method with a rational footing and is
earlier appraisals so that the earlier appraisals
would not affect his conclusions
The other
experts all had a theory to defend, which col
ored their choice of data and methods
Each
appraisal required the appraisers to make nu
merous judgments, but the other appraisers of
ten seemed to base their judgments on the end
result using a technique or methodology if it
tended to support the desired result and chang
ing it when convenient For example the plain
tiffs criticized the states witnesses for using
average P / E s , arguing that a mechanical c o m
putation of averages ignored the factors that
went into an informed judgment See, eg Tr
at 1661-43 Yet they then turned around and
argued that their true market value should be
determined by mechanically computing the av
erage of Dr Schoenwald s income and stock and
debt indicators of value (ignoring the cost indi
cator altogether) when the disparity between
Dr Schoenwald s income and stock and-debt in
dicators was so great as to make one or the
other suspect without even comparing Dr Scho
enwald s figures with the oilier appiaisers
See
eg Tr at !M1
None of the appraisers may
have been perfectly consistent but Mr Prawiit
seemed most concerned with discoveiing an ob
jective value and least committed to a particular
theory or methodology

consistent and evenhanded in applying the
method to all comparable properties, then
conceptually the end result should be pay
ment by taxpayers of a tax bill that is not
disproportionate to the like payments of all
other comparable taxpayers The court
holds that, as long as the state's method
ology has a rational basis and was not
chosen for a discriminatory purpose, the
court will not disturb that choice The
court concludes from all the evidence that
the state's methodology has a rational ba
sis and was not chosen with the intent of
overvaluing railroads Thus, it will not
second guess the state's choice of method
Even if the court were forced to choose
among the competing methodologies, the
court believes that the state's methodology
has much to commend it Not only does
the state consistently use essentially the
same approach for all centrally assessed
property, but also its approach is based on
historical data and market data readily
available both to investors and to the
state " Moreover, it is easy to apply—an
important consideration given the state's
limited resources and the tremendous time
pressures under which the state's apprais
als must be prepared See, e g, Tr at 339
& 402 For example, although a yield capi
tahzation model is more elegant and might
be preferred to a direct capitalization mod
el, Mr Fitzgerald, one of the plaintiffs'
experts, testified that it took him two and
one-half years, working full time, to value
seven railroads, an average of over four
months for each See id at 2068 The
state simply does not have that luxury
Given its time constraints, it may legit
imately choose an approach that is easier to
apply than a more precise but more com
plex model
In many respects, the state's method
ology is closer to Dr Schoenwald's than is
32. For example unlike Messieurs Goodwin and
Ifflander w h o place much weight—possibly too
much—on the company • projections for (he
coming year gleaned in part from internal com
pany documents not available to the public gen
erallv the stale uses the weighted average of (lie
five previous years income to determine the
railroads piojected income in its income ap
proach
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Messieurs Goodwin and lfflander's For
example, both the state and Dr Schoen
wald use a five year average of NROI as
the basis for their income calculations,
whereas Mr Goodwin and Dr Ifflander
use projections based on strategic plans
known more for their inspirational value
than for their prediction value and on a
form of regression analysis discredited by
the plaintiffs' Htatistical expert Both the
state and Dr Schoenwald use the full debt
rate in determining the cost of debt, whereas Mr Goodwin and Dr Ifflander use what
they call current yield Both the state and
Dr Schoenwald treat current assets and
current liabilities in their stock and debt approach, Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander
do not Both the state and Dr Schoenwald
allocate both debt and equity to the rail
road Mr Goodwin and Dr Ifflander allocate only equity And in the cost approach
both the state and Dr Schoenwald purport
to measure obsolescence based on the en
tire railroad industry, the other appraisers
do not See generally id at 1898-1913
(Dr Schoenwald's summary of the basic
differences among the three approaches)
Even if the court were inclined to require
the state to apply yield capitalization rather
than direct capitalization, however, the
court would not require it to apply the
Schoenwald method of yield capitalization
(that is, the expansion model) The Schoen
wald method is based on a critical assumption, namely, that r equals k The assumption is problematic at best It was debated
at length during the course of the trial
Needless to say, there was no consensus
among the experts (who included several
Ph Ds in finance) about the reasonableness
of the assumption The experts vigorously
disputed the issue, predictably aligning
themselves according to the party on
whose behalf they were called to testify M
33 The opinions of some of the experts as to
whether or not r is greater than k appeared to
depend to some extent o n their opinion about
the prospects of the railroad industry At times
il seemed the experts were testifying about two
different industries In Dr Schoenwald s view
the railroads have been in decline sinte at least
ihe 1920s and can never expect to earn a rate of
return even equal to the cost of capital In fact
it is a wonder that they are still in business On
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Without deciding the reasonableness of the January 1, 1955, depended on what inves
assumption, the court can at least say that tors would have been willing to pay for it,
the assumption would appear to be less which in turn would have depended on their
than self-evident and not whole heartedly expectations They further argue that no
accepted in the finance community, judging one could have accurately predicted the
from the expert testimony
actual numbers, which Dr Schoenwald
Dr Schoenwald attempted to prove the uaes implicit in their argument is that
validity of his assumption by showing that investors are overly optimistic and would
historically the railroads have failed to earn have projected much higher cash flows and
a return commensurate with the cost of lower discount rates than actually oc
capital See pltffs' ex 95(a) (Said exhibit curred All Dr Schoenwald tried to show
is annexed to this opinion as appendix B)
was that, had the investors had perfect
In exhibit 95(a) Dr Schoenwald calculated foresight and applied his model, they still
a value for UP using his expansion model would have overvalued the railroad From
based on UP's average NROI for the pen
this he concludes that his assumption that r
od 1950-54 Using his expansion model, he equals k is a generous assumption
valued the railroad at $581,514,000 He
Nevertheless, it appears to the court's
then did a more traditional yield capitaliza
untrained eye that exhibit 95(a) is flawed
tion analysis for the period 1955-84, dis
counting the actual net cash flows for ft suffers from one of those classic "mis
those years based on the actual discount matches" that Dr Schoenwald is fond of
rates and adding a terminal value baaed on talking about Dr Schoenwald's expansion
the average NROI for the period 1980-84, value is based on a discounted average
and concluded that the actual total market NKOI, yet the yield capitalization approach
value of the railroad a net cash flows from he compares it to is based on discounted
1955 into perpetuity was only $247,504,000
net cash flows It is apparent from exhibit
Thus he concluded, his model actually 95(a) that NROI is substantially higher
overvalued UP by more than double, show
than net cash flows, especially for the early
ing the r did not even equal k for UP over years of the study For example, for the
the last thirty years
period 1955-59, the first five-year period
Mister Goodwin and Doctors Ifflander for which complete data are available, the
and Pettit criticized Dr Schoenwald for average NROI is over four times greater
using actual, historical figures They ar- than the average net cash flow Of course,
gued that the value of the railroad as of under Dr Schoenwald's expansion model, a
the other hand in the opinion of Messieurs
Goodwin and Ifflander the Staggers Act which
was passed in 1980 ushered in a new Golden
Age of railroading
Perhaps there is more than o n e railroad in
duscry At least the railroad industry of the late
1800s was a far different industry from the
railroad industry of the mid 1900s Thus Ches
terton could write
(Wjhcn I was a boy which was just before the
motor-car burst upon the world 1 never
dreamed of doubling thai the railway train
dominated the whole future of the world It
was the latest great locomotive that man had
invented
To talk as some people arc
now talking of whether railways will become
obsolete or whether steam can be superseded
of whethei i ail way slock will always be as
safe as it was—all this would have been lo me
a ptophecy as unintelligible as some of those
Old Testament visions thai seem a medley of
wheels and wings and clouds Railways had
been firmly established before I was born J
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never dreamed of doubting that they would
remain exactly the same after I died
G K Chesterton Corns to Tktnk of h
16-17
(1931) Yet the railroads did change Chester
ton lived to see their economic power decline
Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander would have
the court believe that if Chesterton had lived
another fifty years he would have seen the re
birth of the railroad industry The railroads
experts on the other hand talk as though the
railroads will never recover
But if t h c y v e
changed once they may change again
Theic was testimony that the railroad industry is a cyclical industry According to Messl
eurs Goodwin and Ifflander the industry has
come full circle
Perhaps only time will tell
whether or not they are right In any event the
court does not have to choose between the c o m
peting prognostications The market makes its
own choice And the state s valuation methods,
based on the market as they are should reflect
the market s outlook

higher NROI translates into a proportion
ately higher final value Thus, by using
NROI for the period 1950-54 to value the
railroad, Dr Schoenwald arrives at a high
er value than he would have reached had
he used net cash flows for the same period
In other words, Dr Schoenwald concludes
that his model overvalues the railroad
based on a comparison of an expansion
value derived from high NROIs to a yield
capitalization value derived from relatively
low net cash flows
Had Dr Schoenwald compared values
that were both based on net cash flows or
both based on NROI, he may have reached
very different results For example, if one
were to estimate the average net cash flow
for the period 1950-64 by dividing NROI
(Dr
Schoenwald's capitalized income
stream) by four, it would reduce his expan
sion value accordingly and might turn out
that his model actually undervalued the
railroad significantly Unfortunately, ex
hibit 95(a) omits all the data the court
needs to make the proper comparison At
best, however, the court concludes that ex
hibit 95(a) only supports Dr Schoenwald s
second assumption—that NROI is a gener
ous estimate of net cash flow u—and not
his pnmary assumption, namely that r is no
greater than k
Dr Schoenwald also tried to prove his
assumption that r is no greater than k by
calculating expected growth rates and com
paring them to the expected growth that
the investment publication Value Line, the
defendants' Bible, projected for the same

time period Using the basic formula that
growth (g) equals retained earnings (b)
times the rate of return (r) and using the
ICC s cost of capital for the rate of return
(based on his assumption that r equals k),
Dr Schoenwald concluded that not even
Value Line expected the railroads to grow
at even an expansionary growth rate See
Tr at 2059-64, 2117-19, pltffs'exa 464 A
465 However Dr Ifflander testified that
the calculated growth rate (b X r) showed
growth in earnings, and if one used return
on equity (ROE) for r and compared the
calculated growth rate with Value Ltne't
projected growth rate for earnings, the
railroads as a whole were projected to
grow at a rate faster than Dr Schoen
wald s expansionary model allows for**
See Tr at 2230-32, defs' ex 236
Rather than assuming that r equals k,
the state lets the market decide the values
of r and k Implicit m the market price of
a security are the market participants' determinations of the alphabet soup of economic variables for the company—r k, g
and b It appears that at least some inves
tors believed that r would be greater than
k for the plaintiff railroads during the as
sessment years See, eg, Tr at 1504-06,
interveners ex 8 Philip Anschutz bought
the D & RG (or more precisely, its holding
company, Rio Grande Industries) in 1984,
one of the assessment years, and in fact
paid a premium for the company's stock,**
suggesting that he viewed the railroad as a
good investment that could return a rate
greater than the cost of capital"

3 4 In fact exhibit 95(a) c^sls doubt on Dr Schoenwald s second assumption as well Dr Schoenwald justified his use of NROI as opposed to
net cash flow on the grounds that NROI is a
"generous" estimate of net cash flow However
at least for the years from 1980 to 1984 the
years that Dr Schoenwald averaged for his 1985
income estimate net cash flow was greater than
NROI for UP despite a negative net cash flow
for 1980

value Given that Dr Schoenwald s stock and
debt approach consistently valued the plaintiffs
higher than his income approach and that Mr
Anschuu was willing to pay a premium ovet the
company s stock market price the plaintiffs
may be right The stock market may umicrval
ue railroads

35

Even Dr Ifflander conceded that no matter
how one compares projections with implied
growth rales the D & RG was not expected to
achieve even expansionary growth for 1984 So
the assumption that r is no greater than k may
have been true for the D 4b RG for 1984

3 * The plaintiffs suggest that the stock market
may not be the best indicator of a railroads
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37 The plaintiffs point out that both Union Pa
cific and Southern Pacific also had the opportu
nity to buy the D & RG but turned it down Of
course the fact that some investors or potential
buyers may see the value of a company differ
ently than others does not necessarily mean that
there is no market for the company or that it is
overvalued In fact differences of opinion as to
value are what make for a market In the first
place
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Assuming for the moment that Dr Schoenwald's conclusion as to historical facts is
correct, that does not necessarily mean
that his model correctly values the railroad
Looking at history, the willing seller may
conclude that r is no greater than k In
deed, that may he why he wants to sell—
because he cannot earn even his cost of
capital Nevertheless, regardless of |>. i
performance, it seems somewhat counterm
tuitive to suggest that in valuing a prospec
tive investment willing buyers assume that
they will not be able to earn a return at
least equal to their cost of capital Otherwise, one would think that they would look
elsewhere to invest their money Since the
elusive true market value depends on both
a willing buyer and a willing seller, the
assumption that r is no greater than k may
at best be half true, and, as Justice Frankfurter used to observe, a half truth is often
a whole lie See P Rlman, Response, 100
Harv L Rev 1949, 1952 (1987)
The court does not have to decide the
reasonableness of the assumption, how
ever, because the Schoenwald valuation
method suffers from a more serious defect
There is no evidence that those in the busi
ness of valuing railroads for buyers and
sellers actually use Dr Schoenwald's ex
pansion model ** For example, when the
board of directors of Rio Grande Industries
(the holding company for D & RG) was
deciding whether to accept Mr Anachutz's
offer to buy the company it did not ask Dr
Schoenwald to value the railroad Rather,
it commissioned a study by the investment
3ft Mr Fitzgerald of First Boston Corporation
testified that in his yield capitalization method
he uses a method similar to Dr Schoenwald s to
arrive at a terminal value that is a value for the
cash flows after the last year of his analysis
However, his basic analysis is the traditional
yield capitalization approach, similar to Messi
curs Goodwin and IfPander s by which he fore
casts future cash flows for a period of time—in
his case over a ten year period The terminal
value in such an approach is only a small frac
lion of the total value
39 Morgan Stanley concluded that the railroad s
equity value was roughlv $280 million See
defs ex 155 at ex I p I When the debt value
is added to the equity value the value becomes
appioximately $360 million see Tr at 1176
compared to the stale * estimated value of about
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firm of Morgan Stanley, and Morgan Stanley did not value the railroad using Dr
Schoenwald's expansion model See Tr at
1241, defs' ex 156 Its study used a discounted cash flow model similar to the
method Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander
used in the 1984 appraisal of UP and also,
as a check, applied various pnee multiples
in a fashion similar to the state's appraisal
and, incidentally, with results closer to the
state's appraisal than to Dr Schoen
wald's *•
On the other hand, it is undisputed that
the state's methods are used by other professional appraisers and by market ana
lysU See, eg, Tr at 1682 (testimony of
Mr Voytko that P/E ratios are widely used
by security analysts) Dr Schoenwald him
self used price-earnings multiples to value
the nonrailroad subsidiaries of the railroad
holding companies in his stock and-debt approach ** The state's direct capitalization
approach may not be the preferred approach of the more sophisticated analysts,
but at least analysts generally use price
earnings multiples as a check on their yield
capitalization results Moreover, the ICC
used a direct capitalization method in ana
lyzing the offers of competing railroads' to
buy the core lines of the Milwaukee Rail
road and concluded that, of the three meth
ods it used to evaluate the offers, "the
price to-earmngs (P/E) ratio is a more reli
able basis to make an evaluation, since it is
less susceptible to outside influences or to
speculative considerations ' Defs ex 17
$389 million for the railroads stock and debt
See common ex 41 at S-1 To the stock and
debt value must be added another $6 million or
so for operating leases to arrive at a total stock
and debt indicator of value In comparison Dr
Schoenwald's total value for the railroad for the
same assessment year was less than S280 mil
lion
40 If the use of price earnings multiples in fact
overvalues properties as Dr Schoenwald sug
gested in critiquing the appraisals of Messieurs
Goodwin lfflandet and Prawitt then Dr Scho
enwald overvalued the holding companies non
railroad subsidiaries and under his stock and
debt methodology any ovei valuation of the
nonrailroad subsidiaries attributable to Dr
Schoenwald s use of price earnings ratios would
produce a commensurate undervaluation of the
railroad See tnfra p 561
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at 54, see also Tr at 560-63 The ICC also
used a direct capitalization approach when
it decided the question of compensation for
the trackage rights the D & RG was
awarded as a result of the Union PacificMissouri Pacific merger See defs' ex 18
at 4 Perhaps most telling, the D & RG
itself argued that the interest rental por
tion of the compensation should be calculat
ed using a price earnings multiple, id at 7,
and UP agreed, id at 8 Thus, the plain
tiffs themselves have used a form of dire< t
capitalization to determine value
The plaintiffs argue that the state's ap
praisals are flawed because the state looks
to the stock market for both its income and
its stock and debt approaches Because
both approaches depend on the same
source, they argue, they cannot produce
independent and hence accurate results
Dr Schoenwald s income approach has an
advantage over the state's, they suggest,
in that it does not depend on market data
for its conclusions Thus, it provides an
independent indicator to compare to the
stock and debt indicator of value and is
therefore the better method
Of course, nothing in the 4R Act requires
a state to use three separate and indepen
dent indicators of value Dr Schoenwald
himself uses at most only two indicators of
value See supra note 10 4I The fact that
the state looks to the stock market for the
data for two of its approaches does not
mean that its appraisals are flawed Rath
er, it merely reflects the state s underlying
assumption, namely, that the stock market
is the best indicator of a company's value
Given all the evidence, the court cannot say
that that assumption is any less reasonable
than Dr Schoenwald s—namely, that r
equals k4* Consequently, the court be
lieves that the state's income indicator of
value is a proper estimate of true market
value

5to 1

stock and debt approach is more reasonable
than Dr Schoenwald's and arrives at a
more accurate indicator of value
Dr
Schoenwald assumes that the value of the
railroad is whatever is left over after valu
ing the other components of the holding
company While that assumption is theoretically sound, as the state's experts point
ed out, it makes the railroad bear the bur
den of any measurement errors A num
ber of small errors valuing the other properties would create a large error in the
value of the railroad For example, Dr
Ifflander suggested that Dr Schoenwald
may have overvalued Champhn Petroleum,
a subsidiary of Union Pacific Corporation,
the holding company, by as much as a
billion dollars
Using the Schoenwald
method, that error alone would translate
into a billion dollar error in the railroad's
value The plaintiffs' own witness, Mr
Fitzgerald, called Dr Schoenwald's stock
and-debt method ' a discredited activity
which I place very little judgment on," Tr
at 2104, one which could result in "a cas
cade of capricious error" in the railroad's
value, id at 2106 The court believes that
the state's allocation method arrives at a
more accurate figure by allocating not only
the stock price but also the risk of error
In short the court concludes that the
plaintiffs have not shown that Dr Schoen
wald s methodology produces a better result There is thus no reason to disturb
the state's choice of method

While the choice between the parties'
income approaches may present a choice
between equally reasonable alternatives,
the court believes that the defendants'

The State'* Valuation
141 Ordinarily, the court's conclusion in
part I-B that the state's valuation methods
are reasonable and acceptable would end
the dispute The railroads could appeal
any alleged error in applying the state's
methods to the state tax commission
Once the tax commission (and the state
courts if necessary) had corrected any er
rors in applying the method, this court
could then simply plug the state's final
valuation figure into the equation and de

41 In fact for his I98S appraisal of D & RG Dr
Schoenwald used only one indicator See ap
pendix A p 67 n 2

42 The stale s assumption was even supported
by one of the plaintiffs own witnesses See Tr
at 1717 (testimony of James Voytko)
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termine whether the 4R Act had been vio
lated However, because the state in this
case rehea on appraisals that were newly
prepared for this proceeding, the plaintiffs
have not had a chance to challenge the
application of the state's chosen methods
before the tax commission Therefore, the
court will consider the plaintiffs' major
claims of error in the state's application of
its methods
The plaintiffs first claim the state erred
in applying its direct capitalization method
under its income approach The state's
direct capitalization rates or earnings price
ratios are not simply the E/Ps for the
subject companies but are composites for
the railroad industry derived from com par
ing the E/Ps and other financial data of a
number of railroads
Everyone agrees
that, to be useful, the companies compared
must in fact be comparable to the subject
railroad The parties dispute which other
railroads are truly comparable to UP and D
& RG The plaintiffs claim that there are
no true comparables That is just another
way of arguing that the state should not
have used a direct capitalization approach
in valuing the railroads For the reasons
discussed in part l-B, the court concludes
that the state's approach is acceptable
There may be no perfect comparable, but
the evidence suggests that that fact does
not prevent appraisers and other analysts
from comparing railroads and valuing them
based on their comparisons The state's
43 Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander o n the oth
er hand use Value Ltne s "straddle P / b s The
straddle P/fc is based o n the last one or two
quarteis actual earnings and two or three quar
lers of projected earnings The court believes
that the use of trailing ratios produces a more
objective and hence better result
44 The state s projections like Dr Schoenwald s
are backwards looking in that they project fu
lure income based on past performance
The
primary difference be I ween the two is that the
state weights previous years NROI so as to put
gi eater emphasis on more recent histoiy
I lie state also adjusts pievious y e a i s figures
for inflation so that all the figures are in c u n e n l
dollars The plaintiffs argue thai such an ad
justment is improper absent any evidence that
inflation actually benefits rail assets and they
claim it does not
llowevei the states infla
tion adjustment is not meant to indicate the
effect of inflation on the assets but merely to
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approach has an advantage over Mr Good
win's and Dr If Dander's in that it at least
tries to select the moat comparable compa
nies and eliminates the so-called outliers
The state has offered plausible reasons for
its choice of comparables Moreover, at
least in the case of the UP for assessment
year 1984, the state's choice coincides with
those companies Mr Voytko, the plaintiffs'
witness, said he considered the most com
parable Compare Tr at 1655-61 (Mr
Voytko's testimony), with common ex 32
at S/2 In the ultimate analysis, the choice
of comparables is a judgment call by the
particular appraiser This court cannot say
that the railroads the state chose are not
comparable or even that they are not the
most comparable It therefore declines to
disturb the state's choices
The plaintiffs next argue that the state
erred by applying its E/P ratios to the
wrong earnings figure It claims that the
state has created a mismatch by using a
current E/P and applying it to projected
earnings The court concludes that the
mismatch, if any, is insignificant
The state bases its E/Ps on Value
Line's so-called trailing P/Es, which in
turn relate a current pnce to the last
twelve months' earnings See Tr at 956,
clefs' ex 28 at B/2 Thus, trailing P/Es
are based on historical data 4 9 The state
applies this trailing ratio to an earnings
figure that, although a projection, is also
based on historical data 4 4 Although the
enable the appraiser to look at history in terms
of constant dollars It may be as Dr Schoen
wald suggests that any adjustment for inflation
is impiopcr since the question is not buying
power but actual nonnali/xrd earnings
The
court cannot say from the evidence however
that inflation has no positive effect on rail trans
port at ton property and any error in the s t a l e s
adjustment is partially offset by its weighting
process in which revenues from the oldest
years (those most inlluenccd by inflation) re
ceive the least weight
Had the slate based its
projections on a straight five year average as
Dr Schoenwald did instead of a weighted five
yeai average adjusted for inflation its income
figures would have been higher resulting in
higher overall values Thus any eiror in the
stales use of an inflation factor is more than
offset by lis allegedly impiopcr use of a weight
ed average

two historical periods do not correspond
completely, because the state weights the
earnings figures to arrive at its five-year
average, the earnings for the last twelve
months receive the greatest weight Because those earnings relate directly to the
trailing ratio, there is a match, though per
haps an imperfect match The price is at
least roughly matched to the earnings that
produced it
The state's approach tries to establish a
relationship between pnce and earnings
based on so-called normalized data, that is,
data that reflecte historical trends, at the
same time minimizing the effect of anoma
lous data
It does this by a five year
weighted average of earnings and by using
an E/P derived from the industry and not
merely from the subject railroad It is, in
effect, not the E/P for any one railroad but
for a hypothetical, composite railroad The
court does not believe that Dr Schoen
wald's proposed alternatives would neces
aanly produce a better result For exam
pie, to increase the E/P, as Dr Schoenwald
does, Bee, eg, pltffs' ex 475, based on a
projected 'increase" in earnings (which is
really just a normalized earning figure) in
effect begs the question by assuming what
effect such an increase in earnings will
have on price (namely, none) Similarly, to
apply the trailing E/P to actual earnings
for the year, as Dr Schoenwald also does,
see, e g, pltffs' ex 476, does not establish
the relationship between price and project
ed income and may produce a skewed re
suit if the earnings for that particular year
were atypical for any reason, for example,
because of unusual capital expenditures un
dertaken during the year 4 *

company debt in the stx>ck and-debt approach because the stock market does not
look at intracompany debt in valuing %
company However, Mr Prawitt testified
that he prepared his stock and^iebt analy
sis based on the railroad's balance sheet
and that debts among the railroad and af
filiated entities in effect offset each other
on the balance sheet The court believes
there was nothing improper about the
state's treatment of intracompany debt
The court has considered the plaintiffs'
other criticisms of the state appraisals and
has rejected t h e m u In short, the court
accepts the state appraisals prepared by
Mr Prawitt as the best evidence of the
plaintiffs' true market value as of the as
sessment dates

The plaintiffs next argue that the state
appraisals err in their treatment of intra

Conclusions
The court holds that, for purposes of
applying the 4R Act to the state's assess
ments of the plaintiff railroads, the true
market value of the plaintiffs for the as
sessment years in question was as follows
1984
1985
UP
$3 7 billion
$3 4 billion
D & RG $320 million
$320 milium
The court finds that the portion of the
railroads true market value that should be
allocated to Utah for the assessment years
is as follows "
1984
1986
UP
4 99%
4 97%
D & RG 28 39%
26 81%
Thus, the true market value of the rail
roads' rail transportation property in Utah
for the assessment years was
1984
1985
UP
$184,630,000
$168,980,000
D & RG $90 848,000
$85,760,000

49

46

The plaintiffs might argue that if the earn
ings for the year were atypical the price earn
ings ratio should also be atypical and applying
the actual P / b to the actual earnings will still
produce a correct result
llowevei the h / P
that the stale applies is not the h / P foi any
particular company but supposedly an b P for
the industry An atypical year lot one railioad
may not have much effect on the industry E / P
and applying that b / P to abnormal earnings
may produce an abnormal result
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The c o u r t s conclusion is not meant in any
way to preclude the plaintiffs from challenging
the slate s application of its chosen methodology
for other assessment years through the appiopriale state p i o c e d u i c s

47 The panics basically agree on these percent
ages The figures are conveniently summarized
in Plaintiffs Supplemented and Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I^aw
at HA 13 15 19 (UP for 1984) 20 22 25 (UP for
1985) 27 29 32 (D * RG for 1984) 33 35 38
(D & RG for 1985)
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The assessed value of the plaintiffs' rail
transportation property in Utah was as follows *•
1984
1985
UP
$35,928,000
$39,760,000
D & RG $19,305,200
$20,048,565
Thus, the ratio of assessed value to true
market value was as follows
1984
1985
UP
19 46%
23 53%
D & RG 21 25%
23 38%
III
THE PLAINTIFFS'
EQUALIZATION CLAIMS
(5) The court's conclusions in part II-D
of this opinion give the left fin If of the
equation required by the 4P
amely,
the ratio of assessed value to <e market
value of rail transportation property within
the state See supra note 3 The parties
have stipulated to the right half of the
equation, namely, the ratio of assessed val
ue to true market value for all other com
mercial and industrial property in the state
The stipulation presents the court with two
scenarios, depending on whether or not the
48 See pltffs exs 391 at 4 392 at 2 394 at 2
and 396 at 2
49 The stipulation also resolves by agreement
the question of what constitutes "all other com
mercial and industrial property" in Utah for
purposes of the 4R Act The stipulation speci
fies four categories of other commercial and
industrial properties—certain mining and oil
and gas properties utilities locally assessed per
sonal property and locally assessed real proper
ty The parties have agreed on the true market
value and assessment rates for three of the four
categories See pltffs exs 496 it 497 The only
dispute is over the true market value and assessment rate for locally assessed real property and
the only disagreement between the parties there
is whether or not the court should apply the 20
percent discount statute in determining true
market value
90. A revised version of the statute was enacted
in 1987 and is codified at section *°- 2 304 of
the Utah Code
The statute further required the State Tax
Commission to "develop and implement compa
rable sales or cost appraisal methods in valuing
taxable property" that exclude the various fees
services closing costs and other expenses relat
ed to the sales transaction and other intangible
values
Utah Code Ann § 59 54 5(2) (Supp
1986) The timetable for the State Tax Commis
sion to develop and implement such methods
has been pushed back to January 1 1990 See
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court upholds a state statutory scheme that
discounts the assessed value of real property in the state an additional twenty per
cent °
Section 59-5-4 5 of the Utah Code stated
When the county asseslsjor uses the
comparable sales or cost appraisal meth
od in valuing taxable property for assess
ment purposes, the assessor is required
to recognize that various fees, services,
closing costs, and other expenses related
to the transaction lessen the actual
amount that may be received in the
transaction The county assessor shall,
therefore, take 80% of the value based on
comparable sales or cost appraisal of the
property at its reasonable fair cash value
for purposes of assessment
Utah Code Ann $ 59-5-4 5(1) (Supp
1986)"
Two county assessors testified that local
assessments of commercial and industrial
real property are generally based on the
cost appraisal method See Tr at 2344,
2351, 2374 •" The defendants therefore aruf § 59-2-304(2) (Supp 1988) County assessors are required to use the methods the State
Tax Commission develops for assessments beginning January 1, 1990 Id.
91 The assessors also testified that of the three
approaches commonly used namely, the cost,
income and market comparable approaches to
value the cost approach generally results in the
highest values See Tr at 2343-44, 2374 The
intervenors suggest that the discount statute
simply brings the assessed values of locally as
sessed real property more in line with the val
ue* of slate assessed properties, which give
more weight to the income approach—in other
words that one should discount cost indicators
of value by 20 percent to get a value that is
comparable to values based on an income indi
cator A similar argument was rejected in
Louisville A Nashville Railroad Company v Lou
utana Tax Commission. 498 FSupp 418 421
(M D La 1980) This court similarly finds the
argument unpersuasive It also ignores the evi
dence The evidence showed that Mr Prawitt
gives some weight to the cost indicator of value
for the railroads Moreover, Mr Bexell. the
Weber County Assessor, testified that the cost
approach for real property results in values
about 20 percent less than those determined
under sales assessment ratio studies the statuto
rily authorized method of valuing other com
mercial and industrial property under the 4R
Act See Pub I No 94-210 § 306(2)(e) 90 Stat

Cite u 71* F Supp 943 (O Utah I9SS)

gue that, for purposes of the 4R Act, the
true market value of locally assessed com
mercial and industrial property should be
80 percent of the appraised value, as required by the statute
The state's intent in passing the discount
statute appears to have been to tax real
property owners only on what they might
expect to receive from a sale of their property and not on a hypothetical gross sales
price M That intent may be admirable
Moreover, the statute may pass constitu
tional muster" Nevertheless, the court
concludes that applying the statute to de
termtne assessment ratios under the 4R
Act discriminates against the railroads by
artificially increasing the ratio for other
commercial and industrial property
The 4R Act requires a comparison be
tween two ratios, and, as all the experts in
this case agreed, for comparisons to be
valid the items compared must be compara
ble That which is compared under the 4R
Act is "true market value " Although the
statute does not define "true market val
ue," the experts all basically agreed that
true market value (or its various syno
nyms) is the price that a willing and knowl
edgeable seller and a willing and knowl
edgeable buyer would agree on in an arm s
length transaction See, eg,Tr at 12 (Dr
at 55 Yet the slate still reduces the values
determined under the cost approach by 20 per
cent
92 The legislative history of the statute suggests
that the act may also have been meant lo reduce
the relative burden on locally assessed laxpay
ers that arose out of |a| statewide reappraisal
program which had the effect of immediately
injecting a high degree of inflation into resi
dential values
Rio Algom Corp v San Juan
County 681 P 2d 184 193 (Utah 1984) The
legislature apparently felt that the reappraisal
progi am placed an unfaii burden on locally
assessed properties because the formulae used
to assess state assessed properties did not tend
to factor the effects of inflation into the stale as
sessed properties or if they did they did so at a
much more modest and less abrupt pace Id
The evidence in this case makes the legislature s
assumptions suspect l)r Schoenwald testified
thai the slates appraisal methods do factor in
the effects of inflation and if they do so at a
much more modest pace it may be because
inflation affects the value of rail assets less
dramatically than it affects the value of teal
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Schoenwald's definition of fair market val
ue) The fact that the seller might not net
the sale price does not mean that that price
is not true market value ' 4
The evidence in this case was that the
figures arrival at using the comparable
sales and cost appraisal methods of valua
tion—before applying any discount—are
considered true market value See, eg,
Tr at 2302 (testimony of Max Arnold),
2361-62 (testimony of Steven C Bexell),
common ex 11 (Utah State Tax Commis
sion Assessment Sales Ratio Study for
1984) at 2 (referring to the undiscounted
values as fair market value") M In arnv
ing at the railroads' true market value, the
state relies in part on a cost appraisal
method yet it does not reduce its final cost
indicator of value by 20 percent Similarly,
its stock and debt approach is a form of
comparable sales appraisal method, yet the
state does not reduce its stock and-debt
indicator of value by 20 percent nor does it
deduct so-called transaction costs, such as
brokerage commissions in arriving at its
final stock and debt indicator of value
Thus, if the court is to compare true mar
ket value to true market value, it should
compare values before any adjustments for
transaction costs or other so-called intangi
bles are made
property In trying lo adjust taxpayers relative
burdens the legislature would do well to bear in
mind Sir Hermann Black s warning Oh what
a tangled web we weave when (first) we practice
lo relieve
Sayings of the Week Sydney
Morning Herald July 6 1985 quoted in A Ptctio
nary of Irgal Quotations 161 (S James & C
Slebbings comp 1987)
53 In the Rut Algom case 681 P 2d 184 (Utah
1984) the Utah Supreme Courl held that section
S9 S-4 5 did not violate article XIII of the Utah
Constitution or the equal protection provisions
of either the stale or federal constitutions See
681 P 2d at 194
54 Indeed the parlies would generally consider
the transaction costs associated with the sale in
arriving at true market value
53 The parties stipulation itself indicates that
the true inarkel value of locally assessed real
piopeity is the value determined by the assess
ment sales ratio study before the 20 percent
reduction is applied See Settlement Slipula
Hon § IH3)(b)(v)
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[6] In short, the court concludes that,
it,
for purposes of the 4R Act, the true marrket value of "all other commercial and inndustrial property" in the state of Utah
in
must be determined before the 20 percent
nt
discount statute is applied. Cf. Louisville
le
9
& Nashville R.R. Co. v. Department of
f
in
Revenue, 736 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.1984) (an
l
across-the-board reduction in assessed val'~
ues of commercial and industrial pro|>ertie8
"8
c
under a state statute authorizing reduc*
n
tions in values to reflect costs of sale con~
stituted discrimination in violation of the
4R Act because it "handled] non-selling
*
local property owners a windfall . . . that
4
was not bestowed on railroads").* This
does not mean that the state cannot continue to give the 20 percent discount to locally
assessed real property. It simply means
that, in determining whether the state's8
,g
assessments of railroads discriminates
against the railroads in violation of the 4RR
Act, the court must consider the value oflf
locally assessed real property before thee
statutory discount is applied. The statee
may still be free to choose to tax realil
property on the basis of the net amount thee
property owner could expect to receivee
from a sale of his property. But that net
amount is not "true market value" as that
term is used by appraisers and in the 4R'
Act
Based on the stipulation of the parties,•'
the court finds that the ratio of assessed*
value to true market value for all otherr
commercial and industrial property within1
the state for assessment year 1984 was
\
15.4 percent and for assessment year 1985>
was 16.18 percent.
IV.
CONCLUSION
(7) Based on the court's conclusions in
part II-D and part III of this opinion, it isi
clear that the state of Utah has discriminated against the plaintiff railroads in its
56. The Eleventh Circuit left open the question of
whether the state would violate the 4R Act if, in
delei mining the just value of commercial and
industrial property it deducted the actual costs
of sale for those properties that actually sold
during the year.

tax assessments of the plaintiffs for the
years 1984 and 1985 in that it has assessed
them at a higher rate than it assessed all
other commercial and industrial property
within the state for the same period. Howe v er, the 4R Act only authorizes relief if
the ratio of assessed value to true market
value for rail transportation property exceeds the ratio for all other commercial and
industrial property "by at least 5 per centurn." Pub.L. No. 94-210 § 306(2)(c), 90
Stat, at 54. The court must therefore compare the various assessment ratios for each
of the plaintiffs and for "all other commercial and industrial property" in the state
for each assessment year to determine
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief.
The percentage by which UP and the D &
RG were overvalued for each of the assessment years is as follows:
1984
1985
UP
26%
46%
D & RG 38%
45%
Thus, the plaintiffs are entitled to relief
under the 4R Act.17
The defendants are hereby ORDERED
to assess the plaintiffs as follows: For
assessment year 1984, the defendants are
ORDERED to assess the plaintiffs based
on an assessed value that is 15.4 percent of
their true market value as determined by
the court or stipulated to by the parties.
For assessment year 1985, the defendants
are ORDERED to assess the plaintiffs
based on an assessed value that is 16.13
percent of their true market value as determined by the court or stipulated to by the
parties. The defendants are hereby ENJOINED from collecting property taxes
from the plaintiffs for assessment years
1984 and 1985 based on assessed values
that bear a greater ratio to true market
value than 15.4 percent and 16.13 percent
respectively.
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APPENDIX A
Comparison of Appraisals '
UNION PACIFIC
1984
Goodwin SL

Schoenwald
(ex. C-30)
Cost Approach
Net book value
Obsolescence
Cost indicator
Income Approach
Income estimate
Capitalization rate (direct cap)

5,555,803
(2,815,681)
2,740,122

State
(ex. C-32)

Ifflander
(ex. C-31)

6,205,607
(1,828,350)

6,200,299
(1,942,554)

4,377,259

4,267,746

320,000
9.77%
3,275,333
81,972
92,118

356,910
8.90%

Capitalized value of income
Construction in progress
Capitalized value, operating leases
Income indicator (direct cap)
Income estimate (NROI \ net lease rentals)
Capitalization rate (yield cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and Debt Approach
Market value, R.R. stock
R.R. long-term debt
R.R. net current assets & liabilities

338,643
15.40%

4,010,229
N/A
15.11%

2,198,981

4,577,513

3,449,423

3,074,843
1,491,073
(115,622)

3,000,000
1,414,415

4,450,294

4,414,415

83.98%
3,737,360
106,017

89.39%
4,096,115
34,246

3,843,367

4,130,361

2,740,122

4,377,259
3,449,423

2,198,981
3,018,132

3,843,367

4,257,746
4,010,229
4,577,513
4,130,361

2,608,557

3,700,000

4,100,000

R.R. value
Allocation factor (applied only to stock value
by G & I)
Market value, R.R. operating property
Leased equipment
Stock and debt indicator
Total value, parent's stock & debt
Total value, non-railroad & non-operating
property
Stock and debt indicator
Correlated Values
Cost indicator
Income indicator (direct cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and debt indicator
Correlated market value

10,549,892
(7,531,760)
^6TS\T52

IT IS SO ORDERED.
37. The state concedes that, if UP and D & RG
are entitled to equalization relief under the 4R
Act. SP is entitled to iclict as well.
I.

All dollars are expressed in thousands. Final
indicators may vary slightly h u m column totals
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4,010,229

due to rounding,
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APPENDIX A—Continued
UNION PACIFIC
1986
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APPENDIX A—Continued
Goodwin &
Ifflander
(ex. C-34)

Schoenwald
(ex. C-33)

State
(ex. C-35)

6,671,608
(3,187,444)
2,484,164

6,475,611
(2,076,376)
4,399,234

6,467,163
(2,661,884)
3,805,279

310,000
11.98%

366,887
10.30%

Capitalized value of income
Construction in progress
Capitalized value, operating leases

2,587,646
85,762
87,118

3,562,010

Income indicator (direct cap)
Income estimate (NROI f net lease rentals)
Capitalization rate (yield cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and Debt Approach
Market value, RR. stock
RR long-term debt
R.R. net current assets & liabilities
R.R. value
Allocation factor (applied only to stock value
by G & I)

2,760,511

3,562,010

Cost Approach
Net book value
Obsolescence
Cost indicator
Income Approach
Income estimate
Capitalization rate (direct cap)

Market value, R.R. operating property
Leased equipment
Stock and debt indicator
Total value, parent's stock & debt
Total value, non-railroad & non-operating
property
Stock and debt indicator
Correlated Values
Cost indicator
Income indicator (direct cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and debt indicator
Correlated market value

810,815
16.00%
1,942,694
2,674,843
1,427,374
32,464

2,600,000
1,322,267

4,134,671

3,922,267

81.77%^
3,380,866
93,266
3,474,122

86 69%
3,567,207
28,640
3,604,847

22MS87

Goodwin &
Ifflander
(ex. C-87)

311,468

350,000
87,657
(5,026)

300,000
76,767

R.R. value
Allocation factor (applied only to stock value
by G & I)

432,632

375,757

81.87%

89.43%

Market value, R.R. operating property
Leased equipment

354,187
8,946

344,047
6,771

363,133

350,817

343,039
291,894

330,415
311,463

Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and Debt Approach
Market value, R.R. stock
R.R. long-term debt
R.R. net current assets & liabilities

Stock and debt indicator
Total value, parent's stock & debt
Total value, non railroad & non-operating
property
Stock and debt indicator
Correlated Values
Cost indicator
Income indicator (direct cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and debt indicator
Correlated market value

25,183
15.40%
163,626

677,366
(331,531)
345,835
181,717
163,526
345,835

363,133

360,817

254,681

320,000

330,000

State
(ex. C-41)

Goodwin &
Ifflander
(ex. C-40)

DENVER & RIO GRANDE
1985

4,399,234
2,760,611

3,806,279
3,562,011

3,474,122
8,400,000

3,604,847

DENVER & RIO GRANDE
1984

Capitalized value of income

State
(ex. C-38)
&,1<&
5,964
291,894

(6,290,824)
2,690,179

1,942,694
2,590,179

Cost indicator
Income Approach
Income estimate
Capitalization rate (direct cap)

Income indicator (direct cap)
Income estimate (NROI + net lease rentals)
Capitalization rate (yield cap)

8,881,003

2.484,164

Cost Approach
Net book value
Obsolescence

Construction in progress
Capitalized value, operating leases

Schoenwald
(ex. C-36)

&w

$,mm

Schoenwald
(ex. C-36)

State
(ex. C-38)

Goodwin &
Ifflander
(ex. C-37)

467,739
(286,022)

641,000
(197,962)

537,697
(207,282)

181,717

343,039

330,415

23,000
8.28%
277,778

25,851
8.30%
311,453

Schoenwald
(ex. C-39J
Cost Approach
Net book value
Obsolescence

598,509
(159,082)
439,428

586,883
(198,380)

27,000
11 00%

30,727
1010%

Capitalized value of income
Construction in progress
Capitalized value, operating leases

245,455
1,582
5,038

304,282

Income indicator (direct cap)
Income estimate (NROI i net lease rentals)
Capitalization rate (yield cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and Debt Approach
Market value, H.R. stoclc
R.R. long-term debt

252,075

304,232

350,000
79,394

275,000
82,405

Cost indicator
Income Approach
Income estimate
Capitalization rate (direct cap)
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APPENDIX A-Continued
Schoenwald
(ex C-39)
R R net current assets & liabilities

Goodwln

Ifflander
(ex C-40)

R R value
Allocation factor (applied only to stock value
by G & I)

443,393

357,405

87 67%

93 22%

Market value, R R operating property
Leased equipment

388,729
6,181

338,760
8,132

Stock and debt indicator
Total value, parent's stock & debt
Total value, non railroad & non-o|
property

394,910

346,892

Correlated market value

491,129

YEAR
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

NRQI •
149 764
179 842
190 818
214 861
214 407
1/7 78S
181 966
118 168

DEPRECIATION
EXPENSE
82 891
86 441
93 698
106 279
109 989
110 143
109 343
104 724

•

DEFERRED
TAXES
39 697
16316
42 860
44 920
118 790
9 613
• 8 638
30 128

ticMi 323

I960 1964 6 YH NKOI AV(.
DISCOUNT RATE

439,428
252,075

387,503
304,232

278,736

394,910

346,892

278,736*

320,000

325,000

-

SCHOENWA1D 6 YR NROI AVO 1960-1964 -

$34 193

1966
1966
1967
196M
1969
I960
1M1
1962
1963
1964
1966
1966
1967
I**
ISM!)
11170
1971
197^
1973
1974
1976
1976

2

43 739

mm
38 BIB
43 461
56 967
82 836
SI 814
46 776
61 112
63 468
66 944
86 266
Ml 468
M0/.I9
HI 663
114416
I0M4J4
14^086
161 342
14*691
112 H72
IJ5 7JO

»

26 007
26 888
26 847
2M42J
32 746
36 636
38 032
39 103
41428
42 938
46 942
60H06
64 572
64 962
66H28
69 606
bl Mil
6J2M0
66 8JJ
68 179
73H.J8
?H 0 19

•

• 1444
0 1294
0 1149
00998
0 0849
00718
0 0616
0 06*4

4208
2 108
(1601)
26 014
10 377
16 821
7 261

DIVIDED BY

1600% - 11 002 019

006S4

68 608

$247 604

DEt ERRED
TAXES

1681 614

LA PITA 1
EXPENDITURES

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30 143
r
3l7 »8
16 7 W

Di S c h o e n w a l d * appraisal of I) & K(» for
assessment year 198S is based solely on his
analysis of the purchase of Rio Grande Indus

61914
47 812
60 239
64JI0
70 093
66J29
49 898
64 404
76 803
107 876
121 J23
207 929
147 646
M2MM7

144 169
I6J697
147 2J9
lib 463
137 blO
197 844
205 627
179 948

NET
CASH

-

FL0W
6 812
20 213
6 426
17 674
(390)
12 042
19 948
21474
16 737
(11470)
(8 437)
(70 867)
(II 616)
(•J 114
(6 7MM|
10 226
22 296
78 902
79 666
24 Jb9
12 941
4J620

tries, liic by the
tall of 1984

DISCOUNT
RATE
688%
6 91%
6205
6 91%
668%
7 26%
740%
7 34%
7 36%
7 16%
720%
740%
799%
8 46*
9 17*

loom

12 67%
1161%
10 96%
11 66%
12 9 8 *
12 67*

PV
DISCOUNT
RATE
PRESENT
FACTOR
VALUE
1
0 9446
0 8918
08397
0 7864
0 7362
06864
0 6391
0 6964
0 6646
0 6176
0 4827
0 4494
04161
0 3837
0 3616
0 8196
0 2838
0 2643
02292
0 2066
0 1819
0 1616

• 463
18024
4666
18 808
(287)
8 266
12,749
12 786
9282
(6 936)
(4 073)
(SI 848)
(4 792)
20 380
(2 386)
S267
6 828
20 066
18236
6008
2 364
8 019

DIVIDED BY

6 88% -

1681614

1

SCHOENWALD OVER VALUATION (UNDER VALUATION)

8681614

1884 010

(o f lit NOMNI SttflM>
^\T* / * * ' ' * ' * * **

Eugene SANDLIN, Plaintiff,
v
IRON WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL
OF TENNESSEE VALLEY AND VICINITY PENSION PLAN. Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 88-AR-6135-NW.

134 193
688*

PRESENT VAI lit.

NRQI

PRESENT

EM30B

278,736

1955-1984
SCHOENWALD'S 5 YEAR VALUE FROM 1950-1954 FOR 1955 AY
(ADJUSTED DISCOUNT RATE)
(000)

YFAR

EATJ

PV
DISCOUNT
RATE

TOTAL MARKET VAI UL OK NET CASH FLOW FROM 1966-1984 PLUb OUT YEAR INTO PERPETUITY

APPENDIX B

DIPRtClATlON
EXPt-NSfc

NET
DISCOUNT
CASH
- FLOW
1190%
68 606
1163%
32 622
12 69%
18 872
16 11%
(16 036)
17 60%
306 407
1816%
144 628
16 60%
248 719
16 40%
136 982
16 00%

CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES
203 837
260 07b
808 604
379 686
136 779
102 861
6) 118
112088

1198 996

ERAGE 1980-1984 .

(212,393)

IMS)

APPENDIX B-Contmued

4

State
(ex C-41)
13,99$

Stock and debt indicator
Correlated Values
Cost indicator
Income indicator (direct cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and debt indicator
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SANDLIN v. IRON WORKERS DIST COUNCIL PENSION PLAN

United States District Court,
N D Alabama,
Northwestern Division
Dec 15, 1988
Pensioner sued the administrator of an
ERISA pension fund for fund's alleged fail
ure to respond reasonably to pensioner's
request for information
The District
Court, Acker, J , held that the fund's 402day failure to supply information warrant
ed a penalty of $15,000
So ordered

Pensions *=»87
ERISA administrator's refusal to sup
ply information requested by pensioner
Anschul/ Corporation In the
whose benefits were cut off warranted pen
aity of $15,000 for 402-day failure to an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

swer, trustees and their agents deliberately and intentionally withheld information
from pensioner, understandably causing
him frustration and distress, if not ultimate
monetary loss Employee Retirement In
come Security Act of 1974, § 602(c), 29
U S C A § 1182(c)
John B Baugh, Gonce, Young & West
brook, Florence, Ala, for plaintiff
Norman J Slawsky, Jacobs and Lang
ford, P A , Atlanta, Ga, pro hac vice, and
Thomas N Crawford, J r , Cooper, Mitch,
Crawford, Kuykendall & Whatley, Birming
ham, Ala , for defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ACKER, District Judge
The court tried the above-entitled cause
without a jury in Florence, Alabama, on
November 15, 1988
Plaintiff, Eugene
Sandlin, framed his complaint under the
fc mployee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 29 U S C §§ 1001, et aeq, against
the Ironworkers District Council of Tennes
see Valley and Vicinity Pension Plan, an
ERISA governed pension plan as to which
Sandlin was and is a pensioner Sandlin
sought both pension benefits which he

TabF
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RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
v.
SAN JUAN COUNTY, et al.. Defendant,
and Respondents.
No. 18782.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 13, 1984.
Owners of state-assessed properties
challenged tax statutes as unlawfully increasing their ad valorem pro|>erty taxes
by requiring them to pay greater taxes to
compensate for reduced taxes paid by owners of county-assessed pro|>erties.
The
Seventh District Court, San Juan County,
Boyd Bunnell, J., ruled against taxpayers
on their motion for partial summary judg
ment and held statute constitutional, and
taxpayers appealed. The Supreme Cxnirt,
Stewart, J ., held that: (I) statute reducing
by 20 percent the value of county assessed
property appraised by comparable sales or
costs methods was not violative of constitutional tax uniformity requirement as requiring owners of state-assessed pro|M?rties
to pay greater taxes to compensate for
reduced taxes paid by owners of county-assessed properties in absence of evidence
that state properties were assessed at market value or that they bore a tax burden
greater than their pro rata share of pro|>erty taxes or that deduction of transaction
costs from comparable sales of figures or
estimates of cost defeated constitutional
objective of establishing a valuation that
was fair and equitable in comparison with
and commensurate with valuation of other
kinds of property, and (2) statute which
rolled back the value of county assessed
real property to reach 1978 levels produced
valuations that were not based on market
value and, as such, was violative of consti
tutional tax uniformity requirement.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded
Howe, J., concurred and filed opinion.

Hall, C.J., concurred in part and dissented in part filed opinion.

1. Taxation «=M9
Constitutional
provisions
requiring
that all tangible pro|>erty "be taxed in proportion to its value" and that pro|»erty be
valued "according to its value in money"
must be construed as requiring that the
valuation for assessment and taxation be,
as near as reasonably practicable, a s|>ecific
cash value for which the property value
would sell in the open market. U.C.A. 1953,
59-5-4.5 (Repealed).
2. Constitutional l^iw <*=>4H( I)
Acts of the legislature are presumed
constitutional especially when dealing with
economic matters based on factual assumptions.
.1. (oiiNtilultonal Law ®^IH(I>
A party attacking the constitutionality
of a statute must affirmatively demonstrate its unconstitutionality.
4. Constitutional U w «=»48(l>
Presumption of constitutionality applies with particular force to tax statute.
5. Taxation <£»4<M8>
Because of the lack of a more precise
common denominator than "market value"
for use in achieving uniformity and in deference to the inherent difficulties in assessing value, in dealing with assessments of
prices of pro|>erty, constitutional requirement of tax uniformity must IK* construed
as permitting a necessary latitude in defining "market value." Const. Art. 13, § 3.
6. Taxation <^»40(8)
(Constitutional authority vested in the
legislature to adopt means to achieve that
degree of uniformity of valuation that is
practicably attainable within the general
confines of the term "market value" is
intended to assure that the taxes that are
levied in a given county will result in each
property's being accountable for its pro
rata share of the burden of local govern
ment. II.C.A.1953, 59-5-4.5 (Repealed).
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11. Constitutional U w 4=>228.5
7. Taxation «=»40(8)
Taxation e=»42(l>
Statute reducing by 20 percent the value of county assessed property appraised
Equal protection provisions of the Fedby comparable sales or costs methods was
eral and State Constitutions accord particunot violative of constitutional tax uniformlarly wide latitude to legislative classificaity requirement as requiring owners of
tions in tax statute. Const. Art. 1, § 2;
state assessed properties to pay greater
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
taxes to compensate for reduced taxes paid
12. Constitutional Law <*=>229<3)
by owners of county-assessed properties in
Taxation <*=»40(8>
absence of evidence that state properties
Statute reducing by 20 |>ercent the valwere assessed at market value or that they
bore a tax burden greater than their pro
ue of county assessed property appraised
rata share of property taxes or that deducby comparable sales or costs methods is
tion of transaction costs from comparable
not violative of the equal protection provisales of figures or estimates of cost defeatsions under the State and Federal Constitued constitutional objective of establishing a
tions as requiring owners of slate assessed
valuation that was fair and equitable in
property to pay greater taxes to compencomparison with and commensurate with
sate for reduced taxes paid by owners of
valuation of other kinds of property. U.C.
county-assessed property. U.C.A. 1953, 59A 1953, 59-5-109; Const. Art. 13, §§ 2, 3.
5-4.5(Repealed); Const. Art. 1, § 2; U.S.
C.A. Const Amend 14.
8. Taxation e»4(MH)
Since "market value" is not a term
having a wholly fixed and precise meaning,
it is reasonable and constitutionally permissible for the legislature to recognize that
transaction costs can and do influence values computed on actual sales prices, as
well as other valuation formulae, to provide
that they may be taken into account in
determining "market value." U.C.A. 1953,
59-5-109; Const. Art. 13, §§ 2, 3.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
9. Taxation «=>40(8)
When inflation has a significant and
different effect on the value of properties,
the legislature may readdress the imbalances and inequities created. U.C.A. 1953, 5 9 5-109; Const. Art. 13, S$ 2, 3.
10. Taxation «=»42(l>
The legislature may not establish formal classifications of property that result
in nonuniform or disproportionate tax burdens, but it may seek to enforce the constitutional uniformity requirement by at
tempting to equalize the tax burden borne
by those taxpayers who pay a greater tax
in proportion to the value of their property
than others. U C.A.I953, 59-5-109; Const
Art 13, §S 2, 3.
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13. Taxation <t~40(8>
An ad valorem tax system must IK?
based on periodic reassessments that take
into consideration the fluctuating factors
that affect value. Const. Art. 13, § 3.
14. Taxation «=M0<8)
An indefinite, partial freeze on the
evaluation of some properties in the state
is inherently inconsistent with the basic
concept of an ad valorem tax system.
Const. Art. 13, § 3.
15. Constitutional Law <&=5
If the Constitution is to be changed for
some inequity, the people must make that
change by constitutional amendment.
16. Taxation e=>49
Statute which rolled back the value of
county assessed real property to reach 1978
levels produced valuations that were not
based on market value and, as such, was
violative of constitutional tax uniformity
requirement.
U.C. A. 1953,
59-5-109;
Const Art 13, *i§ 2, 3.
17. Courts «=» 100(1)
Decision determining that the statute
which rolled back the value of all countyassessed real property to its 197H level was
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violative of the constitutional tax uniformity requirement was prospective and effective only from and after J a n u a r y 1. 1984,
b u t as to the six t a x p a y e r s who were parties to the appeal, it was retroactive for the
year for which the suit for tefxtid w a s
brought
U C A 1953, 59-5- 109; Const
Art 13, §§ 2. 3
18. Taxation *»5I3<7»
Owners of s t a t e assessed property
seeking to recover an alleged overpayment
of taxes under protest on ground t h a t statute declared unconstitutional caused a shift
in tax burden to their pro|»erties m u s t demonstrate that county assessed pro|>erties
were appraised at less th . . i t . niHI t r u e
values, and, in addition, im
fish the
t r u e value of their own piindependent evidence, and the , i
used
m u s t give due effect to the san,
. onomic
factors a s the formulae used to value the
county assessed properties.
U C A 1953,
59-5-109
19. T a x a t i o n
tf^ltfftf)
Although there usually is a p r e s u m p
tion that pro|»erty assessed by a s t a t e or
county assessor has been appraised a t full
value, the presumption applies only when a
taxpayer challenges the valuation of his
own property and not when he challenges
the appraised value of another's property
U C A 1953, 59-5-109
20. Taxation e=>543<7. K)
If the taxpayers demonstrated t h a t the
county-assessed pro|>erties were appraised
at less than their 1981 t r u e values and
established the true value of their s t a t e
assessed properties by independent evi
dence, the taxpayers could recover the dif
ference between the a m o u n t of taxes they
paid and the amount (hey would have paid
had the s t a t u t e not been in effect, and if
the taxpayers' s t a t e assessed pro|»erties
were appraised at less than full value, the
taxpayers would be entitled to what they
would have paid had the s t a t u t e not been in
effect, less the amount they underpaid
their taxes because the properties were
umlerassesstui
U C A J 953, 59-5-109
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J a m e s B Lee, J a m e s M Elegante, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants
Bruce K Halhday, Monticello, Bill Tomas
P e t e r s , Salt Lake City, for defendants and
respondents
STEWART, Justice
This is an action brought by plaintiffs
Rio Algom Corporation, Utah Power and
l i g h t Company, Atlas Corporation, Energy
Fuel* Nuclear, Inc, Consolidated Oil and
Gas, Inc , and Northwest Pipeline Cor|»oration against San J u a n County and various
of its officials, the San J u a n School District
and various of its employees, and the S t a t e
Tax Commission and its commissioners for
a refund of a part of the property t a x e s the
; ! untiffs paid, over protest, to San J u a n
< unity for the year 1981
The plaintiff taxpayers are owners of
state-assessed properties located in San
J u a n County
On this' apical, they chal
lenge the constitutionality of two s t a t u t e s
(1) U C A . 1953, «* 59 5-4 5 (Supp 1981),
which reduces by 20 percent the value of
county assessed property appraiser) by
comparable sales or cost methods, and (2)
UCA.
1953. s 59-5-109 (Supp 1981),
which rolls back the value of all county as
sessed real property to its 1978 level
Plaintiffs contend that the reduction of the
assessed value of county assessed properties, but not state assessed properties, has
unlawfully increased their ad valorem property taxes by requiring them to pay greater taxes to compensate for the reduced
taxes that owners of county assessed properties pay
The plaintiffs' contention is
that the two challenged statutory provisions violate, on their face, the tax uniformity and equal protection provisions of the
Utah Constitution and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

I

AD VALOREM PROPERTY
TAXES GENERALLY

U C A , 1953, s 59-5-4 5 (Supp 1981) and
t) 59 5 109 (Supp 1981) were enacted in

1981. Laws of Utah 1981, ch 231, § 1 '
Section 59-5-4 5 provides
Assessor to recognize certain expenses in
valuing property—percentage limitation
When the county assessor uses the com
parable sales or cost appraisal method in
valuing taxable property for a s s e s s m e n t
purposes, the assessor is required to rec
ognize that various fees, services, closing
costs, and other expenses related to the
transaction lessen the actual amount that
may be received in the transaction
The
county assessor, shall, therefore, take
807c of the value based on comparable
sales or cost appraisal of the property as
its reasonable fair cash value for pur
poses of a s s e s s m e n t
Section 59-5-109 providesAll locally assessed taxable real property
shall be appraised at current fair market
value and the value of such property
rolled back to its J a n u a r y 1, 1978, level
as such level is determined by the s t a t e
tax commission
In the trial court, the plaintiffs sued for
a refund of that portion of their 1981 prop
erty taxes which they contend should have
been paid by county assessed property
owners in San J u a n County who were mi
derassessed pursuant to the above s t a t
utes
On a motion for partial summary
judgment, <»<* 59-5-4 5 and 59-5-109 were
attacked as being facially unconstitutional
Plaintiffs adduced no evidence of actual
nonuniformtty in the tax a s s e s s m e n t s of
state-assessed properties as compared with
county-assessed properties
Plaintiffs' arg u m e n t was that county assessed properties were not assessed at current market
value, and therefore the assessments were
unconstitutional as a matter of law
De
fendants opposed the motion in part on the
ground that the issues could not be adjudi
I.

In Us 1982 budget session the legislature
passed a proposed constitutional amendment
thai was lalifietl by the volets in the November
1982 genetal election and became effective Jan
uary 1, 198)
t h e amendment alleis A n u l e
XIII. s 1 to read
(I) the I egistatuit shall pioside b\ law a
umfoim ami equal tate of assessment on all
tangible pi o p e n \ in the state accoidmg to its
value in mone\ exiept as otherwise
ptoxuied
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cated by s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t because of the
existence of issues of fact
Defendants
submitted evidence indicating that state-assessed properties were undervalued and
t h a t the s t a t u t e s in question were intended
by the Legislature to redress a substantial
and discriminatory shift of property taxes
from s t a t e assessed properties to county
assessed properties The trial court ruled
against the plaintiffs on the motion and
held the s t a t u t e s constitutional The court
held that the s t a t u t e s were enacted pursii
ant to the state's constitutional authority to
classify property and to establish different
methods for valuing different types of
property
The constitutional attack on §§ 59-5-4 5
and 59-5-109 focuses primarily on §§ 2 and
3 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution
Section 2 of that article a s it read in 1981
provided
All tangible property in the state
shall be taxed in proportion to its value,
to be ascertained as pi ox tiled by law
f Emphasis added |
Section 3 of Article XIII provides
The legislature shall provide by law a
uniform and equal r a t e of assessment
and taxation on all tangible property in
the s t i t e , according to tts value in mon
cy, and shall prescribe by law such regu
lations as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of such property so that
every person and corporation shall pay a
tax in pro|M>rtion to the value of his, her,
or its tangible property
(Emphasis
added j
Two other constitutional provisions also
deal with the a s s e s s m e n t of ad valorem
property taxes and are pertinent to this
case Section 4 of Article XIII deals with
the taxation of mines and mining claims
in Section 2 of this Artule
[I mphasis added
to show alteration )
Section 2 was simultaneously am< tuled to allow
the ( ( g i s l a l u i e to exempt up |o 4S pciceul of
the (an mailed value ol i evidential piopeilv
Ailicle XIII § 2(8)
Ihe I egislattiie also lepealed t) S9 S-4S effci
l i u as of the same date the conslUulioii.il
amendment betainc elleetise
l a w s of Utah
1981 ch 2*1 * I
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All metalliferous mines or mining
claims, both placer and rock in place,
shall be assessed as the legislature shall
provide; provided, the basis and multiple
now used in determining the value of
metalliferous mines for taxation purposes and the additional assessed value
of $5.00 per acre thereof shall not be
changed before January 1, 1935, nor
thereafter until otherwise provided by
law. All other mines or mining claims
and other valuable mineral deposits, including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in mining
and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or
mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of mining claims, or mining property for other than mining purposes, shall be assessed as other tangible
property,
Section 11 of Article XIII provides that
the "State Tax Commission shall administer and supervise the tax laws of the state.
It shall assess mines and public utilities
. . . . It shall have such other powers of
original assessment as the legislature may
provide."
Pursuant to § 5 9 - 5 - 3 (Supp 1983), the
Legislature has directed the Commission to
assess the following properties:
Pi|>elines, power lines and plants, canals and irrigation works, bridges and
ferries, and the property of car and
transportation companies, when they are
operated as a unit in more than one
county; all pro|»erty of public utilities
whether 0|>eruted within one county or
more; all mines and mining claims, and
the value of metalliferous mines based
on two times the annual net proceeds
thereof as provided in section 59-5-57,
and all other mines and mining claims
and other valuable deposits, including
lands containing coal or hydrocarbons,
nonmetalliferous
minerals
underlying
land the surface of which is owned by a
person other than the owner of such
minerals, all machinery used in mining
and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or

SAN JUAN COUNTY
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mining claims and the value of any surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or mining pro|>erty for other
than mining purposes; must be assessed
by the state tax commission as hereinafter provided; except that property assessed by the unitary method, not necessary to the conduct and which does not
contribute to the income of the business
shall be assessed separately. All taxable
pro|>erty not required by the Constitution
or by law to be assessed by the state tax
commission must be assessed by the
county assessor of the several counties
in which the same is situated. For the
purposes of taxation all mills, reduction
works and smelters used exclusively for
the purpose of reducing or smelting the
ores from a mine or mining claim by the
owner thereof shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or mining claim
though the same is not u|ion such mine
or mining claim.
Under this section and its antecedent, the
State Tax Commission has assessed the
tangible properties of the plaintiffs in this
action.

other companies, and the number of years
utilized in the formula may also vary. The
decision as to which ratios and how many
years to use is based upon the discretion of
the appraiser utilizing the approach or the
Commission itself.
The stock and debt method ia based on
the equity and liabilities of the company as
shown on its balance sheet. It is applied to
value state assessed properties that are
sold so infrequently that the comparable
sales method cannot be used. Again, substantial discretion may be exercised by the
appraiser in valuing a company on this
basis. In addition, the Commission may
use the "correlated value" method, which is
The constitution and laws of the state
mentioned below.
divide the responsibility for valuation of
Properties owned by utilities are valued
tangible properties between the State Tax
by a weighted average of the three basic
Commission and the county assessors of
For example, the properties
the respective counties. Article XI11, §§ 5 methods.
and 11. County-assessed properties, such owned by Utah Power & Light Company
and Mountain Fuel Company thus are valas residences and farmland, are assessed
ued by a formula using 50 |>ercent cost, 45
on the basis of cost or comparable sales,
percent income, and 5 percent stock and
and commercial enterprises that are coundebt. The Commission also uses a variant
ty-assessed are usually assessed on a capiof this formula called the "correlated
talized income method. The Tax Commisvalue" method, by which each of the above
sion utilizes a wide variety of assessment
factors is given such weight as the judgmethods and formulae. The basic valuament of the Tax Commission dictates.
tion methods utilized by the Commission
State appraisers, acting under the generare cost, income, and stock and debt. A
al direction of the State Tax Commission or
number of variations of these methods and
a Commissioner, have considerable discreoften substantial discretion are used to
tion in determining which method should be
modify the basic methods.
utilized in assessing a particular property
The cost method values pro|>erty on the
and the weight to be given to each indicabasis of net book value, which equals origitor of value.
nal cost less depreciation. That method
Pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, § 59-5-57, the
gives very little effect to the impact of
legislature has provided that metalliferous
inflation in the assessment process.
mines are to be valued at two times the
Valuations are also made on the income
average net annual proceeds for the preapproach. However, its application in a
ceding three calendar years. Nonmetalligiven case may vary. The valuation of
ferous mines are presently valued by capilarge growth companies under this formu
talizing net income, using a five-year averla, for example, is generally done on the
age, and negative values are taken into
basis of a five-year average of the ratio of
consideration. See Utah Tax Commission
the value of assets to net income. The
Regulation A12-4-12. Under Tax Commisratios used involve a variety of measures
sion Property Tax Regulation No. A12-4of the value of assets and may include
10, oil and gas properties are valued "in an
current book value, current net book value,
amount equal to 80% of the gross realizaaverage book value over five years, and
tion from the sale of oil or gas which was
average net book value over five years.
produced from each such property during
Different levels of income are used for

the basis of comparable market sales;
some types of property are rarely sold and
have no ascertainable market value based
on comparable sales. The value of some
properties may be strongly influenced by
general economic or market conditions,
while others are not. Some may be "wasting asset" type properties (such as mines
and oil and gas properties), while most are
not. Indeed, some properties may have a
value that is peculiar to the owner and to
no one else. See Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. Salt Lake County, 122 Utah 431, 250
P.2d 938 (1952) (where the issue was the
valuation of a mine dump).

Under Article XIII, § 3, the property taxes paid on each property are required to
have a uniform proportion to the value of
the property. Although the objective is
easily stated, its attainment is more difficult. Because of the many different kinds
of property and the various factors that
affect their values, the determination of
what constitutes equal "in proportion to
the value of his, her or its tangible proper
ty," under Article XIII, fc 3, cunnot be
made by application of any single formula.
Of primary importance is the determination of what valuation methods should be
utilized, and that depends on the nature of
the properties to be taxed.
Residential,
commercial, transportation, mining, and
public utilities, etc., must be treated differently because of the economic conditions
that give value to such properties. Some
properties are income producing; some are
not. Some types of property sell frequently in an open market and have a market
value that may he reasonably
on W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized byestimated
the Howard
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trend by enacting Sections 59 5-4 5 and
59-5^109 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended 1981
Does the trend result
from the regulations procedures and as
sessment practices of the Tax Commis
sion 7 These statistics, on comparison
fail to illustrate any of the contentions
put forth by the Plaintiffs as being disad
vantaged by the challenged legislation

the calendar year prior to the d a t e of a s
sessment'
In sum the Tax Commission uses a v a n
ety of formulae to value projM rties
How
ever the formulae used a r e generally not
very sensitive to inflation, e s | * cially those
formulae based in whole or in p a r t on hook
value

"d
'

Because of the methods used to a s s e s s
county assessed properties—especially cost
of reproduction and comparable sales,
which are highly sensitive to inflation—and
because of recent high r a t e s of inflation
and the statewide reassessment of county
assessed properties during t h e 1970s, the
assessed valuation of county assessed prop
erties es|>ecially residential properties has
become disproportionately high to s t a t e a s
sessed properties From 1971 to 1981, the
value of county assessed properties in
creased 245 percent a multiple of slightly
less t h a n 37^ During the s a m e time, the
value of s t a t e assessed properties increased
approximately only 45 percent
Although
the total increase in the value of county a s
sessed properties was undoubtedly not en
tirely attributable to general inflation it is
a fair inference that a significant p a r t of
the increase was The t o m p u itivcly small
increase in the value of s t a t e assessed
pro|M*rties was no doubt a reflection in p a r t
of valuation formulae t h a t gave little effect
to inflation The differences in the effects
accorded inflation by the a s s e s s m e n t for
mulae were no doubt substantial factors in
producing the disparity between the in
creases in the value of county assessed and
slat* assess* d properties
That disparity
was the basis for lh« \A gislature s « na< t
mg the statutes in question
In partial sup|>ort of their (M)sition on
summary judgment the defendants s u b
nutted the unrebiitted affidavit of a deputv
Salt l>ake ( o u n t y auditor which stated
(Olver the period from 1971 to 1981 there
is demonstrated a trend t h a t shows the
continuing disparity in the growth in val
ue of locally assessed property as com
pared to state assessed property
This
disparity and trend has continued in spite
of the legislative attempt to curb the

II

T H E CONSTITUTIONAI ITY Or

A

Sections 2 and f of Article XIII of the
Utah
Constitution
We first address the plaintiffs conten
turns that § 59 5-4 5 violates Arti< le XIII
of the Utah Constitution s|»ee ificallv s*» 2
and 3 of that article The argumc nt is th it
the s t a t u t e in permitting a 20 p< r t e n t re
duction from the comparable sales a p p r u s
al or a cost appraisal is in confix t with the
language in § 2 that requires that all tangi
ble pro|ierty shall be taxed in proportion
to its value and the language, in *» i that
pro|»ertv should be valued according to its
value in money
( I ] This language was construed in
State ex rel Cunningham
v Thomas, lb
Utah 86 50 P <>15 (1897) to mean that
property should be valued as tic ar as is
reasonably practicable at its full cash val
ue, in other words
the valuation for
assessment and taxation shall be as near
as reasonably practicable equal to the cash
value for which the properly v tine d would
sell in the o|>en market
lit at 90 50
P at 615-lh
Su also Hat mi i i
State
7<r» ( ommission
II lit ih 2d <2I 152 P 2el
87<> (19<»<l) Kuinuott
( oppu
( oi p i
Salt lakt (ountu
122 lit ih Ml 250 P 2d
918(1952) In particular the e Unit is t i n t
§ 59 5-4 5 is uiuonstitution il b<e inse it
permits assessments it other t h i n in irket
value
| 2 , 3 | An analysis of the constitutional!
ty of s 59 5-4 5 must begin with the pre»po
sition that acts of the !> gisl iture ire pre
sumed constitutional cspccidly when <l< il
mg with economic m itte is b ise <l on f u t u a l
assumptions
liaku
i Mathtson
lit dt
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607 P 2d 2 U (1979) Salt I ake (ity i Tax suit from the various valuation formulae
Commission
11 Utah 2d *59 159 P 2d J97
utilized for estimating m a r k e t value
(19(>l) A p i r t y attacking the constitution
15 61 Because of the lack of a more
ality of i s t a t u t e must affirmative ly
precise common denominator than market
d e m o n s t r i t c its unconstitutionality
f a
value for use in achieving uniformity and
Stone
i Ih pa it men t oj
Rtgistiation
in deference to the inherent difficulties in
Utah 567 P 2d 1115(1977)
SaltlakeCity assessing value *J I confers on the I^gisla
i Tax (omniission
supra
Thomas i
ture the powe r to provide by law for just
Daughters
oj Utah Pioneers
114 Utah
valuations
Accordingly
when dealing
108 197 p 2d 477 (1918)
with a s s e s s m e n t s of classes of prof>erty
111 The presumption of constitutionality
applies with p irticular force to tax s t a t
utes
Although we are concerned here
with the constitutionality of § 59 5-4 5 un
der Article XIII of the Utah Constitution
what has been stated by the United States
Supreme Court with respect to tax s t a t u t e s
challenged under the frejual Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
relevant to the instant problem
In San
Antonio
S7hool District i Rodriguez
411
US 1 40 9 I S ( t 1278 1100 % l Ed 2d
16 (197 I) the (e»urt stated
No sche me of taxation whether the t ix
is imposed on properly income or pur
chases of goods and services has yet
bec n de vised whic It is fre e of all discrinu
natorv impact In such a complex arena
in which no pc rfect alternatives exist the
Court docs well not to impose toe» rigor
ous a st inel irel of se rutwty lest all lo< il
fiscal s< he me s become subjects of criti
cism undt r the Fcpial Protection Clause
(Footnote omitted ]
.See also Madden i Kentucky
109 U S 8 i
(»0 S ( t 406 84 I r d 590 (1940)
Nut
\ork Rapid Transit (orp
i M M )f)rk
101 I I S 77 1 58 S ( t 721 82 I I el | 0 2 t
(1918)
Under (IM (It ih ( oustilution there is no
g e n e r i l constitutional authority for classi
fying pre>p<rt\ for assessment purposes
I he pi un f i i t is however t i n t ehffere nt
types of prop< rty cannot be issc sse d under
one formuli
He cause of the necessity let
use ehffc re nt me thods for assessing diffe r
ent types of preipe rty a certain degree of
de f u t o el issifuatiein is unavoidable
Therefore notwithstanding the basic con
stitutional objective e>f uniformity there
are mmv de fie to classifu itions that re
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*» I must be re M\ to permit a nc cc ssary
latitude m defining m a r k e t value
State
ex rel ( unmngham
i Thomas
16 Utah
8b 99 50 P 615 618(1897) the case upon
which the plaintiffs heavily rely recognized
as much
Because of its dissimilarity the process
by which the j u d g m e n t jof valuation| is
formed must vary and probably as to all
property except money perfe ct eepiahty
in vain itions and a s s e s s m e n t s is unat
tamable owing to the fallibility of the
human j u d g m e n t
The point was made eve n more cle arly in
Unittd Statts Smelting
Rifining
& Mm
ingio
i Hayius
111 Utah 172 181 17b
P 2 d 622 <»27 (1917)
It will be observed t i n t these provi
sions (s*s 2 and i of Article X111 ] reepnre
t i n t all t mgiblc property
shall be
subjecteel to i uniform inel equal r i t e of
assessmc nt ae e o r d m g to its v iluc in inon
ey The mcttmd or yarelstuk by which
the valuation m money is te» be deter
mine el sb ill be prescribed by the le gisla
ture
It is not required ( h i t the same
V irelstie k or me thod of de te running value
sh dl be use d with re spe e 1 let .til kinds of
property
Kill the different formula
wliuh m iy be ipphe d lo different kinds
of property must be sue It that they um
and te nd to se e ore for isse ssme nt pur
poses t \ tin thon f tir nul e eput ible in
cennpinsori with ind eeunme nsurate with
the v ilu ition ol ettlte r kinds of propt rty
When the v a l u i h o n thus secureel is such
that if the uniform and equal rate of
t ixation is applied to the valuation the
property is taxed in the same proportion
to its value as is all other tangible prop
erty

the

methoel e/f
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sessed valuation is not subject to constitutional objections as violative of our Ar
tide XIII
Thus, §§ 2 and 3 of Article XIII permit the
l e g i s l a t u r e to adopt means to achieve that
degree of uniformity in valuation that is
practicably attainable within the general
confines of the term " m a r k e t value " The
objective is to a s s u r e that the taxes that
are levied in a given county will result in
each property's being "accountable for its
pro rata s h a r e of the burden of local
government " Appeal of Johnstoivn
Associates, 494 Pa 433, 438, 431 A 2*1 932, 934
< 1U81 > Accotd Kenney v heeblei Co, f>.*l
P a C o m m w 507, 411) A 2d 210 (1980)*

^3
'

|71 Plaintiffs contend that a reduction
in the value of county assessed pro|>erlics
by 20 percent d e m o n s t r a t e s on its face an
unconstitutional discrimination in favor of
county assessed pro|»erties
However, the
plaintiffs have not attempted to demon
s t r a t e by affidavit or otherwise that their
own properties a r e assessed at m a i k e t val
ue or that they hear a tax burden g r e a t e r
than their pro rata s h a r e of the property
taxes in San J u a n C/ounty
Nor have they
demonstrated that the deduction of " t r a n s
action c o s t s " from comparable sales fig
ures or estimates of cost as (leniulted by
§ 59-5-4 5 defeats the constitutional objec
tive of establishing "a valuation (that i s |
fair and equitable in comparison with and
commensurate with the valuation of other
kinds of property " United Stales
Smelt
ing, Refining & Mining Co v
llaynes,
supra, 111 Utah at 181, 17<i P 2d at <»27
Nor have the plaintiffs demonstrated
that § 59-5-*4 5 is not consistent with the
constitutional requirement that properties
be valued at market value See State ci
iel Cunningham
e Thomas, supra
In
2

RIO AL<;<>M CORP. v SAN JUAN COUNTY

6 8 ! PACIFIC RKPORTKR. 2d S Kit IKS

Piopcrty lax sthenic* llial s p t u l u a l l v allow
t-lassif nations uic designed m pail lo spitad
I lie lax buidcn on the al>ihl> ol p i o p n i x lo
pioduic i i u o m t
In It//on \ti>ne h/n I itn in
v Stale Hd of / quuhmlton
I \H Moiil 60 \ ISM
P 2 d SS. 64 (I960) llu. town slaliel
I lit* pni|K>s4 ol ilie i lassilii.ilion slalole
IS
lo slilll lilt lundi n nl luxts l i o m piopei l\ as
sin h lo pioeluelivilv 01, in o l l m woids lo
IIII|M»SC ill*, bin ik us ol i^ovt rniiR ill upon
pioptily in piopoiliou lo Us list lis piodui

deed, Thomas itself recognizes that the
term "market value" is a term that cannot
be applied in an overly rigid fashion
The numerous formulae used to deter
mine market value demonstrate that the
term is a judgment not subject to mathe
matical precision that is based on a wide
variety of factors
"Market value," the basis for all assessment valuation, is an attempt to create a
fictitious sale of the subject pnqierty by
assuming an owner willing to sell and a
buyer desiring to buy When, as in the
instant case, there is no actual buyer
desiring to purchase the property for
continuation of its s|>eeia! use. the property's highest and beat use as a special
pui'|Mjse property must still be considered
for valuation pur|M»ses The very n a t u r e
of special purjKise property is such that
market value cannot readily be determined by the existence of an actual market, and therefore other methods of valuation, such as reproduction cost, must be
resorted to
Math i oj MeCanntl.
Minn, HOI N W 2d
910, 924 (1980) Accord United
National
Coip e County of Ileum pin, Minn, 299
N W 2 d 7.1, 7h (1980)
riven when there are sales of the type of
pioperly to be assessed, it Is still the case
that the term "market v.due" is at best an
approximation In United National
Coip
e County
oj Hennepin,
supia,
299
N W 2d at 7t>, n 4, the court s t a t t d
Market value and sales puce a t e not
s\nonymotis
Although l e t e n t sales of
pioperties of a similar n a t u i e are per
stiasive in determining market value, fat
tors such as sales and holding prices in
the aiea, location, a n ess, age, use, si/e,
livilv lis uliltl\ Us t>i ini al silling in lln. i t o
iiomii oigaiii/alion ol sotitl>, so dial « . \ n \
one IAIII lu t.illitl upon lo i oiiti il>ul< . m o i d
inn lo Ins alnlilv lo lx ai bin d i n s oi a s i i i . u k
so as max In
|l ilaliou ounilcil |
S< c also [fuiiht (i>nttt\ i Alihisi>n in/nia
A
Sunm 11 K\ An/ 476 I* 2*1 6S7 (l«»/0)
I lie
Hl.ili ( on .Million thus uoi pi i mil i l a . s i l n a
lions .is sui h ixi«pl lo llu i \|t nl III it Xili.li
Mil I) 2 pi i mils spiti.il litalmiiil ol iisiiltii
Hal pi opt i lu s
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type of construction, method of financing
and the a r m ' s length nature of a transac
tion may render any comparisons invalid
In Mattel
oj McCannel,
supra,
U01
N W 2d at 922, the court phrased the point
in a somewhat different manner
"AI
though selling price is usually a good indie
ator of market value if the sale is an a r m ' s
length transaction between parties with
equal bargaining power, the terms or condi
tions of a sale may affect the selling price
and make it unrepresentative of the proper
ty's actual v a l u e " See also
Minnesota
Entertainment
Enterprises
v State, 30<>
Minn 184, 187, 285 N W 2d 390, 392-93
(1975), Deitch Co v Board of
Property
Assessment,
417 Pa 213, 218, 209 A 2d 397,
402 (1965)

county assessed properties as a result of
inflation In part, the problem arose out of
the statewide reappraisal program, which
had the effect of immediately injecting a
high degree of inflation into residential values
In contrast, the formulae used to
assess state assessed properties did not
tend to factor the effects of inflation into
the state assessed properties, or if they did,
they did so at a much more modest and less
abrupt pace When inflation has a significant and differing effect on the value of
properties, the l e g i s l a t u r e may redress the
imbalances and inequities created
North
ein Natural
lias Co v Williams,
208
Kan 407, 493 P 2d 5B8 (1972),
Supervisor
oj Assessments
v Otremba, 50 Md App
o08, 440 A 2d 403 (1982)

181 Since " m a r k e t value" is not a term
having a wholly fixed and precise meaning,
it is reasonable and constitutionally permis
sible for the Legislature to recognize that
"transaction c o s t s " can and do influence
values computed on actual sales prices, as
well as other valuation formulae, to provide
that they may be taken into account in
determining m a r k e t value
That conclu
sion is supported by the language in Article
XIII, *» 2 t h a t gives the l e g i s l a t u r e some
|>ower to define value (Since there is no
claim in this case that the amount of the
transaction costs provided for in § 59-5-4 5
is factually arbitrary, the reasonableness
of the amount of those costs is in effect
conceded )
191 F u r t h e r m o r e , the l e g i s l a t u r e was
justified in enacting § 59-5-4 5 for another
reason The l e g i s l a t u r e acted on the pre
muse that the then existing property tax
scheme in the s t a t e was discriminatory be
cause it required county assessed taxpay
ers to shoulder an unfair portion of the
taxes and violated the requirement of uni
fortuity The l e g i s l a t u r e was well aware,
as the legislative history of both challenged
acts unequivocally demonstrates, that there
had been a large shift of the property tax
burden from s t a t e assessed properties to
3

lu iespouse |«> iUc plainlilis lequesl lot ail
missions I lie lax Commission iknieil that all
piopeily untlt i Us jui isdu lion was assessed al
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The l e g i s l a t u r e ' s factual premise that
state valuation and county valuation were
not uniform has not been attacked 3 I)e
fendants filed affidavits with the Court on
the cross motions for summary judgment
that lend some support to the factual proposition that there is a significant lack of
uniformity
Kven without the defendants'
evidence, however, we would still be oh
hged to presume that there is a valid factu
al basis for the challenged s t a t u t e
See
Muttei of MtCannel. supia, 301 N W 2d at
9 Hi, El well e Ileum pin County,
301
Mum t>3, 221 N W 2d 538 (1974)
110) Certainly the l e g i s l a t u r e may not
establish formal classifications of property
that result in nonuniform or dispro|M>rtion
ate tax burdens Hut the l e g i s l a t u r e may
seek to enforce the uniformity requirement
of ^ 3 by attempting to equalize the tax
burden borne by those taxpayers who pay
a g r e a t e r tax in pro|>ortion to the value of
their property than others
In permitting
transaction costs to be deducted from a|>praisals based on comparable sales or cost
appraisal method, the l e g i s l a t u r e has uel
ther departed from the "cash value" re
qutremenl of Article XIII, <» 3, nor gone
beyond its constitutional duty lo "prescribe
by law such regulations as shall secure a
Us t u n e nl (an easli value and luilhci denied
dial llu plamlilfs pio|HH\ was assesstd al 100
| K i i i n l ol the l u n e n l lull i asli value
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just valuation for taxation " Id
Clearly,
the s t a t u t e is not based on a plan or a
principle designed to violate equality and
uniformity
Denver v I^eunn, 106 Colo
331, 105 P 2 d 854 (1940)

Accordingly we hold that § 59-5-4 5
was constitutional under Article XIII

The overarching purpose of §§ 2 and 3 of
Article XIII is to achieve uniformity in the
ad valorem taxing scheme The definition
of value is one element in a formula designed to achieve t h a t end by establishing a
common denominator for valuation p u r
poses The law has long been that where
"it is impossible to achieve both the s t a n
dards of the t r u e value and the uniformity
and equality required by law the latter
requirement is to be preferred as the j u s t
and ultimate purpose of the law "
Deln
ware Lackawanna & Western Raihoad v
Neeld, 23 N J 561. 570, 130 A 2d 6. 11
(1957), quoting Swur City Bridge Co v
Dakota County, 260 U S 441, 43 S Ct 190,
67 L E d 340(1923)

(11) Equal protection provisions of the
federal and state constitutions accord par
ticularly wide latitude to legislative classifi
cations in tax s t a t u t e s Apache (*ounty v
Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe
Railuay,
106 A m 356. 476 P 2d 657 (1970)
No
scheme of taxation," whether property, in
come or otherwise * has yet been devised
which is free of all discriminatory impact '
San Antonio
School District
i
Rodn
guez, 411 U S 1, 41, 93 S Ct 1278. 1,101, 36
L E d 2d 16 (1973) In Nashnlle,
Chatta
nooga <£ St Louis Railway v
Rioumng,
310 U S 362, 368, 60 S Ct 968, 971, 84
L E d 1254 (1940) the Supreme Court s t a t
ed
This Court has previously had occasion
to advert to the narrow and sometimes
cramping provision of these s t a t e uni
formity clauses, and has left no doubt
that their inflexible restrictions u|»on the
taxing powers of the state were not to be
insinuated into that meritorious concep
tion of equality which alone the Equal
Protection Clause was designed to as
sure

To assess pro|M»rty a t its j u s t \ a l u e is
only one of the fundamental require
ments of law The a s s e s s m e n t m u s t fur
ther represent the owner' 1 < qual portion
of the burden of taxaf
I if the
assessors have not appraise u .*«. lull val
ue but only a t a fixed percentage of t r u e
value then such t r e a t m e n t m u s t be uni
form and equal on all real e s t a t e and
tangible pro|»ertv, so much so t h a t if
both cannot be obtained then equality
must prevail
Ktttery Electric Light Co v Assessors oj
the Town of hittery
M e . 219 A 2d 728,
734 (1966)
In the instant case, the l e g i s l a t u r e
might have dealt with the problem of uni
form taxation bv requiring adjustments in
the formulae used by the S t a t e Tax Com
mission to assess state assessed preqierties
As a practical m a t t e r the Legislature may
well have decided not to a t t e m p t t h a t a|>proach because of the complexity and diffi
culty of having to deal with so many differ
ent kinds of formulae for assessing market
value By acting as it did, the liegislature
acted neither unconstitutionally nor unrea
sonably

B

Equal Protection and Uniform
ation of the Laws

Oper

(121 In sum § 59-5-4 5 does not violate
the equal protection provisions of the s t a t e
and federal constitutions
HI

CONSTITUTION ALII Y O F
s 59 5 109

I J C A , 1953 § 59 5-109 (Stipp 1981) pro
vides that all ' locally assessed real proper
ty shall be appraised at e urn nt f ur m u ke t
value and the value ol such prop* rty rolled
back to its J a n u a r y I 1978 level
Article
XIII of the Utah Constitution authorizes ad
valorem property taxes The term ,u\ va
lorem t a x " means literally according to its
value" and is used to designate an assess
ment of taxes against property at a certain
rate on its value Von ell > dhason
50
An? 542 74 P 2d 47 (1917)

113,141 A critical factor in establishing
a s s e s s m e n t s that represent reasonably ac
curate approximations of value is tune
Virtually all factors that influence value
vary with time An ad valor* m tax system
must, therefore be based on periodic re as
sessments that take into consideration the
fluctuating factors that affect value
To
free7e the value of some properties at a
given point in time, and not others must
necessarily result in nonuniform assess
ments
In Moon Lake Etettnc
Associa
tton i» State Tajr Commission
9 Utah 2d
384, 145 P 2 d 612 (1959) this Court held
unconstitutional a s t a t u t o r y formula that
fixed the assessment of a property for ad
valorem tax purposes
The Court stated
"The effect of these ( s t a t u t o r y | sections is
nothing unless it prevents the accurate
a s s e s s m e n t of pro|ierty in a given case to
its full value The conflict with the consti
tution is clear
Id at 387 M 5 P 2 d a t < > 1 4
T h a t is precisely the difficulty with the
r o l l h i c k s t a t u h * It n<c<ssanly follows
that an inch finite partial fre« /* on th<
valuation of some prop* rties in the state is
inherently inconsistent with the basic con
cept of an ad valorem tax system
IneviU
bly, the s t a t u t e would produce valuations
that a r e not based on market value and
that are in violation of the princ iple of
uniformity •
(I5|
We recognize t i n t s 59 5-109 w i s
enacted to redress a disparity l>< twee it as
sessments of state assessed and count\ is
sessed properties
But if the constitution
is to be c h a n g i d to adjust for MHIK IIH qui
ty, the> ptoph must make (hat < h uige l»y
constitution il tint udnie ut
(I6|
In sum the fixing of base line is
s e s s m e n t s of county assess* <l real pi oper
ties as of a give n year in the past VM I tah
Hotel ( o i l oiuason
Utah, 659 P 2d 10 ><>
(198J), is a violation of Article XIII ss 2
and 3 and is unc (institution tl
IV

PROSPECllVr- AND
RrTROA( H V r
rrrrCIS

Defendants irgue that if either of these
s t a t u t e s is found IIIK onshtution il the n (lie
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( ourt should make its ruling prospective
only as we did in overruling pnor decisions
in / oyat Order of Moose No 259 t> Coun
ty Hoard Utah 657 P 2d 257 (1982) Oth
e rwise defendants maintain local govern
ments will be subject to enormous financial
and administrative b u r d e n s
Taxing dis
tricts throughout the s t a t e have relied on
the provisions of these s t a t u t e s in setting
their null levies for 1981 through 198a*
I^ocal governments o p e r a t e on very precise
and often strained b u d g e t s that are care
fully tied to these levies
Since 1981 a
number of owners of s t a t e assessed proper
tics h i v e paid their t a x e s under protest or
have filed formal complaints with the Tax
Commission
Retroactive effect to a deci
sion altering the relative tax burdens be
tween locally assessed and state assessed
properties would require reopening the as
sessme nt process as to tax obligations not
yet final
To the extent that this might
result in re fmuh of fixes paid on state as
s< ss« d |>ro|»<rties it would impose incle bt
edness for future r e p a y m e n t s from locally
assessed properties
Such indebtedness
could be huge in counties that derive high
proportions of their b u d g e t s from state as
sessed properties
The purely prospective application of a
state court decisietn overruling prior au
thoritv in a < IMI ease violates no right
under the United S U t e s Constitution
(tteat Notthun
Railuay
i Sunburst
Oil
d Rt funny (o 287 U S 158 53 S Ct 145
77 I I d 160 (19*2) (The prospective or
n t r o u t i v c eff« < t of <U c isions in criminal
< is< s m \ o l \ < s i difle r« nt range of consul
erition uid is n c i l h t r precedent for nor
should he dee nice! influenced by what is
done in < ivil c is* s ( ompare State v Nor
ton t»7r» p 2d 577 (198 1)) In recent years
the United States Supreme 1 ( o u r t has on
s e \ e r i l occasions held civil legislation un
constitution il t\tu\ then given only prosper
tive effe* t to its holding in order to avoid
imposing undue administrative or financial
burdens on agencies of local government
r u Ittnont
kurtzman
411 V i> 192 91
S ( t 1461 16 I M 2 d 151 (1971), City of
I'homn
i kolodzHjshi
1 9 q | I S 204 9(1
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S C I 1990, 26 L E d 2 d 523 (1970), Ciprta no v City oj tloumu,
395 U S 701, 89
S C t 1897, 23 L E d 2 d 047 (1909)
The
prospective effect the Court gave to its
holding on the unconstitutionality of the
hroad jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts IH
another example Northern Pipeline Con
struct ion Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co,
458 I! S 50, 102 S Ct 2858, 73 I. Ed 2d 598
(1982)

hrj
I
^J

Similarly, in cases holding that state taxes or assessment procedures were unconsti
lutional, numerous state courts have direct
ed that their holdings should have only
prospective effect Eg, Southern
Pacific
Co v Cochise County, 92 Aru 395, 377
P 2 d 770 (1963), Deltona Corp v Hadey,
F l a , 330 So 2d 1103 (1976), Strickland
v
Newton County, 244 Ga 54, 258 S E 2d
132 (1979), Kansas City Millwright
Co v
Kalb, 221 Kan 658, 562 P 2d 65 (1977),
Jacobs v Leu i nylon Fayette Ihban
Coun
ty Government,
Ky , 500 S W 2d 10 (1977),
Salorto r Glasei, 93 N J 447, 461 A 2d
1100 (1983), Soo Line Rail,ond
r State,
N i l , 286 N W 2 d 459 (1979), Pttktns
r
County of A/bet matte, 214 Va 416, 200
S E 2 d 566 (1973), (iottlub
e City oj Milwaukee, 33 Wis 2d 408, 147 N W 2d 033
(1967)

Burger in Lemon r huttzman,
sit pi a
We relied on these same considerations in
directing purely prospective elfect (front a
future date) to our overruling decision in
Isoyal Ordet oj Moose No 259,
supra
On the basis of the circumstances of this
case, the foregoing considerations and au
thorities persuade us of the appropnate
ness of prospective effect to our bidding
that § 59-5-109 is unconstitutional
One of the criticisms of giving only pro
spective effect to a decision is that it turns
the court's opinion into an advisory opinion
or dicta It also deprives the litigants, who
have sustained the burden of attacking an
unconstitutional statute, of the fruits of
their victory For this reason, prospective
effect may even discourage challenges to
statutes of questionable validity
In re
spouse to these considerations, some deci
sions that give only prospective effect to a
holding of unconstitutionality as to all oth
er parties give the holthng retroactive ef
feet as to the litigants or others who have
litigation (tending Stm klattd c
Ntwton
County, suptn ((la parties onl>)
huii
sas City Mtllwi tyht Co v ha lb,
supia
(Kan —parties and others with action pend
ing), Pet kins v County oj Albet
matte,
supra (Va—parties only) See yene tally
Schaefer, "Pros|»ective Rulings Two Per
speclives," I9HJ Suptemc COM// Review 1,
6, Schaefer, "The Omtrol of 'Sunbursts'
Techniques of Pros|>ective Overruling," 42
N Y UL Rev M l , 638-40 (1967) We gave
this kind of hunted retroactive effect to a
decision that local government legislation
was unconstitutional, a decision that was
otherwise prospective only Cutttt e IU tt
eer County
Set rue A tea No One, 16
Utah 2d 280, 283, 399 P 2d 410, 4 12 (1965)
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under these circumstances could well be
V PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND
contrary to fact and could result in enhancHaving concluded that § 59 5-109 is un
ing the inequality the legislature sought to
constitutional, it is appropriate to state the
redress Ste Reading Co t»
Woodbndge,
guidelines that should be applied in deter
supra, 212 A 2d at 660
mining what relief may be granted on re
1201 If plaintiffs prove both elements,
mand
they may recover the difference between
1181 For the plaintiffs to recover an al
the amount of taxes they paid and the
leged overpayment of taxes paid under pro
amount they would have paid if § 59-5-109
test on the ground that § 59-5-109 caused
had not been in effect See First
National
a shift in the tax burden to their properties,
Hank r Chnstensen,
39 Utah 568, 577-78,
plaintiffs must prove two elements First,
118 P 778, 781 (1911), Continental
Na
the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
tional Bank i> Nay lor, 54 Utah 49, 58, 179
county assessed properties were appraised
P 67, 71 (1919) If the plaintiffs* proper
at less than their 1981 true values Sec
ties were appraised at less than full value,
ond, the plaintiffs must establish by inde
they will be entitled to what they would
pendent evidence the true value of their
have paid had § 59-5-109 not been in ef
own properties, and the appraisal used
feet, less the amount they underpaid their
must give due effect to the same economic
taxes because their properties were under
factors as the formulae used to value the
assessed
county assessed properties
Reading Co
The case is affirmed in part, reversed in
v Woodbrtdye, 45 N J 407, 426, 212 A 2d
part, and remanded for further proceed
649, 659-60 (1905), In ie Appeals
of
ings No costs
Kents, 34 N J 21, 33, 166 A 2d 763, 769-70
(1961), Tri Terminal
Corp v
Edgewatet,
OAKS and DURHAM, J.l , concur
68 N J 405, 412, 346 A 2d 396, 400 (1975),
HOWE, Justice (concurring)
Fott Lee v Hudson Ten ace Apat tint nt\
1 concur except in the application in part
175 N J Super 221, 236, 417 A 2d 1124,
11(A) of the principle that "where it is
1132 (1980), Anaconda
Co v Perth Am
impossible to achieve both the standard of
boy, 157 N J Super 42, 53-54, 384 A 2d
the true value, and the uniformity and
531, 536-37 (1978)
equality required by law, the latter require

These state decisions rely on the need to
preserve the financial solvency of local
(191 Although there usually is a pre
government units, the great financial and
sumption that property assessed by a slate
administrative hardship that would be en
or county assessor has been appraised al
tailed if general retroactive effect were
full value, the presumption applies only
allowed, and the tax authorities' justifiable
when a taxpayer challenges the valuation
reliance on the statute, which is presump
of his own property and not when he dial
tively constitutional To the objection that
lenges the appraised value of another's
an unconstitutional act is void from its
property
Eg, State ex ret Stephan
v
inception so that everything done thereun
Martin, 227 Kan 456, 463, 608 P 2d 880,
der must be undone, the New Jersey Su
887 (1980), Reading Co v Woodbrtdye, 45
pre me Court cited the mi|»ortauce of recog
N J at 429, 212 A 2d at 661 To extend
lining "that we are acting within the
that presumption to plaintiffs' properties in
framework of appropriate equitable relief
117| For the same reasons that motivat
this case would conflict with the implied
with respect to an unconstitutional taxation
ed the foregoing de< isions we duett that
legislative finding that slate assessed prop
statute " Salouo r Gla.s< t, 93 N .) at f>h t, our holding of line nnstit ut lou.iht \ h< pro
erties were underassessed
It would also
401 A 2d .it 1108 In fashioning an equita
spec Uvc and old « live onl\ horn and a l h r
conflict with the Tax Commission's admis
bl< remedy, reliant e mten sts weigh heavi
Jauiiaiy I 19X1 As to tin six plaintiff
sion thut plaintiffs' properties are not val
ly. ami the tour! should seek a blend of
taxpayeis who an p.utus to tins .ipp4.il
ued at full value • To presume that plain
what is necessary, what is lair, and wb.it is
bowevei Ibis decision shall he u t i o . u l K c
tiffs' properties are assessed at full value
workable
Id at 564, 461 A 2d at 1109,
for the year for which this suit toi lefund
relying on the opinion of Chief Justice
was brought
4. Clark
See ii Law
3 supra
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
School, BYU.
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nient is to be preferred as the just and
ultimate purpose of the law " That princi
pie apparently originated in Sioux
City
Budge
Co v Dakota County, 260 U S
441, 43 S C t 190, 67 I. Ed 340 (1923),
where that Court relied upon it to justify
its departure from a statute requiring property to be valued at its fair market value in
order to comply with a constitutional man
date that there be uniformity and equality
of taxation By applying the principle, the
Court was able to afford relief to a tax pay
er whose property had been assessed at
full fair maiket value while other proper
tits in the county had been assessed at only
55 < '1 In principle was applied under HUUI
lur circumstances in Dvluivun', Lut Kuwait
na & Wtstttn
Raihoad
i> Neeid, 23 N J
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561. 130 A 2d 6 (1957) cited in the main
opinion.
In the instant case, however, valuation at
fair market value is mandated by article
XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution, and its requirements cannot be relaxed in an effort to obtain uniformity and
equality also mandated by section 3
In
the context of this case, the principle can
have no application
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and dissenting)
I join the Court in declaring the roll back
provisions of 11 C A , 1953, § 59-5-109
(Supp 1981) unconstitutional on their face
However, for the same reasons, I also view
as unconstitutional on their face the provisions of U C A , 1953. § 59-5-4 5 (Supp
19HI), which reduce the value of taxable
real property assessed by the counties by
200*

•"rj
I

Article XIII. sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution of Utah in unequivocal Ian
guage require that all non exempt tangible
pro|»erty, both real and personal, be as
sessed at a "uniform and equal rate," and
that it be assessed and taxed 'according to
its value in money "

The defendants recite the legislative history of the subject statute, which reflects
that a disparity was found to exist in the
valuation of county assessed and state as
sessed property The disparity was appar
ently occasioned by the different valuation
methods employed by the state and the
counties The counties generally utilized a
comparable sales method that readily re
fleeted the effect of inflation upon market
value. However, the state continued to
inflexibly follow its usual cost, income,
stock and debt approaches to market value
and failed to in any way eomi>ensate for
the effects of inflation This caused con
siderable consternation on the part of coun
ty assessors who were compelled to assess
the pro|>erty of their constituents at sharp
ly increasing values while stale assessments lagged far behind It was to relieve
this inequity in assessment that the Leg is
lature enacted the subject statutes
How
ever well mtentioned the legislative enact
inents were, the> nevertheless do not meet
constitutional muster

It is thus to be seen that § 59-5 4 5 is
unconstitutional on its face in that it directs
the county assessor to assess and tax conn
ty assessed property at 80'/! of its "reason
able fair cash value" rather than at UM)"'
of its value This is precisely the sort of
inequality and lack of uniformity that vio
tales the express provisions of article XIII,
sections 2 ami 3, mpta

Article XIII. section 3, supta.
confers
upon the legislature the obligation and
duty to "provide by law a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation" and
to "prescribe bv law such regulations as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of
such pro|»erty " However, that authority
must be read in light of the overriding
concept espoused by the constitution, l e ,
that all pro|>erty be assessed at a "uniform
and equal rate," and that it be taxed "according to its value in money " The case
of Vtntctl States Smtltiuq.
h'e/imuq <VMttnnq Co v Haynes.1 relied upon bv the
defendants does not hold to the contrary
flathei. it is supportive of this basic propo
sition This is to be seen in that no matter
which method or yardslak the legislature
chooses to determine the valuation of prop
erty in money, the end result th.it must be
achieved is just that, l e "aceoiding to its
value in innnev

1

3

This Court has long heretofore interpret
ed the term "according to its value in mon
ey" as the full cash value of the property '
Also, the term "full cash value" has been
determined to be synonymous with the
terms "actual cash value," "market value,"
' reasonable fair cash value" and "value in
money " *

2

Stale v lhnma*.

16 Ulali 86. SO l» 6IS <I8<*7)

kenneiott
( opper (ntp i Salt I <tke < onttt\
122 Huh 411 ?S0 T2d <M8 (l«S2)

111 Utah 172. 176 I' 2d 622 (IV47)

WELLS v. CHILDREN
ClteasMtl P 2d
Viewed in light of what has just been
said, the subject legislation causes state as
sessed and county assessed pro|»erty to be
assessed at unequal rates and at values
other than actual market value
Further
more, the legislation tends to compound
rather than alleviate the problem of dispari
ty in assessed valuation
This it does by
leaving in place and thereby sanctioning
the erroneous assessment practices of the
state that fail to assess property according
to its actual value Rather than legislating
so as to insure that the assessment prac
tices of the state be revamped so as to
bring them in conformity with constitution
al mandate, the legislation directs the coun
ty assessor to also violate the constitution
by assessing property at a rate 20'^ less
than actual
value
I would reverse the decision of the trial
court in its entirety
(O f«l»

n«miiM>

CindyN Fay WELLS. Ouarduin ad litem
for Dennis Edgar Wells. Jr., a minor
over the age of 11 years, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY OE UTAH.
Successor in Custody of K i t . . Mother
of Infant K . and K.K . Defendants and
Appellants.
v
John DOE and Mnrv Doe and Robert D
Maack. Esq . (Guardian ad litem for Infant It. Intervenors and Appellants
No.

18537.

Supierne Court of Utah
March 23. 1984
Unwed ininoi father brought action
through guardian ad litem seeking c ustody
of newborn child that had been released to
state adoption agency and subsequently to
adoptive parents, after father failed lo
make timely filing of his acknowledgment
of paternity as required by statute
The
Seventh District Court. Or.tud Cnuiit\,
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199 (Utah 1984)
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Royd Bunnell. J , granted custody of child
to father on grounds that statute could not
constitutionally be applied to him, and
mother, agency, and adoptive parents ap
pealed The Supreme Court, Oaks, J , held
that (1) statute specifying procedure for
terminating parental rights of unwed fa
ther is constitutional under due process
clause of United States Constitution, {2)
such procedure is consistent with due pro
cess requirements of Utah Constitution,
and (3) agency correctly applied statute on
facts of case and did not violate fathers
federal or state due process rights
Judgment reversed,
with directions

case

remanded

1. Children Out of-Wedlock <S=»20
Parent and Child <s=»2( 1)
The relationship between parent and
child is protected by Federal and State Con
stitutions, these protections include the fa
ther of an illegitimate child
2. InfantH ®=>|55, 156. 157
Con ditutionaliy
ptohcltd
parental
rights can be lost, tlt< \ tan be siirtendered
pursuant to statute, they can be lost
through abandonment of the child by mat
tion or course of conduct for which parent
is personally responsible, such rights can
also be teimutated through parental unfit
ness or substantial neglect
II C A 1953,
78 30 t(l, 2b 78 30 5
3. Adoption <£=>I4
To serve its purpose for welfare of
child, determination that newborn child can
be adopted must be final as well as luuncdi
ate
I Adoption e=>7 2<3>
The stall's stiong inteiest in immedi
ale secuie adoptions for eligible newborns
piovides a sufficient justification for signil
leant variations in parental tights of imw< d
fathers, who, in contrast to mothers, are
not automatically identified by vutue of
their role in the process of birth
5 Constitutional Law o > 2 l 2 l t h
Infants C--|;{2
Statute sp«.« il\ mg plot « dure for lei nil
nating parental rights of unwed lather,
Hquiniig lathet to file acknowledgment of
paternity pnoi to date ( Inld is n It a s . d t o

TabG
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DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah
corporation, and Dakal, Inc., a Utah
corporation, Plaintiffs and Respondents,

refer the reader to that opinion for a full
expression of my views on this practice.

u£

AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Petitioner.
No. 870343.

BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF

Supreme Court of Utah.

UTAH, a nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

July 12, 1989.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, Third District, Salt Lake County; J.
Dennis Frederick.

v.
STATE of Utah, Utah State Tax Commission, and Utah State Insurance Department, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 1W76.

Ted Boyer, H. Mifflin Williams, III, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and petitioner.
Jerome H. Mooney, Arthur M. Strong,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
Prior report: 765 P.2d 1277.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Having heard oral arguments and having
further reviewed the record and the briefs
on file, it appears that certiorari was inv
providently granted. The case is therefore
dismissed.
STEWART, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
(dissenting):
1 dissent I do not join in dismissing the
writ of certiorari. No valid reason exists
for doing so, and the majority expresses
none. In Israel Pagan Estate v. Capitol
Thrift and Loan, 771 P.2d 1032 (Utah
1989) (Howe, Assoc. C.J., dissenting), I set
out the conditions under which the United
States Supreme Court dismisses writs of
certiorari as having been improvidently
granted and suggested that we follow its
practice. None of those conditions exist
here, and I decry the wasteful use of time
and money of the parties, their lawyers,
and this Court which dismissal promotes. I

Supreme Court of Utah.
July 19, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 1989.
Nonprofit health service corporation
challenged constitutionality of statute imposing premium income tax on health service corporations and other insurers, but
exempting mutual benefit associations and
cooperative benefit associations.
The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J.
Dennis Frederick, J., granted summary
judgment in favor of State, Tax Commission, and Insurance Department. Corporation appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that imposing premium
income tax on nonprofit health service corporation, but exempting mutual benefit associations, did not violate "uniform operation of laws" provision of State Constitution, equal protection clause, or prohibition
against private or special law.
Affirmed.
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2. Constitutional Law *»209
If statutes can withstand scrutiny under "uniform operation of laws" provision
of State Constitution, they comply with federal equal protection clause. Const. Art 1,
§ 24; U.S.C.A. Const. A mend. 14.
3. Constitutional Law *»213.1(2)
In scrutinizing legislative measure under "uniform operation of laws" provision
of State Constitution, it is necessary to
determine whether classification is reasonable, whether objectives of action are legitimate, and whether there is reasonable relationship between classification and purposes. Const Art. 1, $ 24.
4. Constitutional Law ••70.1(12)
In tax area and in other areas of purely economic regulation, broad deference is
given to legislature when scrutinizing reasonableness of classifications and relationship to legitimate, legislative purposes under "uniform operation of laws" provision
of State Constitution. Const Art 1, $ 24.
6. Constitutional Law *»229.2
Taxation *»9S4
Insurance companies and health service corporations on the one hand and mutual benefit associations and cooperative
benefit associations on the other hand were
relevant groupings in "uniform operation
sof laws" challenge to statute imposing premium income tax on health service corporations and statute imposing premium income
tax on other insurers, but exempting mutual benefit associations and cooperative benefit associations. Const Art 1, $ 24; U.C.
A.1953, 81-14-4(1), 31-87-9(2) (Repealed);
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
6. Constitutional Law *=»70.1(5)
Supreme Court deciding challenge to
statutes under "uniform operation of laws"
provision of State Constitution is not free
to break out groups that might be distinguishable if legislature did not do so.
Const. Art. 1, $ 24.

1. Constitutional Law «=»213.1<2)
Examination into reasonableness of ec7. Constitutional Law «=»229.2
onomic legislation under "uniform operaTaxation «=»955
tion of laws" provision of State ConstituImposing premium income tax on nontion is at least as vigorous as that required
profit health service corporation and other
by federal equal protection clause. Const.
Digitized
by the Howard
J. Reubenbut
Clark
Law School,
BYU.benefit asexempting
mutual
Art. 1, § 24; U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend.
14. W. Hunter Law Library, insurers,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sociations, was reasonably related to legitimate purposes of raising revenue and giving special treatment to fraternal nature of
associations, and, therefore, did not violate
"uniform operation of laws" provision of
State Constitution or equal protection
clause, even though associations could operate as for-profit corporations and were
not required to be adjuncts of nonprofit,
religious, cooperative, or benevolent organizations, and even though two of the six
mutual benefit associations in State did not
restrict themselves to issuing policies only
to employees of single company or members of church or association; corporation
failed to show tax took business from it or
other commercial insurers. Const Art 1,
§ 24; U.C.A.1953, 31-14-4(1), 31-37-9(2)
(Repealed); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
8. Constitutional Law *=»213.1(2)
In determining whether classifications
that legislature has used are reasonably
related to legitimate legislative purpose
and comply with "uniform operation of
laws" provision of State Constitution, Supreme Court is not limited to considering
those purposes that can be plainly shown to
have been held by some or all legislators.
Const Art. 1, \ 24.
9. Constitutional Law *=»211(2)
Impact of measure can be relevant in
determining whether legislative body has
exceeded bounds of broad discretion it has
in fashioning purely economic legislation
and can be relevant in determining whether
legislation complies with "uniform operation of laws" provision of State Constitution. Const Art 1. $ 24.
10. Statutes «=»96<1)
Taxation *=»955
Statutes imposing premium income tax
on insurers of nonprofit health service corporations, but exempting mutual benefit
associations and cooperative benefit associations, are "general laws" and do not violate state constitutional prohibition against
private or special laws, in that statute complied with "uniform operation of laws" requirement of State Constitution. Const
Art 1, % 24; Art 6, ft 26; U.S.C.A. Const
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Amend 14, U C A 1958, 31-14-4(1), 31-379(2) (Repealed)
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions

11 Statutes *»77(1)
If law satisfies "uniform operation of
laws" provision of State Constitution, it
will not violate prohibition against private
or s|»ecial law Const Art 1, $ 24, Art 6,
§ 26
David R Money, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant
David L Wilkinson, Stephen G Schwendiman, Bruce H Pettey, Mary Beth Walz,
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appel
lees
ZIMMERMAN, Justice
Plaintiff Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Utah ("Blue Cross"), a nonprofit health
service corporation, appeals from a summa
ry judgment granted against it and in favor
of defendants State of Utah, Utah State
Tax Commission, and Utah State Insurance
Department (collectively, "the State")
This judgment upheld against state and
federal constitutional challenge a pair of
Utah tax statutes Taken together, these
statutes levied a 2 26 percent tax on subscription income received by nonprofit
health service corporations and on premium
income received by all other insurance companies in the state, but exempted from the
tax the premium income received by insurance companies organized as mutual benefit associations ("MBAs")
Utah Code
Ann 55 31-14-4(1), 31-37-9(2) (Supp
1981)' We conclude that the tax scheme
enacted by these statutes is constitutional,
therefore, the trial court's ruling is af
firmed
Blue Cross initiated this action against
the State, challenging the taxing scheme
represented by sections 31-14-4(1) and 3137-9(2) of the Code It contended that
I

Title 31 of the Code has been repealed and
replaced by title 31A 1985 Utah U w s ch 242,
§ 58 effective July I 1986 This opinion will
address the constitutionality of the tax levied by
title 31 because it was the law in effect at the

MBAs were in all material respects indis
tinguishable from Blue Cross, a health service corporation, against which the MBAs
competed directly It also contended that
by exempting MBAs from the 2 25 percent
tax imposed on all other insurers, the legis
lature had placed Blue Cross at a competi
tive disadvantage and that in treating the
MBAs add Blue Cross differently, the leg
islature had created a classification that
bore no reasonable relation to the purpose
of the taxing scheme, which was to raise
revenue Blue Cross attacked the taxing
scheme under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution as well as under the
uniform operation of the laws provision
and the special laws ban contained in the
Utah Constitution
U S Const amend
XIV, § 1; Utah Const art I, § 24, Utah
Const art VI, 5 26 Both Blue Cross and
the State filed motions tor summary judg
ment The trial court granted the State's
motion and denied that of Blue Cross, hold
ing that as a matter of law, Blue Cross had
not demonstrated the taxing scheme's un
constitutionality Blue Cross appeals that
determination
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of ma Lena I fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law
Utah RCivP 66(c), see, eg, Ron Cose
Roofing and Asphalt Paxnng, Inc v
Blomquxst, 773 P 2d 1382, 1384 (1989) In
considering an appeal from a grant of sum
mary judgment, we view the facts in a light
most favorable to the losing party below
Eg, Sejlel v Capital Ctty Bank, 767 P 2d
941, 946 (Utah Ct App 1989), Payne ex rel
Payne v Myers, 743 P2d 186, 187-88
(Utah 1987) And in determining whether
those facts require, as a matter of law, the
entry of judgment for the prevailing party
below, we give no deference to the trial
court's conclusions of law those conclu
sions are reviewed for correctness
Eg,
Bonham v Morgan, — P 2d
,
time Blue Cross filed its first complaint See
Utah Code Ann $ 31A-l-202(2) (1986) ( An ac
lion or proceeding commenced under any law
repealed by this title is not affected by the
repeal")

BLUE CROSS AND BLUh SIIIKLU v SI AIL
CIUM779 PJd *34 (Utah 1989)

102 Utah AdvRep 8, 9 (Feb 23, 1989),
Scharfv BMG Corp, 700 P 2d 1068, 1070
(Utah 1985)
Blue Cross renews on appeal all the chal
lenges it made below We consider first its
claims that the taxing scheme violates both
the equal protection clause of the federal
constitution and the uniform operation of
the laws provision of the Utah Constitu
tion US Count amend XIV, § 1, Utah
Const art I, § 24 We will then treat the
assertion that the tax violates the special
laws ban of article VI, section 26
(1,2) The principles and concepts em
bodied in the federal equal protection
clause and the state uniform operation of
the laws provision are substantially similar
Mountain Fuel Supply Co v Salt Lake
City Corp, 752 P 2d 884, 888 (Utah 1988),
Malan v Lewis, 693 P 2d 661, 669-70 (Utah
1984) However, our examination into the
reasonableness of economic legislation un
der article I, section 24 of the Utah Consti
tution is at least as vigorous as that re
quired by the federal equal protection
clause, and probably more so
Mountain
Fuel Supply, 752 P 2d at 889, 890, see
Recent Developments, 1989 Utah L Rev
143, 317 Therefore, if the statutes under
attack can withstand scrutiny under article
I, section 24, they will not be found to
violate the federal equal protection clause
752 P 2d at 890 Accordingly, we will con
sider Blue Cross's claims under article I,
section 24
(3) Article I, section 24 of the Utah
Constitution commands that "(a]ll laws of a
genera) nature shall have uniform opera
tion " Utah Const art I, § 24 The con
cept underlying this provision is "the set
tied concern of the law that the legislature
be restrained from the fundamentally un
fair practice" of classifying persons in such
a manner that those who are similarly situ
ated with respect to the purpose of a law
are treated differently by that law, to the
detriment of some of those so classified
Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P 2d at 888
In scrutinizing a legislative measure under
article I, § 24, we must determine whether
the classification is reasonable, whether the
objectives of the legislative action are legit
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imate, and whether there is a reasonable
relationship between the classification and
the legislative purposes 752 P 2d at 890,
see Malan, 693 P 2d at 670-75
[4] It is important to note at the outset
that our uniform operation of the laws
analysis is guided by the well settled proposition that all statutes are presumed to be
constitutional and the party challenging a
statute bears the burden of proving its
invalidity ( tty of West Jordan v Retire
ment Bd, 767 P 2d 530. 537 (Utah 1988),
Baker v Matheson, 607 P 2d 233, 236
(Utah 1979), State Tax Comm'n v Wright,
596 P 2d 634, 636 (Utah 1979) It is also
important to note that although the broad
outlines of the analytical model used in
determining compliance with the uniform
operation of the laws provision remain the
same in all cases, the level of scrutiny we
give legislative enactments varies See,
e g, Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P 2d at 888
n 3, Condemann v University Hospital,
775 P 2d 348 353-57 (Utah 1989) (opinions of
Durham and Stewart, JJ ) In the tax area,
as m other areas of purely economic regu
lation, we give broad deference to the legis
lature when scrutinizing the reasonable
ness of its classifications and their relation
ship to legitimate legislative purposes
City of West Jordan, 767 P 2d at 637,
Mountain f>\iel Supply, 762 P 2d at
888, Baker, 607 P 2d at 236 That broad
deference leads us to sustain a classifies
tion if "facts can reasonably be conceived
which would justify the distinctions or dif
ferences in stM*? policy [expressed by the
challenged legislation] as between different
persons " Baker, 607 P 2d at 244 (citing
Lindsley v Natural Carbonic Gas Co,
220 US 61, 31 SCt 337, 66 LEd 369
(1911)) We do not, however, "accept any
conceivable reason for the legislation
Rather, we judge such enactments on the
basis of reasonable or actual legislative
purposes " Malan, 693 P2d at 671 n 14
(5,6] Having stated the legal principles
that govern our review of Blue Cross's
claims, we proceed to the analysis, begin
ning with the statutory scheme, for it determines the classification at issue Nor
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mally, there would be little dispute about
the definition of the class to be tested
Here, however, where two sections of the
Code combine to impose the taxes under
attack, the classification issue is comphcat
ed Section 31-37-9(2) f taxes at a 2 25
percent rate the premium income of all
health service corporations, while section
31-14-4(1) * taxes at the same rate the premium income of all other insurers, but exempts MBAs 4 The question is whether
these two sections should be viewed separately, thereby placing Blue Cross in one
class and all other insurers, including
MBAs, in another, with members of each
class subject to being compared only with
other members of the same class, or whether the two sections should be viewed as
part of one taxing scheme that classifies all
insurers together, thereby permitting com
parison of the law's treatment of subgroups within that larger class, such as all
insurers but the MBAs, and the MBAs
Under our cases, if the legislature has clas
sifted all insurers but the MBAs in one
group and the MBAs in another, those are
the classifications we must examine We
are not free to break out groups that might
be distinguishable if the legislature has
not See Crowder v Salt Lake County,
552 P2d 646, 647 (Utah 1976), gee also
State v Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 726 P2d
202, 205 (Ct App 1986), Aetna Life Ins Co

v Washington Life & Disability Ins
Guar Ass'n, 83 Wash 2d 523, 527 n 6, 520
P2d 162, 165 n 6 (1974) (en banc) To
resolve this issue, a brief history of the
premium income tax is necessary
As early as 1907, the legislature passed
laws regulating "insurance corporations "
Utah Compiled Laws tit 14, ch 7, §§ 403422 (1907) Those laws imposed a tax on
"[ejvery insurance company doing business
in this state" of 1 5 percent of the gross
premiums received, less any property tax
paid to the state Id at (§ 419, 421 "Social," "benevolent," and "religious" orga
nidations were excluded from these insurance laws, including the premium tax provision Id at i 418 We are unaware of
whether any of the then-existing social,
benevolent, or religious organizations offered insurance to any of their members at
the time, although the specific exemption
would suggest that this is a distinct possi
bility The 1907 statute did not define "in
surance corporations" This lack was
remedied in 1909, when insurance corpora
tions were defined to include "all corporations, associations, partnerships or individu
als engaged as principals in the insurance
business, excepting fraternal and benevolent orders and societies"
1909 Utah
Laws ch 121, % 2 (emphasis added)
In 1909, the legislature authorized the
creation of county mutual insurance compa-

There shall be paid to the state tax commisfor reinsurance of such property or risks and,
sion by every corporation subject to the provt
less the amount of dividends, including pre
sions of this act a tax of 2'/M of the total
mium reduction coupons maturing within
subscription income received by it during the
said year, paid or credited to policyholders
next preceding calendar year from contracts
within this state or applied in abatement or
covering risks in this slate less the amount of
reduction of premiums due during the calen
mil subscription income returned or credited
dar year next preceding and less premiums
to subscribers on direct business in this state
on policies which have been or will be issued
Utah Code Ann § 31-37-9(2) (Supp 1981) (em
by domestic benefit fMBAsJ. or co-operative
phasis added)
benefit associations.
Every insurance company engaged tn the trans
Utah Code Ann f 3l~14-4()) (Supp 1981) (em
action of business tn this state shall pay to the
phasis added)
state tax commission, on or before March 31
Technically, section 31-14-4(1) gives the
in each year (I) a tax of 2'/*H of the total
MBAs a deduction rather than an exemption
premium received by it during the next prated
But since the deduction eliminates the MBAs'
tng calendar year from insurance covering
liability for premium tax. it is de facto an ex
property or risks located in this state, other
emotion, and we will refer to it as such
than workmen s compensation and occupa
lional disease disability insurance premiums 4
Subscription income" for health service cor
specified in subsection (3). and other than
porations, the term used in section 31-37-9(2).
ocean marine as specified in subsection (2)
is equivalent to "premium income" for other
hereof less the amount of ail premiums re
insurance companies, and the remainder of this
turned or credited to policyholders on direct
opinion will refer to both types of income as
business in this state and premiums received
premium income
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At that
nies that could provide protection against laws of Utah were recodified
losses occasioned by fire 1909 Utah Laws time, insurance companies, benefit associach 95 In 1916, these county mutuals were tions, and cooperatives were each covered
exempted from the general statutes regu- by separate titles See Utah Code Ann
lating insurance companies, including the tit 43, §§ 3, 11, 12 (1943) All the insurprovision imposing the 15 percent tax
ance laws were recodified in 1947 At that
Utah Compiled Laws ttUe 19, ch 11, $ 1187 time, the exemption from the premium tax
(1917) The insurance laws were recodified enjoyed by "domestic benefit or cooperain 1933 At this time, county mutuals and tive benefit associations" was inserted in
fraternal benefit societies were each bro- the section imposing the tax on other insurken out and covered by then* own specific ers
1947 Utah Laws tit 43, ch 14,
provisions of title 43 of the 1933 Code, and § 4(1) The name "benefit associations"
each was explicitly excluded from the other
was also changed to "mutual benefit assoprovisions of the insurance laws, including
ciations " 1947 Utah Laws title 43, ch 31
that imposing the premium tax Utah Rev
Stat §§ 43-8-18, 43-9-4 (1933)
In 1947, the legislature added chapter 30
"Benefit associations" made their first to title 43 It applied to "non profit hospi
appearance in the Code in 1935 At that tal service plans" such as Blue Cross This
time, the legislature required that they is the first time such plans appeared in the
comply with the provisions of the newly Code These hospital service plans were
excluded from the coverage of the insurenacted statute 1935 Utah Laws ch 41
It appears that these associations were not ance laws that contained the 2 25 percent
to be subjected to the premium tax then premium tax 1947 Utah Laws tit 43, ch
applicable to all insurance companies, and 30
it also appears that the new benefit associ
In 1969, the insurance laws were again
atlons were defined so as to permit the
recodified What were then termed health
fraternal or religious benefit associations
service corporations were brought under
that had been previously exempted from
the insurance laws to continue business the jurisdiction of the state Commissioner
under this new form with the proviso that of Insurance, and the 2 25 percent premium
those societies and/or organizations paying tax was imposed on them At the same
sick or death benefits to members or their time, the legislature barred the entry of
any new MBAs or cooperatives into the
dependents would be exempt from provi
sions of the Act 1935 Utah Laws ch 41, insurance field, however, existing compa
§ 18 During the same legislative session, nies of that type were grandfathered, and
the grandfathered companies remained tax
the premium income tax on insurance com
names was raised from 1 5 percent to 2 25 exempt, as they had been since they were
percent, where it remains today
1935 first recognized in the statutes The rea
son for shifting health service corporations
Utah Laws ch 40
In 1941, the legislature provided for the such as Blue Cross into the category of
creation of "cooperative life insurance asso- insurers subject to the premium tax apciations " 1941 Utah Laws ch 47 These pears to have been a desire to equalize
associations appear not to have been sub- what the legislature saw as competitive
unfairness resulting from then* previous
jected to the general premium tax applies
ble to insurance corporations In 1943, the tax exempt status•
3. In debate on the floor of the House of Representatives regarding the imposition of the 2 25
percent premium tax on Blue Cross and the
other health service corporations Representa
live Gunnell the chair of the committee that
recommended the legislation said the commit
tee had studied this issue for several years and
"felt at that time that this bill that covers Blue
Cross/Blue Shield should bring Blue Cross/Blue
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Shield under the same regulations and under
the same taxing situation as other insur
ance companies in the State
I think I
state as chairman of the committee the feeling
of that committee—that the Blue Cross/Blue
Shield Insurance Company should be taxed
equally, and that it would be absolutely fair In
light of the competitive situation that exists in
the insurance industry"
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As this history reveals, there is a good
deal of variety in the types of organizations
offering insurance, and ways of organizing
and operating insurers are constantly
evolving. Over the years since 1907, when
insurance companies were first explicitly
recognized in the Utah at »
legislature has classified insu<
grouped
them together in various wa> <tt different
times for purposes of regulation and taxation.* Since 1969, the legislature has
grouped health service corporations and
other insurance corporations together for
purposes of imposing the 2.25 percent premium tax, and it has grouped mutual benefit associations and cooperative benefit associations together for the puiftoses of exempting them from the tax. Based on the
legislature's very conscious decision in
1969 to group insurance corporations and
health service corporations together for the
purposes of the premium tax nnd to continue to exempt expressly MBAs and cooperatives from that tax, we conclude that we
must accept those classifications for the
purpose of analyzing the constitutionality
of the premium tax. We therefore reject
efforts by the State and Blue Cross to have
us consider other groupings for comparison
purposes, such as health service corporations and MBAs, or health service corporations alone. The relevant groupings for
our purposes are insurance companies covered by section 31-14-4 and health service
corporations covered by section 31-37-9, on
the one hand, and MBAs and cooperative
benefit associations, a mug! :• of insurance companies, on the otlui (hereafter
referred to collectively as "MBAs"7).
17] Having settled the question of the
relevant classifications, we next move to
the three-step analytical model used to determine compliance with the uniform operation of the laws provision of article I, sec*. It is also noteworthy that a new form of what
might broadly be termed health care insurance
has emerged recently in the form of health
maintainence organizations, or HMOs, and the
legislature has chosen not to consider these insurance at all. They are not separately regulated, and they are not subject to the premium tax.
The same is true of the "insurance" offered by
motor clubs; they are not regulated, and their

BLUE CROSS AND Bl UE SHIELD v. STATE

tion 24. See p. 637, supra. The first
question is whether there is anything inherently unreasonable in the legislature's classifying all insurers together but then treating as a separate class those organized as
MM As. On its face, that distinction is not
patently unreasonable. There might well
be characteristics of companies organized
as MBAs that would warrant treating them
differently than other insurers. Indeed,
the legislature has classified different insurers differently at various times for various regulatory or revenue purposes.
Therefore, we cannot say that in the abstract, the classifications drawn by the
statutes create a discrimination "with no
rational basis." Mountain Fuel Supply,
752 P.2d at 890 (quoting Mountain States
Legal Found, v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 636
P.2d 1047, 1065 (Utah 1981)). And the
basis upon which the classification is made
is certainly not proscribed. See Mountain
Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 890.
The second issue under our analytical
model is the legitimacy of the objectives
pursued by the legislation. Here, the State
advances two purposes. The first and predominant purpose of the premium income
tax is to raise revenue for general governmental expenses. This is a legitimate purpose. Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at
890. A second and somewhat subsidiary
purpose suggested by the State for the
inclusion in 1969 of health service corporations within the group of insurers subject
to the premium tax is to equalize taxation
of insurers who compete with each other.
As for the exclusion of the MBAs from the
tax, the State suggests that the legislature
may have thought the "fraternal" nature
of the MBAs warranted treating them differently than more commercially oriented
insurers. This, too, is a legitimate legislapremium income is not taxed. See Utah Code
Ann. § 31-42-31 (1974).
7. From our review of the record, we are unable
to determine whether there are. in fact, any
cooperative benefit associations. Certainly,
none are part of this litigation. Therefore, for
the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to
those exempted from the premium tax as MBAs.

tive purpose.*

OtaaaTTV PJ4 *S4 (Utah I9t9)

The third and most critical question is
whether the legislature chose a permissible
means to achieve its legitimate ends. According to Blue Cross, MBAs are in all
significant respects operationally indistinguishable from other insurers and compete
directly against them. Blue Cross also contends that it has lost business to the MBAs
because of the price-distorting impact of
the premium tax. Blue Cross submitted a
conclusory affidavit in support of this latter proposition which stated that Blue
Cross had been unsuccessful in gaining the
health insurance business of certain institutions served by MBAs and that the premium tax exemption enjoyed by MBAs gave
them a competitive pricing advantage, including Blue Cross. Given the lack of any
significant differences between the MBAs
and nonprofit health service corporations
and the competitive burden the premium tax
creates for Blue Cross when competing with
the MBAs, Blue Cross contends that the
MBAs' premium tax exemption constitutes
a discrimination that is not reasonably related to any legitimate legislative end; therefore, it must be declared invalid and the
whole premium tax scheme struck down.
Blue Cross dismisses the State's claim
that in imposing the tax on health service
corporations, the legislature was also attempting to remedy a perceived market
place inequity—that Blue Cross had proven
itself to be a very successful competitor in
the health care insurance market, that its
exemption from the premium income tax
paid by other generally for-profit insurers
had become unfair, and that treating MBAs
differently by continuing their exemption
was appropriate because their "fraternal"
character distinguished them from the commercial insurers—by asserting that there is
virtually no legislative history explaining
why the MBAs' exemption was continued.
On this basis, Blue Cross contends that
there is no legitimate objective for the legt.

Blue Cross strenuously objects thai this supposed purpose was raised for the first lime on
appeal. Our review of the record indicates thai
this is not the case The issue was raised before
the trial court, and extensive reference to the
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is la tion beyond revenue enhancement and,
therefore, we must judge the segregation
of MBAs and Blue Cross into two different
classes against that purpose only.
[8] In this approach to the issue, Blue
Cross misp**rceives the applicable standard
of review when addressing purely economic
enactments. As stated earlier, in determining whether the classifications the legislature has used in such enactments are reasonably related to a legitimate legislative
purpose, we are not limited to considering
those purposes that can be plainly shown to
have been held by some or all legislators.
We will sustain a classification if we can
reasonably conceive of facts "which would
justify the distinctions or differences in
state policy [expressed by the challenged
legislation] as between different persons."
Baker, 607 P.2d at 244 (citing Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31
S.Ct. 337, 66 LEd. 369 (1911)). We do not
"accept any conceivable reason for the legislation
Rather, we judge such enactments on the basis of reasonable or actual
legislative purposes." Malan, 693 P.2d at
671 n. 14. But we do not require any exact
proof of those purposes; it is enough that
they may be reasonably imputed to the
legislative body.

With this standard in mind, we move on
to consider the relationship of the means
used to a legitimate end. From the legislative history cited to the trial court, it appears obvious that the health service corporations were subjected to the premium tax
in 1969 because the legislature thought it
unfair to exempt them from a tax imposed
on their competitors in the marketplace.
There is nothing in the legislative history,
however, that helps explain why the MBAs'
exemption was continued. It is in the history of the premium tax that we find a
probable reason for treating the MBAs differently: the legislature considered MBAs,
unlike health service corporations, to be
different in character than the run-of-thelegislative history of the premium tax scheme
was submitted in support of the State's contention. Blue Cross certainly cannot contend that
it has been surprised by the assertion of this
claim again on appeal.
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Utah Code Ann tit 31. ch 8(1974)

10 Utah Code Ann til 31 ch 9 (1974 * Supp
1981)
11 Utah Code Ann tit 31 ch 10 (1974 A Supp
1981)
12

Utah Code Ann tit 31 ch 31(1966)

IB Utah Code Ann tit 31 ch 37 (1974 4 Supp
1981)
14 Deseret Mutual Benefit Association has forty
one policyholders most of which are affiliates
of the Corporation of the President of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Lalter-Day Saints
Deseret Mutual does not use a sales force and
does not solicit insurance business from the
general public
Associated American Mutual Life Insurance
Company has only three policyholders—Deseret

Utah 643
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the legislature did not find those distinc
tions significant for tax classification pur
poses
This is evident because MBAs
share many characteristics both with
health service corporations and with others
of the insurers mentioned above, yet the
legislature chose to treat MBAs differently
for purposes of the premium tax
The only characteristic that seems to set
MBAs apart from the insurers taxed is that
of the six MBAs in Utah, most are nonprof
it and restrict their business to issuing
policies only to employees of a single com
pany or to members of a church or associa
tion to which the MBA is captive " There
In an effort to find a reasonable basis for is nothing in the statutes under which the
the legislature's separate classification of MBAs are organized that requires them to
M BAs for purposes of the premium tax, we so restrict their business or prevents them
have reviewed their organizational struc
from being operated as for profit corpora
ture and mode of operation, as they are tiona However, all but two have so reexplained in the statutes and record In stricted themselves with respect to the
summary, we can say that while health sources of their business, and only one
insurance in Utah is offered by a variety of
MBA is operated as a for profit corpora
types of companies, including stock insur
tion This raises two questions first, can
19
era,* mutual insurers, reciprocal insur
the legislature treat all insurers sharing
ers," mutual benefit associations,11 and
health service corporations " and each is these characteristics as a separate class for
purposes of the premium tax, second, if
organized and functions in a slightly differ
the
class includes some insurers that do not
ent manner, there is little inherent in any
fact
of these forms of organization that is of share those characteristics, does that
7
much significance when it comes to deter- invalidate the classification measure We
mining what sorts of products they can or treat these questions separately
do offer in the insurance marketplace
The first issue, whether these character
And whatever distinctions may exist in or- istics are sufficient to justify the legisla
ganization, function, or product offered, ture's treating those sharing them as a
mill commercial insurer This legislative
judgment about the character of those ex
empted from the premium tax has a long
history, dating back to the initial insurance
legislation in 1907 From then on, what
have variously been labeled fraternal, cooperative, religious, or mutual benefit associations that offer insurance to their mem
here or adherents have been exempt from
the premium tax and, at various times,
have been subjected to entirely separate
schemes of regulation The question for
us is whether the judgment that MBAs are
sufficiently different to be eligible for dif
ferent tax treatment is sustainable
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for this conclusion redistinct class of insurers for purposes of The
quiresexplanation
that we return to the standard gov
the premium tax, we answer in the positive
eming review of challenges under the uniWe see nothing illegitimate in treating in
form operation of the laws provision of
surers that can be characterized as ad
article 1 section 24 to the constitutionality
juncla of nonprofit, religious, cooperative, of legislation that is purely economic As
or benevolent organizations as different noted earlier, we accord the legislature
than what might be characterized as com
broad deference when reviewing the rea
mercial insurers
By exempting MBAs sonableness of the relationship between the
from the premium tax, the legislature may classifications it uses and legitimate legis
have been expressing its judgment that lative purposes it seeks to achieve How
entities of this type are not comparable to ever, the analytical model spelled out above
commercial insurers that compete in the does not explicitly address the question of
open market and should not therefore be what we do when faced with what we con
burdened by the premium tax That judg
elude is an imperfect classification, even
ment does not appear to be without rational after we accord the legislative act every
foundation
presumption The answer lies in an exami
Blue Cross notes that the law under nation of the impact of the misclassifica
which these insurers are organized does
tion
not require MBAs to have the characters
tics that we conclude could have motivated
(9] There is nothing inherent in the arti
the legislature to treat them separately
cle 1, section 24 test as it was stated in
The relevant question is not whether the Malan and our other decisions based on
law requires those characteristics, but equal protection or uniform operation of
whether in fact they share those character
the laws principles such as Allen v Inter
istics If they all did, we would have no mountain Health Care, Inc, 635 P 2d 30
further question about whether the exemp- (Utah 1981) and Redwood Gym v Salt
tion is reasonably related to a legitimate Lake County Comm'n, 624 P 2d 1138
legislative purpose, however, they do not (Utah 1981), that expressly requires us, in
Gem State Mutual and Allied Mutual As
determining the constitutionality of an en
surance do not have the same captive affil
actment, to take into account the impact of
lation with a specific group that character
the legislative classification under attack
izes all the rest of the MBAs, both these on those classified
However, it seems
companies sell to anyone in Utah, and Gem clear that the impact of a measure can be
State sells health insurance, presumably in relevant to determining whether the legis
direct competition with Blue Cross and oth
lative body has exceeded the bounds of the
er health insurers We cannot conceive of
broad discretion it has in fashioning purely
any reason why such insurers would be
economic legislation
treated differently for purposes of the preFor example in Mountain Fuel Supply,
mium tax To this extent, then, the legisla
ture, in exempting all entities organized as appellant Mountain Fuel contended that
MBAs from the premium tax, has used a Salt Lake City had created an arbitrary
classification that imperfectly effects its classification when it singled out for the
imposition of a franchise tax, set at four per
purposes
cent of gross receipts, all public utilities
This gives rise to the second issue posed
supplying natural gas, electricity, and teleabove if the class includes some insurers
phone service and all others supplying nat
that do not share the characteristics that
ural gas, electricity, and telephone service
could be legitimately used to define the
in competition with the public utilities>ft
class, does that fact invalidate the classifi
Mountain Fuel contended that the classifh
cation measure7 We think that it does not

Mutual Benefit Association Intermountain
Health Care (formerly owned by the L D S
Church) and the Corporation of the President
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints Associated American provides coverage
only for employees of Intermountain Health
Care
Electric Mutual Benefit Association provides
group hospital and surgical insurance and acci
dental death insurance to employees of Utah
Power it light Company
Educators Mutual Insurance Association provides insurance to members of the Utah Edu
cation Association and others who are engaged
in certain educational activities in Utah
Gem State Mutual offers insurance to anyone
in Utah but primarily sells group policies to
small businesses
IS The Salt Lake City ordinance under attack
Allied Mutual Assurance Association is a for
taxed equally all suppliers of gas electricity
profit corporation that offers insurance to any
and telephone services It was not limited in its
one in Utah but it does not offer health or
reach to public utilities Mountain Fuel Supply
accident insurance Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
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Co v Salt Lake City Corp 752 P 2d 884 886 *
n 1 (Utah 1988) But see opinion of Howe J
concurring 752 P 2d at 891
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cation was Invalid because It did not treat
equally all those similarly situated; specifically, the City did not impose the tax on
those who sold heating fuels other than
gas and electricity in direct competition
with those taxed Finally, Mountain Fuel
contended that as a result of this tax, its
ability to compete for certain customers,
such as those able to switch from coal to
gas with ease, was severely hampered
The Court rejected Mountain Fuel's challenge to the ordinance In so doing, we
accepted as fact the claim that those subjected to the tax, including both utilities
and nonutihties, were competitively disadvantaged to some degree because of the
tax 752 P 2d at 891 We also implicitly
accepted as fact the contention that natural
gas and electricity competed with other
fuels in the heating fuel market Id But
we determined that the question was not
whether Salt Lake City had dra vn perfectly the boundaries of the class of persons to
be taxed; rather, the question was whether
the City had drawn them in a permissible
fashion. The permissibility of the classification was determined by balancing the
justifications advanced by the City for excluding those who might logically have
been included in the class aga<« * the harm
allegedly suffered by those in \ led as a
result of the exclusion of their competitors.
Id. We concluded that Mountain Fuel had
not shown that the competitive disadvantage imposed on those taxed as a result of
the arguably misdrawn class lines was sufficiently great, given the effectiveness of
the tax in accomplishing the City's aims
and the administrative efficiencies realized
by not including in the taxed class those
providing heating fuels other than natural
gas and electricity, to warrant a finding
that the burden resulting from the ordinance was "unreasonable" or "unjustifiable " Id.1*

classification boundaries it drew were reasonably related to its revenue and taxspreading objectives. Although the justifications for not taxing suppliers of alternative heating fuels focused on the ease of
collecting the tax from public utilities and
their ability to pass the tax on to customers, the fact remains that the tax was also
levied on small-scale, non-utility suppliers
of those same commodities and services.
The administrative ease and efficiency
claims advanced by the City to distinguish
the public utilities from the suppliers of
alternative fuels arguably did not apply
when the non-utility suppliers who were
taxed were compared with the alternative
fuel suppliers who were not. See 752 P 2d
at 891.
At the margins, then, the operation of
the City's classification scheme might not
have stood the test of its justifications.
Some might have been excluded who could
logically have been included and vice versa.
However, the Court still affirmed the validity of the City's ordinance because, on the
whole, after considering the burdens it imposed on those taxed, it appeared to be a
reasonable attempt to achieve the legitimate government ends.

It is important to note that in evaluating
the justifications for imposing the tax on
suppliers of natural gas, electricity, and
telephone service, the Court gave wide latitude to the City in demonstrating that the

In so holding, we demonstrated the operation of the principle that in the area of
purely economic legislation, and especially
taxation, we do not require perfection
This principle was well stated in Baker v.
Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979):
Legislative enactments that are basically economic in nature rarely affect all
persons equally. Such enactments require classifications which necessarily reflect legislative judgments which accord
various weights to various shadings of
differences in human affairs Razor thin
distinctions which are entirely devoid of
some arbitrariness are rarely, if ever,
possible. The rationality of the classifications is a matter of degree. If courts
were to insist upon logical precision in
creating classifications not consistent
with the nature of the problem to be

16. Tor another case reflecting the examination
of the burdens imposed by a tax in considering
the reasonableness of the classification scheme

defining those subject to it, see Continental
Bank 4 Trust Co v Farmtngton City. 599 P 2d
1242 (Utah 1979)

addressed, legislative power would be
seriously crippled As Justice Holmes
observed, "We must remember that the
machinery of government would not
work if it were not allowed a little play in
its joints " Bam Peanut Co v Ptnson,
282 U S 499, 501, 51 S Ct 228, 229, 75
LEd 482 (1931)
607 P 2d at 243, see Recent Developments,
Uniform Operation of Economic Regulations, 1989 Utah L Rev 143, 307
Returning to the present case, the question is whether the legislature acted impermissibly when it used a classification—
MBAs—to achieve its objective of excluding insurers that can be characterized as
adjuncts of nonprofit, religious, cooper a
tive, or benevolent organizations from the
premium tax when that classification is
over inclusive in that it exempts not only
such organizations, but also two insurers
that are apparently indistinguishable from
those taxed As noted, the classification
used in Mountain Fuel was also over inclusive It taxed nonutility vendors that
did not fit the justifications offered for the
classification and that were presumably
disadvantaged by the tax when competing
against sellers of alternative fuels Yet we
upheld the classification, inasmuch as there
had been no showing that the competitive
burden imposed was unreasonable in light
of the reasons offered in support of the
classification used in imposing the franchise tax
Similar logic applies in this case Blue
Cross submitted a conclusory affidavit to
the trial court suggesting that it had been
unable to secure contracts for insurance
from some customers who had insured
through MB As However, Blue Cross did
not show that this business would have
gone to it or to some other commercial
insurer but for the premium tax, nor did it
demonstrate that any disadvantage which
resulted from the premium tax that it or
the other insurers suffered when competing with MBAs was substantial or caused
Blue Cross or the other insurers any finan
cial hardship The legislature is not to be
denied an "effective means of raising need
ed revenues unless that means imposes an
unreasonable burden on the affected par
ties." Mountain Fuel, 752 P 2d at 891
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In the present case, Blue Cross failed to
show that it or any other insurer incurred
any burden Therefore, even though we
cannot conceive of any reason for exempting two MBAs from the premium tax, that
misclassification of insurers resulting from
the measure is not sufficient to warrant
striking down the tax
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude
that the challenge to the premium tax un
der article I, section 24 must be rejected
Since we reject that claim under the Utah
Constitution, we also reject the challenge
made under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution Mountain Fuel, 752
P 2d at 890
(10,11) The next issue is Blue Cross's
challenge to the premium tax under article
VI, section 26 of the Utah Constitution
That provision states: "No private or special law shall be enacted where a general
law can be applicable " Utah Const art
VI, § 26 Our cases make it clear that a
special law is a law that classifies its objects
unreasonably, as by selecting from a gener
al class particular persons, places, or things
for the purpose of conferring privileges or
imposing burdens See, eg, Hulbert v
State, 607 P2d 1217, 1223-24 (Utah 1980),
Utah Farm Bureau Ins Co v Utah Ins
Guar Ass'n, 564 P 2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977)
Although there may be some differences
between the reach of article I, section 24
and article VI, section 26, our cases to date
have, in essence, viewed the special laws
ban to be the flip side of the uniform opera
tion of the laws command See State v
Bishop, 717 P 2d 261, 265 (Utah 1986) If a
law satisfies the requirement of article I,
section 24, that all laws of "a general nature
shall have uniform operation," it will not
violate article VI, section 26
In the present case, we have found that
sections 31-14-4(1) and 31-37-9(2) operate
to validly impose a premium tax on msur
ers, except for MBAs As such, these stat
utes constitute general laws And we have
found that they do not offend the uniform
operation of the laws requirement of article
1, section 24 We therefore conclude that
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they do not violate the special laws ban of
article VI, section 26

STATE v BRUCE
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judge was also judge who presided over
suppression hearing
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vic lions for impeachment purposes is
whether, absent error, there was reasonFor the reasons stated above, we affirm 2 Criminal Law *»1168(4)
able likelihood of more favorable result for
the judgment of the trial court
defendant
U C A 1953, 76-6-301. 76-6In the absence of clear error, the Su302
preme Court upholds trial judge's factual
HALL, C J , HOWE, Associate C J ,
assessment underlying decision to grant or
13 Criminal Law ^»1184(3)
and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ,
deny suppression motion
There was insufficient evidence to es
concur
tablish that defendant used firearm or fac
2. Arrest «»t3.6(2)
simile thereof, or any deadly weapon, in
Police officers may, in appropriate circourse of committing robbery, therefore,
to f «l» JNIMMI m i t M >
8
Witnesses
«=>345(1)
cumstances and in appropriate manner, apdefendant was entitled to have conviction
Convictions
for
crimes
not
involving
proach person for purposes of investigating
dishonesty or false statement cannot be reduced from aggravated robbery to rob
possible criminal behavior, even though
used for im|>eachment purposes unless bery U( A 1953, 76-^302
there is no probable cause to make arrest
they are felony convictions and trial court
4. Arrest «-**.« 4)
haa applied proper balancing test under
Debra K Loy, Salt U k e City, for defen
In justifying particular investigatory
rule Rules of Evid , Rule 609(a)
dant and appellant
8TATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, intrusion, police officer must be able to
David L Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for
9 Witnesses *=>34S(1)
point to specific and articulable facta
v.
which, taken together with rational inferFactors
to
consider
when
balancing
plaintiff
and appellee
Henry S BRUCE, Jr, Defendant
ences from those facta, reasonably warrant
probative value of prior crimes evidence
and Appellant.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
intrusion
against prejudicial effect, for purposes of
No 860326.
Defendant Henry S Bruce, Jr , appeals
determining admissibility for impeachment,
6 Arrest * » * 3 6(C)
from his jury conviction of aggravated robinclude
nature
of
crime,
as
bearing
on
char
Supreme Court of Utah
While police officers who issued radio
acter for veracity of witness, recentness or bery, a felony of the first degree Utah
broadcast may have improperly placed two
July 28, 1989
remoteness of prior conviction, similarity Code Ann § 76-6-302 (1978, Supp 1989)
black males in front seat of orange car
On November 26, 1985, the Corner Mart
of prior crime to charged crime, tmpor
seen leaving scene of robbery, sufficient
lance of credibility issues in determining gas and convenience store in northwest
Defendant was convicted in the Third information was provided and articulable
truth in prosecution tried without decisive Salt Lake City was robbed At approxi
District Court, Salt l*ke County, Leonard facta existed to support at least reasonable
nontestimonia) evidence, and importance of mately 3 00 in the afternoon, Sue Ann
H Russon, J , of aggravated robbery De- suspicion that robber was in orange car,
Candelana a store employee, received a
accused's testimony, as perhaps warrant
fendant appealed The Supreme Court, therefore, stop was made in objective renig the exclusion of convictions probative phone call from a man claiming to have a
liance
on
broadcast
which
was
issued
by
Howe, Associate C J , held that (1) investi
gun pointed directly at her He instructed
of accused's character for veracity
officers possessing reasonable suspicion
gatory stop was pro|»er, (2) in court identl
her to put all the money from the register
10 Witnesses • - 3 4 5 ( 2 )
fication by police officer was proper, (3) justifying stop
in a bag and give it to a man who would
prior convictions should not have been ad 6. Criminal Law *»339 HK2)
Prior conviction for theft may be ad
soon be entering the store The caller
nutted for impeachment purposes but ad
missibte for impeachment purposes if in threatened to shoot her if she did not com
In-court identification of defendant by
mission was harmless, and (4) defendant's police officer, who pulled defendant's arfact crime was committed by fraudulent or ply Within a few minutes, a young man
conviction would be reduced from aggrava
deceitful means
Rules of Evid, Rule whom she subsequently identified as defen
rest file and looked at his photograph to
ted robbery to robbery
609(a)
see if defendant was person officer had
dant entered the store and placed his hand
Conviction vacated in part and case seen standing across from store on night of
under his jacket as though he had a gun
11. Criminal Law «=»1170%U)
remanded
robbery, was admissible, although it was
and demanded that Candelana "do what
Witnesses «=»337(lt. 19)
the man on the phone said " She did not
Defendant's prior convictions for steal
Zimmerman, J , filed a concurring and contended that identification was baaed on
see a gun and later testified that she could
dissenting opinion in which Durham, J , out-of-court one photo showup, there was
tng type crimes of retail theft and attempt
no reasonable likelihood of irreparable misconcurred
ed burglary were not crimes of "dishonesty not recall that the man made any reference
identification at trial resulting from police
to his having a gun She stated, "It just
or false statement" which could be admit
officer's conduct
looked like a normal thing, like a gun, but
ted for impeachment purposes, however
1 Criminal Law «=>1036 1(4)
it wasn t I knew it wasn't" Without
7 Criminal Law *»782(6 6)
admission of prior convictions was harm
Defendant did not waive for appellate
less given evidence of guilt
Rules of putting the money in a bag, she gave the
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
robber approximately $214, and he left the
review challenge to admission of evidence in refusing to give cautionary instruction
Evid , Rule 609(a)(2)
store, heading north on foot As he walked
which was subject of motion to suppress on eyewitness identification where four
12 Criminal I .aw <*=•! I70%< I)
when defendant failed to further object to eyewitnesses identified defendant two witaway, Candelana saw him appear to place
Standard for reveraal in cases involv
adniisHiofi of evideiue at trial where trial nesses stood only an arm s length from
the money down the front of his pants
ing erroneous failure to exclude prior con
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
man they both identified as defendant, they
had particularly good opportunity to observe, it was highly likely that result would
have been exactly the same even if caution
ary instruction had been given, and defense
counsel's cross examination of State's wit
nesses and extensive closing argument
more than sufficiently alerted jury to possi
bility of error in eyewitness identification

TabH
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ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH COAL CO. v. COUNTY
COMMISSION OF WEBSTER COUNTY,
WEST VIRGINIA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST
VIRGINIA
No. 87-1303.

Argued December 7, 1988-Decided January 18, 1989*

The West Virginia Constitution in relevant part establishes a general principle of uniform taxation so that all property, both real and personal,
shall be taxed in proportion to its value. The Webster County tax assessor, from 1975 to 1986, valued petitioners' real property on the basis
of its recent purchase price Other properties not recently transferred
were assessed based on their previous assessments with minor modifications. This system resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of
generally comparable property. Each year, respondent county commission affirmed the assessments, and petitioners appealed to the State Circuit Court. Eventually, a number of these appeals were consolidated
and decided. The State Circuit Court held that the county's assessment
system systematically and intentionally discriminated against petitioners
in violation of the State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. It ordered respondent to reduce petitioners'
assessments to the levels recommended by the state tax commissioner in
Jus guidelines for local assessors. The State Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed. It held that the record did not support a finding of intentional
and systematic discrimination because petitioners' property was not assessed at more than true value, as appropriately measured by the recent
arm's-length purchase price of the property. In its view, any comparative undervaluation of other property could only be remedied by an action by petitioners to raise those other assessments
Held
1 The assessments on petitioners' property violated the Equal Protection Clause There is no constitutional defect in a scheme that bases
an assessment on the recent arm's-length purchase price of the property,
and uses a general adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual reappraisal of other parcels. But the Clause requires that such general adjustments be accurate enough to obtain, over a short period of
time, rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property ownTogether with No 87-1310, East Kentucky Energy Corp et al v
County Coynmission of Webster County, West Virginia, also on certiorari
to the same court
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ers This action is not one involving permissible transitional inequality,
since petitioners' property has been assessed at roughly * to 35 time*
more than comparable neighboring propeity ami these discrepancies
have continued for more than 10 yeais with little change The county's
adjustments to assessments that aie carried over are too small to season
ably dissipate the disparity Pp 342-344
2 The Equal Protection Clause permits a State to divide different
kinds of property into classes and to assign to each a different tax burden
so long as those divisions and burdens are neither arbitrary nor capricious
West Virginia has not drawn such a distinction here as its
Constitution and laws provide that all property of the kind held by peti
tioners shall be taxed uniformly according to its estimated mai ket value
There is no suggestion that the State has in practice adopted a different system that authorizes individual counties to independently fashion
their own substantive assessment policies The Webster County assessor has, apparently on her own initiative, applied state tax law in a man
ner resulting in significant and persistent disparity in assessed value
between petitioners' and similarly situated property
The intentional
systematic undervaluation of such other property unfairlv deprives petitioners of their rights under the Clause Pp 344-340
3 The State might on its own initiative remove the discrimination
against petitioners by raising the assessments of systematically and
intentionally undervalued property in the same class A taxpayer in |>etitioners' position, however, forced to litigate foi redress, may not be
remitted by the State to the remedy of seeking to have the assessments
of the undervalued property raised P 346
W Va
, 360 S E 2d 560, reversed and l emanded
REHNQUIST, C J , delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs were John G. Roberts, Jr., and William James Murphy.
C. William Ullrich, Chief Deputy Attorney General of
West Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were Charles G. Brown, Attorney General, and
Jack AlsopA
tBriefs of anuci curiae urging reversal were filed for the National As
sociation of Realtors by Lam em K Janik, and foi the National Taxpayer
Union by Gale A Norton
(Footnote is continued on /> iisf

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

338

OCTOBER TERM, 1988
Opinion of the Court

a
b

ALLEGHENY PITTSBURGH COAL v WEBSTER COUNTY
488 U. S.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The West Virginia Constitution guarantees to its citizens
that, with certain exceptions, "taxation shall be equal and
uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and
personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value . . . ."
Art. X, § 1. The Webster County tax assessor valued petitioners' real property on the basis of its recent purchase
price, but made only minor modifications in the assessments
of land which had not been recently sold. This practice resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of generally
comparable property, and we hold that it denied petitioners
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to them by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Between 1975 and 1986, the tax assessor for Webster
County, West Virginia, fixed yearly assessments for property within the county at 50% of appraised value. She fixed
the appraised value at the declared consideration at which
the property last sold. Some adjustments were made in the
assessments of properties that had not been recently sold, although they amounted to, at most, 10% increases in 1976,
1981, and 1983 respectively.1
Benna Ruth Solomon and Eugene J Comey filed a brief for the National
Association of Counties et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al.
by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Anthony T. Caso, and Jonathan M Coupal,
and for the International Association of Assessing Officers by James F
Gossett.
1
Petitioners contend that the adjustments to the assessments for property not recently transferred were uneven at best. According to petitioners, a study of the assessed value of all coal tracts in Webster County from
1983 to 1984 was in*«- i'tred at trial and demonstrated that the assessment
of 35% of the tracts was unchanged during that period. The courts below
do not appear to have made specific factual findings accepting or rejecting
this study or petitioners' conclusions drawn from it. For the purposes of
argument, we will accept the county's figures since we find that, even accepting those figures, the adjustments do not dispel the constitutional flaw
in the assessment system.
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In 1974, for example, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company
(Allegheny) purchased fee, surface, and mineral interests in
certain properties for a stated price somewhat in excess of
$24 million, and during the tax years 1976 through 1983 its
property was assessed annually at half of this figure. In
1982 Allegheny sold the property to East Kentucky Energy
Corp. (Kentucky Energy) for a figure of nearly $30 million,
and the property thereafter was annually assessed at a valuation just below $15 million. Oneida Coal Company and
Shamrock Coal Company participated in similar transactions
in Webster County, and the property they purchased or sold
was assessed in a similar manner.
Each year, petitioners pursued relief before the County
Commission of Webster County sitting as a review board.
They argued that the assessment policy of the Webster
County assessor systematically resulted in appraisals for
their property that were excessive compared to the appraised value of similar parcels that had not been recently
conveyed. Each year the county commission affirmed the
assessments, and each year petitioners appealed to the State
Circuit Court. A group of these appeals from Allegheny and
its successor in interest, Kentucky Energy, were consolidated by the West Virginia Circuit Court and finally decided
in 1985. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1303, p. 15a. Another group of appeals from Shamrock and Oneida were consolidated and decided by the West Virginia Circuit Court
early the next year. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310,
p. 49a/
The judge in both of these cases concluded that the system
of real property assessment used by the Webster County assessor systematically and intentionally discriminated against
2

After each of these primary decisions adjudicating the validity of the
assessments to the lands in question, petitioners obtained a number of
other orders applying the findings in the primary decisions to their specific
cases and to other appeals not consolidated in the primary decisions. See
App to Pet. for Cert in No 87-1310, pp 79a, 83a, and 86a
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petitioners in violation of the West Virginia Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. He
ordered the county commission to reduce the assessments on
petitioners' property to the levels recommended by the state
tax commissioner in his valuation guidelines published for use
by local assessors. Underlying the judge's conclusions were
findings that petitioners' tax assessments over the years
were dramatically in excess of those for comparable property
in the county. He found that "the assessor did not compare
the various features of the real estate to which the high assessment was applied with the various features of land assessed at a much lower rate." App. to Pet. for Cert, in
No. 87-1303, p. 29a; App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310,
p. 59a. "The questioned assessments were not based upon
the presence of economically minable or removable coal, oil,
gas or harvestable timber in or upon petitioners' real estate,
as compared to an absence of the same in or upon [neighboring] properties." Ibid. Nor were they "based upon present
use or immediately foreseeable economic development of petitioners' real estate." Ibid. Rather, "[t]he sole basis of the
assessment of petitioners' real estate was, according to the
assessor, the consideration declared in petitioners' deeds."
Ibid.3
* Respondent argues in this Court that petitioners' land was not truly
comparable to that of the surrounding properties. It points to the fact
that one of the parcels held by Allegheny, and then by Kentucky Energy,
comprising 4,287 acres, allegedly contains 32 million tons of low-sulfur coal
recoverable by strip mining. This unusually valuable parcel skews the average value of all the properties, as well as serving as a basis for higher
valuation of this parcel than those surrounding it.
Petitioners make a number of answers: First, they rely on respondent's
stipulations that "[t]he properties surrounding the property owned by
. . . Petitioner, . . . are comparable properties in that they are substantially the same geologically as the properties of the Petitioner . . . ."
Record 1319-1320, 1085. Next, they point to the factual findings of the
West Virginia Circuit Court, never rejected by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, that "[although the real estate of each of these petitioners is not identical to that of all other real estate in Webster County, it
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This approach systematically produced dramatic differences in valuation between petitioners' recently transferred
property and otherwise comparable surrounding land. For
the years 1976 through 1982, Allegheny was assessed and
taxed at approximately 35 times the rate applied to owners of
comparable properties. After purchasing that land, Kentucky Energy was assessed and taxed at approximately
33 times the rate of similar parcels. From 1981 through
1985, the county assessed and taxed the Shamrock-Oneida
property at roughly 8 to 20 times that of comparable neighboring coal tracts. These disparities existed notwithstanding the adjustments made to the assessments of land not
recently conveyed. In the case of the property held by Allegheny and Kentucky Energy, the county's adjustment policy
appears that petitioners' real estate is substantially similar to the real estate of the others in topography, location, access, development, mineral
content and forestation, and that the petitioners' real estate is substantially similar to adjacent and contiguous tracts and parcels of real estate
owned by others." App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1303, p. 16a; App. to
Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1310, p. 50a. Finally, they note that the court's
findings were founded on the testimony of Kentucky Energy's expert witness, the one who testified to the estimated 32 million tons of coal under
Kentucky Energy's land, that the surrounding properties were equally
promising. On direct examination he said:
"As far as comparing this area with the surrounding property, geologically,
those same seams are present on all the other properties [suggested as
comparablel. The same coal seams are present there. . . . [T]he coal is
there and I know that the chances of them being mineable are just as good
there as they are on the [Kentucky Energy] properties.
". . . There may be some variations, depending on which individual seam
is mineable from one property to the other, but in the long run they are
very similar properties located within the same area and there is no geological reason that they should not be comparable." Brief in Opposition in
No. 87-1303, pp. lOa-lla.
We think that petitioners' submissions justify the conclusion on the
record presented to us that their properties were, in aspects relevant to
valuation and assessment, comparable to surrounding property valued and
assessed at markedly lower amounts.
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would have rr^piired more than 500 years to equalize the
assessments.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
reversed. It found that the record did not support the trial
courts ruling that the actions of the assessor and board of review constituted "intentional and systematic" discrimination.
It held that "assessments based upon the price paid for the
property in arm's length transactions are an appropriate
measure of the 'true and actual value* of . . . property." In
re 1975 Tax Assessments against Oneida Coal Co.,
W. Va.
,
, 360 S. E. 2d 560, 564 (1987). That other
properties might be undervalued relative to petitioners' did
not require that petitioners' assessments be reduced: "'Instead, they should seek to have the assessments of other taxpayers raised to market value/" Id., at
, 360 S. E. 2d,
at 565 (quoting Killen v. Logan County Comm'n,
W. Va.
,
, 295 S. E* 2d 689, 709 (1982)). We
granted certiorari to decide whether these Webster County
tax assessments denied petitioners the equal protection of
the law and, if so, whether petitioners could constitutionally
be limited to the remedy of seeking to raise the assessments
of-others. 485 U. S. 976 (1988).
We agree with the import of the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia that petitioners have no
constitutional complaint simply because their property is assessed for real property tax purposes at a figure equal to 50%
of the price paid for it at a recent arm's-length transaction.
But their complaint is a comparative one: while their property is assessed at 50% of what is roughly its current value,
neighboring comparable property which has not been recently sold is assessed at only a minor fraction of that figure.
We do not understand the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals to have disputed this fact. We read its opinion as
saying that even if there is a constitutional violation on these
facts, the only remedy available to petitioners was an effort
to have the assessments on the neighboring properties raised
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by an appropriate amount. We hold that the assessments on
petitioners* property in this case violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and that petitioners may not be remitted
to the remedy specified by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia.
The county argues that its assessment scheme is rationally
related to its purpose of assessing properties at true current
value: when available, it makes use of exceedingly accurate
information about the market value of a property—the price
at which it was recently purchased. As those data grow
stale, it periodically adjusts the assessment based on some
perception of the general change in area property values.
We do not intend to cast doubt upon the theoretical basis of
such a scheme. That two methods are used to assess property in the same class is, without more, of no constitutional
moment. The Equal Protection Clause "applies only to taxation which in fact bears unequally on persons or property of
the same class." Charleston Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v.
Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 190 (1945) (collecting cases). The
use of a general adjustment as a transitional substitute for an
individual reappraisal violates no constitutional command.
As long as general adjustments are accurate enough over a
short period of time to equalize the differences in proportion
between the assessments of a class of property holders, the
Equal Protection Clause is satisfied. Just as that Clause tolerates occasional errors of state law or mistakes in judgment
when valuing property for tax purposes, see Sunday Lake
Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 353 (1918); Coulter v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 196 U. S. 599 (1905), it does
not require immediate general adjustment on the basis of the
latest market developments. In each case, the constitutional requirement is the seasonable attainment of a rough
equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property owners. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 526-527
(1959), and cases there cited; cf. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
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Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602 (1944) (noting, in the ratemaking
context, that "[i]t is not theory, but the impact . . . that
counts").
But the present action is not an example of transitional
delay in adjustment of assessed value resulting in inequalities
in assessments of comparable property. Petitioners' property has been assessed at roughly 8 to 35 times more than
comparable neighboring property, and these discrepancies
have continued for more than 10 years with little change.
The county's adjustments to the assessments of property not
recently sold are too small to seasonably dissipate the remaining disparity between these assessments and the assessments based on a recent purchase price.
The States, of course, have broad powers to impose and
collect taxes. A State may divide different kinds of property
into classes and assign to each class a different tax burden so
long as those divisions and burdens are reasonable. Allied
Stores, supra, at 526-527 ("The State may impose different
specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may
vary the rate of excise upon various products"). It might,
for example, decide to tax property held by corporations, including petitioners, at a different rate than property held by
individuals. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U. S. 356 (1973) (Illinois ad valorem tax on personalty of
corporations). In each case, "[i]f the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some
reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no
denial of the equal protection of the law." Brown-Forman
Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573 (1910).4
1

We need not and do not decide today whether the Webster County assessment method would stand on a different footing if it were the law of a
State, generally applied, instead of the aberrational enforcement policy it
appears to be. The State of California has adopted a similar policy as Article XIIIA of its Constitution, popularly known as "Proposition 13." Proposition 13 generally provides that property will be assessed at its 19751970 value, and reassessed only when transferred or constructed upon, or
in a limited manner for inflation. Cal. Const., Art. XIIIA, $2 (limiting
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But West Virginia has not drawn such a distinction. Its
Constitution and laws provide that all property of the kind
held by petitioners shall be taxed at a rate uniform throughout the State according to its estimated market value.
There is no suggestion in the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, or from any other authoritative
source, that the State may have adopted a different system in
practice from that specified by statute; we have held that such
a system may be valid so long as the implicit policy is applied
evenhandedly to all similarly situated property within the
State. Nashville C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S.
362,368-369 (1940). We are not advised of any West Virginia
statute or practice which authorizes individual counties of the
State to fashion their own substantive assessment policies independently of state statute. See Salsburg v. Maryland, 346
U. S. 545 (1954). The Webster County assessor has, apparently on her own initiative, applied the tax laws of West Virginia in the manner heretofore described, with the resulting
disparity in assessed value of similar property. Indeed, her
practice seems contrary to that of the guide published by the
West Virginia Tax Commission as an aid to local assessors in
the assessment of real property.
"[IIntentional systematic undervaluation by state officials
of other taxable property in the same class contravenes the
constitutional right of one taxed upon the full value of his
property." Sunday Lake Iron Co., supra, at 352-353; Sioux
City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 445-446
(1923); Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax
Assessments in Greene County, Pa.y 284 U. S. 23, 28-29
(1931). "The equal protection clause . . . protects the individual from state action which selects him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on
others of the same class/' Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326
inflation adjustments to 2% per year). The system is grounded on the belief that taxes should be based on the original cost of property and should
not tax unrealized paper gains in the value of the property.
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U. S. 620, 623 (1946). We have no doubt that petitioners
have suffered from such "intentional systematic undervaluation by state officials" of comparable property in Webster
County. Viewed in isolation, the assessments for petitioners' property may fully comply with West Virginia law. But
the fairness of one's allocable share of the total property tax
burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by comparison
with the share of others similarly situated relative to their
property holdings. The relative undervaluation of comparable property in Webster County over time therefore denies
petitioners the equal protection of the law.
A taxpayer in this situation may not be remitted by the
State to the remedy of seeking to have the assessments of
the undervalued property raised. "The [Equal Protection
Clause] is not satisfied if a State does not itself remove the
discrimination, but imposes on him against whom the discrimination has been directed the burden of seeking an
upward revision of the taxes of other members of the class."
Hillsborough, supra, at 623, citing Sioux City Bridge Co.,
supra, 445-447; lowa-Des Moines NaVl Rank v. Bennett, 284
II. S. 239, 247 (1931); Cumberland Coal Co., supra, at 28-29.
The'judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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SHEET METAL WORKERS1 INTERNATIONAL
ASSN. ET AL. v. LYNN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 86-1940.

Argued November 7, 1988-Decided January 18, 1989

In an attempt to alleviate a financial crisis plaguing petitioner local union
(Local), which is an affiliate of petitioner international union (International), the International's president appointed Richard Hawkins as
trustee to supervise the Local's affairs, with authority under the International's constitution to suspend the Local's officers and business
representatives. Five days after a special meeting at which the Local's
membership defeated Hawkins' proposal to increase their dues, Hawkins
notified respondent Lynn, an elected business representative of the
Local, that he was being removed "indefinitely" from his position because of his outspoken opposition to the proposal at the meeting. After
exhausting his intraunion remedies, Lynn brought suit in Federal District Court, claiming that his removal violated the free speech provision of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (LMRDA or Act). The court granted summary judgment for
petitioners under F omega n v. Leu, 45(5 U. S. 431, which held that the
discharge of a union's appointed business agents by the union president,
following his election over the incumbent for whom the business agents
had campaigned, did not violate Title J. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that Fintiegan did not control where the dismissed
union official was elected rather than appointed, and rejecting the contention that Lynn's removal was valid because it was carried out under
Hawkins' authority as trustee.
Held: The removal of an elected business agent, in retaliation for statements he made at a union meeting in opposition to a dues increase sought
by the union trustee, violates the LMRDA. Pp. 352-359.
(a) Petitioners' argument is unpersuasive that Lynn's status as an
elected, rather than an appointed, official is immaterial, and that the
loss of his union employment cannot amount to a Title I violation because
he remains a member of the Local and was not prevented from attending
the special meeting, expressing his views on the dues proposal, or casting his vote. Even though Lynn was not actually prevented from exercising such Title I rights, his removal interfered with those rights by
forcing him to chose between them and his job. Moreover, in contrast
to the discharge of an appointed union official, the removal of an elected
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er The subrogee insurer may still sue the
insured for liability in excess of the policy
amount or outside the scope of coverage
In addition, the subrogee insurer may directly sue the insolvent insurer, although
such suit is unlikely to produce any significant recovery
As to the third factor, we do acknowledge that rights of indemnity and contribution are significant longstanding rights derived from traditional principles of equity.
After weighing the three factors, however,
we believe RAM's cause of action against
Dunbar Kappie is not such a vested right
that it cannot be impaired by subsequent
legislation. At this point, RAM's cause of
action is merely a contingent right, one
that could be reduced to a vested right only
after litigation against Dunbar Kappie and
sufficient proof, as determined by the trier
of fact, to establish that Dunbar Kappie
was in fact negligent in its design and
manufacture of the product and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the
employee's injury. We are particularly
persuaded by the reasoning in Peterson
and in Benson v Farmer* Union Central
Exchange, Inc., 414 N W.2d 425 (Minn Ct
App 1987), pet for rev dented (Minn Nov

24, 1987), where the courts found that the
legislature, as a matter of public policy,
could enact retroactive legislation affecting
various rights of recovery in pending personal injury actions
Because we determine that RAM's action
is barred under either Minnesota or Illinois
law, we do not address the issue of which
state's law should apply under a conflicts
analysis. See PiUo, 146 Wis 2d at 632-33,
427 NW.2d at 420 (no need to address
which state's law applies where there is no
conflict).
DECISION
The trial court correctly ruled that under
either Minnesota or Illinois law, RAM's action for indemnity and contribution against
Dunbar Kappie, the insured of an insolvent
insurer, is barred
Affirmed.
fo ittVMMtHSVSftMl

232 Neb 806
jypNORTHERN NATURAL GAS COMPANY and Enron Liquids Pipeline
Company, Appellants,

forms to law, is supported by competent
and relevant evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable Neb
Rev St § 84-918

v.

3. Taxation «=»446'A
State Board of Equalization and Assessment has wide latitude of judgment
and discretion in equalizing assessment of
property

8TATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
AND ASSESSMENT, Appellee.
No. 88-706.
Supreme Court of Nebraska
July 14, 1989
Pipeline company whose property was
centrally assessed for tax purposes appealed from decision of the State Board of
Equalization and Assessment dismissing its
request that its unit valves be equalised
with railroads and car companies doing
business in Nebraska and deciding to
equalize its property, and all other centrally assessed property, through application
of statewide "aggregate level of assessment" determined by Department of Revenue to be 88 7% of actual value The Supreme Court, Hastings, C J , held that (1)
Board denied pipeline company equal protection by not taxing personal property of
railroads and car companies, even though it
acted involuntarily and under compulsion
of federal law, and (2) underground pipelines were personal property exempt from
taxation, not fixtures
Reversed and remanded for further
proceedings
1. Taxation *»493.6
Any person, county, or municipality affected by final decision of State Board of
Equalization and Assessment may prosecute appeal to Supreme Court Neb
Rev St ft 77-510
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
*»676
When appeal from administrative
agency is not taken pursuant to Admints
trative Procedure Act because of special
statute, standard of review in Supreme
Court is to search only for errors appearing
in the record, i e , whether decision con
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4. Taxation *^446'A
State Board of Equalization and Assessment acts in quasi judicial capacity
when equalizing property
5. Taxation «=»251
Initial determination as to whether certain locally assessed property is exempt
from taxation, made by county boards of
equalization, involves mixed question of
fact and law
6. Appeal and Error «»893(1)
In instances where Supreme Court is
required to review case for error appearing
in the record, questions of law are nonetheless reviewed de novo on the record
7. Taxation «»460(1, 4)
In application before State Board of
Equalization and Assessment, taxpayer
may employ any factual or legal argument
in support of his, her, or its position requesting equalization, subject to final determination of questions of law on de novo
basis by Supreme Court on appeal
8. Taxation «»45CK4)
When State Board of Equalization and
Assessment arbitrarily undervalues particular class of property so as to make another class of property disproportionately
higher, or achieves the same result because
of legislative action, Supreme Court must
correct constitutional inequity by lowering
complaining taxpayer's valuation to such
an extent as to equalize it with other property in state Const Art 8, § 1
9 Constitutional Law «=»229<3)
Taxation *=»42(2)
State Board of Equalization and As
sessment denied equal protection to public
service entity whose property was centrally
assessed by not taxing personal property
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of railroads and car companies in the same
class, even though it was ompelled by
federal law to exempt latter entities* property from taxation.
U.S.CA. Const
Amend. 14.
10. Taxation *»4<H8)
Under principle that uniformity and
equality required by law is to be preferred
as just and ultimate purpose of law where
it is impossible to secure both standard of
true value and that of uniformity and equality, taxpayer whose property alone is taxed
at 100% of its true value has right to have
assessment reduced to percentage of that
value of which others are taxed even
though this represents departure from statutory requirement
U.S.CA.
Const
Amend. 14.
11. Taxation *»ft7

For tax purposes in Nebraska, "personal property" includes all property other
than real property and franchises. Neb.
Rev.St ft 77-104.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
12. Fixtures «»1

To determine whether item constitutes
future, Supreme Court looks at three
factors—actual annexation to realty or
something appurtenant thereto, appropriation to use or purpose of that part of realty
with which it is connected, and intention of
party making annexation to make article
permanent accession to freehold—and third
factor is generally regarded as the moat
important, with the other two having value
primarily as evidence of intention.
IS. Fixtures * » 4

Whether party making annexation intends to make article a permanent accession to freehold can be inferred from nature of articles affixed, relation and situation of that party, structure and mode of
annexation, and purpose or use for which
annexation has been made.
14. Fixtures «=»7
In considering issue of annexation
when determining whether article is fixture, important factor is whether removal
of article will injure realty or article itself.

16. Fixtures «»1

Chattel that is necessary or useful adjunct to realty may be said to have been
appropriated to use or purpose of realty to
which it was affixed, whereas chattel that
is attached for use which does not enhance
value of land is generally deemed not to
become part of land.
16. Futures «»6
Taxation *»220
Underground pipelines were personal
property exempt from taxation, not fixtures; pipeline company had right to remove pipeline and did so on occasion, pipeline was not adapted to agricultural use to
which ground in which it was embedded
was applied and did not improve land or
make it more valuable, and pipeline company did not intend to make pipelines a permanent accession to freehold in light of
evidence that its normal method of operation was to obtain easements for purposes
of laying pipelines, which were generally
located on rights-of-way rather than land
pipeline company owned in fee. Neb.
Rev.St M 77-103. 77-104.
17. Taxation *M2(1)
Although taxing authorities may classify different types of property for taxation purposes, results reached by such different methods and reasonable classifications must be correlated so that valuations
reached shall be uniform and proportionate. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14; Const
Art 8. § 1.
Syllabus by the Court
1. State Equalization Board: Appeal
and Error. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 77-510 (Cum.
Supp. 1988) provides that any person, county, or municipality affected by a final decision of the State Board of Equalization and
Assessment may prosecute an appeal to the
Supreme Court
2. Administrative Law: Appeal and
Error. When an appeal from an administrative agency is not taken pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act because of a
special statute, the standard of review in
this court is to search only for errors appearing in the record; i.e.. whether the
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decision conforms to law. is supported by
competent and relevant evidence, and was
not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
3. 8Ute Equalization Board: Taxation: Valuation. The State Board of
Equalization island Assessment has a wide
latitude of judgment and discretion in
equalizing assessment of property.
4. State Equalization Board: Taxation: Valuation. The State Board of
Equalization and Assessment acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when equalizing property.
5. Appeal and Error. In instances
where the Supreme Court is required to
review a case for error appearing in the
record, questions of law are nonetheless
reviewed de novo on the record.
6. State Equalization Board: Taxation: Valuation: Appeal and Error. In
an application before the State Board of
Equalization and Assessment, a taxpayer
may employ any factual or legal argument
in support of his. her. or its position requesting equalization, subject to the final
determination of questions of law on a de
novo basis by this court on appeal.
7. Stat* Equalization Board: Taxation: Valuation: Appeal and Error.
When the State Board of Equalization and
Assessment arbitrarily undervalues a particular class of property so as to make
another class of property disproportionately higher, or achieves the same result because of legislative action, the Supreme
Court must correct that constitutional inequity by lowering the complaining taxpayer's valuation to such an extent as to equalize it with other property in the state.
8. State Equalization Board: Taxation: Federal Acts. Equal Protection.
The State Board of Equalization and Assessment, by not taxing the personal property of certain property in a class, although
acting involuntarily and under compulsion
of federal law, nevertheless, by complying
with that mandate, has denied another taxpayer in that same class the equal protection of the law contrary to the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
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9. Constitutional Law: Taxation:
Valuation. The right of a taxpayer whose
property alone is taxed at 100 percent of its
true value is to have his, her, or its assessment reduced to the percentage of that
value at which others are taxed even
though this is a departure from the requirement of statute.
10. Constitutional Law: Taxation:
Valuation. Where it is impossible to secure both the standard of the true value,
and the uniformity and equality required
by law, the latter requirement is to be
preferred as the just and ultimate purpose
of law.
11. Taxation: Property: Words and
Phrases. For tax purposes in Nebraska,
persona) property includes all property other than real property and franchises.
12. Property: Appurtenances: Intent To determine whether an item constitutes a fixture, this court looks at three
factors: (1) actual annexation to the realty,
or something appurtenant thereto, (2) appropriation to the use or purpose of that
part of the realty with which it is connected, and (3) the intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a
permanent accession to the freehold.
13. Property: Appurtenances: Intent Of the three factors determining
whether an item constitutes a fixture, the
most important is the intention to make the
article a permanent accession to the freehold.
14. Property: Appurtenances: Intent The intention of the party making
the annexation can be inferred from the
nature of the articles affixed, the relation
and situation of the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for which the
annexation has been made.
l8o»15. Property: Appurtenances. In
considering the issue of annexation, an important factor is whether removal of the
article will injure the realty or will injure
the article itself.
16. Property: Appurtenances. If a
chattel is a necessary or useful adjunct to
the realty, then it may be said generally to
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have been appropriated to the use or purpose of the realty to which it was affixed.
17. Constitutional Law: Taxation:
Valuation. Although the taxing authorities may classify different types of property for taxation purposes, nevertheless, the
results reached by such different methods
and reasonable classifications must be correlated so that the valuations reached shall
be uniform and proportionate.
John K. Boyer, Norman H. Wright, and
Amy S. Bones of Fraser, Stryker, Vaughn,
Meusey, Olson, Boyer A Bloch, PC., Omaha, for appellants.
Robert M. Spire, Atty. Gen. and L. Jay
Bartel, Lincoln, for appellee.
HASTINGS, OX, and BOSLAUGH,
WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN,
GRANT and PAHRNBRUCH, JJ.
HASTINGS, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal by Northern Natural
Gas Company and Enron Liquids Pipeline
Company (hereinafter collectively referred
to as Enron) from a decision of the Nebraska State Board of Equalisation and Assessment (the Board) with respect to a request
made by Enron for equalization of centrally assessed property.
[1] Enron appealed directly to this
court pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat ft 77-610
(Cum.Supp.1988), which provides in part:
"From any filial decision of the State Board
of Equalization and Assessment with respect to the valuation of any real or personal property, any person, county, or municipality affected thereby may prosecute an
appeal to the Supreme Court."
[2] Since appeal was not taken pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat ft 84-918 (Reissue
1987) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
this court's standard of review is not de
novo on the record. This court has decided
that when the Administrative Procedure
Act is inapplicable because another method
of appeal has been prescribed, the standard
of review will be to search only for
lawerrors appearing in the record; i.e.,
whether the decision conforms to law, is

supported by competent and relevant evidence, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. In re Application A-15738,
226 Neb. 146, 410 N.W.2d 101 (1987) (direct
appeal to the Supreme Court from the Department of Water Resources); Banner
County v. State Bd. of Equal., 226 Neb.
286, 411 N.W.2d 36 (1987).
The disputes involved in this appeal
arose in part as a result of three cases
which were decided by the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nebraska: Trailer
Train Co. et ai v. Leuenberger, No.
CV87-L-29 (D.Neb. Dec. 11, 1987), affd
No. 88-1118 (8th Cur. Dec. 19, 1988), cert
denied, Boehm v. Trailer Train Co. et ai,
U.S
, 109 S.Ct 2066, 104 LEd.2d
630 (1989); Burlington Northern RR. Co.
et at v. Leuenberger, No. CV87-L-565
(D.Neb. Dec. 10,1987); and Oklahoma Gas
& Electric Co. et aL v. Leuenberger, No.
CV88-L-52 (D.Neb. Jan 26,1988).
The plaintiffs in Trailer Train were car
companies that furnish railcars to railroads. Their only relationship to Nebraska
stems from the fact that their railcars are
located or operated in Nebraska by the
railroads. The federal district court held
that the assessment of the plaintiffs' personal property and the imposition, levy, or
collection of any personal property taxes
against the plaintiffs pursuant to Neb.Rev.
Stat ftft 77-624 et seq. (Reissue 1986) violates ft 806(l)(d) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976
(the 4-R Act), and permanently enjoined
the imposition, levy, and collection of any
personal property taxes from the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the
levy and collection of Nebraska's ad valorem tax on car company property violated
the 4-R Act.
The plaintiffs in Burlington
Northern
RR. Co. were several of the railroads that
do business in Nebraska. The federal district court preliminarily enjoined and restrained the collection of ad valorem property tax payments for tax year 1987 on
that portion of plaintiffs' operating property that consists of personal property. The

court issued the preliminary injunction after finding reasonable cause to believe that
the Uioperaonal property tax levied on the
plaintiffs results in discriminatory treatment of common carriers by railroad, in
violation of § 306<l)(d) of the 4-R Act
The plaintiffs in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. were carlines doing business in
Nebraska. The federal district court enjoined distribution of the Nebraska carline
tax for the 1987 tax year, finding reasonable cause to believe that the tax violates
ft 806 of the 4-R Act
The result in each case was reached
through application of the 4-R Act, a federal statute. To prevent the unreasonable
burdening of interstate commerce that results from discriminatory state and local
taxation of rail carrier property, Congress
enacted the 4-R Act, Pub.L No. 94-210, 90
Stat 64, ft 306 (codified at 49 U.S.C. ft 26c
(1976); recodified at 49 U.S.C. ft 11603
(1982) in accordance with the revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978).
At issue in Trailer Train was whether
Nebraska's personal property taxation system, which provides for extensive exemptions from personal property tax under
Neb.Rev.SUt ft 77-202 (Supp.1987), violates ft 306(lKd) of the 4-R Act, which prohibits the imposition of any tax which results in discriminatory treatment of a common carrier by railroad. The federal district court found that the Nebraska system
of taxation did violate the federal statute.
According to the court,
Under the Nebraska scheme, the majority of the personal property in the state is
statutorily exempted from taxation,
while a minority of personal property,
including all the property that belongs to
Trailer Train in the state, is subject to an
ad valorem tax on its actual value
[T]he Nebraska system favors a majority
of the property of possible taxpayers by
exempting that property from taxation
but denies the property of rail car lines
the same favorable treatment.
Trailer Train, supra, slip. op. at 6. The
court further found that the actual result
of Nebraska's taxation scheme is an unfair
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and discriminatory tax burden on the railroads.
In light of the federal district court's
rulings in the three cases discussed above,
Enron submitted a request with the Board
asking that its unit values be equalized
with the railroads and | 8 ncar companies
doing business in Nebraska, i.e., that the
portion of the unit value that is comprised
of personal property be disregarded in determining the amount of property tax it
owes to the state. In conjunction with this
request, Enron also sought a determination
that its pipelines constitute personal property.
Enron is a public service entity within
the meaning of Neb.Rev .Stat ft 77-801
(Reissue 1986). Northern Natural Gaa, a
division of Enron Corporation, owns, maintains, and operates a gas pipeline system in
Nebraska. Enron Liquids, a subsidiary of
Enron Corporation, owns, maintains, and
operates a liquid hydrocarbon pipeline in
Nebraska. Enron's property is centrally
assessed by the state for property tax purposes through the Tax Commissioner rather than county assessors, pursuant to Neb.
Rev.Stat ft 77-802 (Cum.Supp.1988).
To establish the value of a centrally assessed taxpayer, the Department of Revenue uses a methodology known as "unit
value." Rather than valuing individual
items of property owned by such a taxpayer, the department values the property of
the taxpayer as a total unit. Dennis Donner, the central assessment manager of the
Department of Revenue, explained the unit
value method at the Board's August 2,
1988, hearing:
These values are derived by use of the
unit value concept, which is a valuation
of the company as a going concern, as
opposed to just a simple summary of the
assets of the company. The Department
uses the traditional three approaches to
value, that being the market[,] income
and cost approach in developing these
values, and then it correlates the results
into an indication of value for the company. This value is then allocated to the
state of Nebraska, based on varying
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factors, depending on which particular
industry we're referring to.
Once the department has calculated the
unit value of the centrally assessed taxpayer and determined what portion of that
value should be taxed by Nebraska, the
Tax Commissioner apportions the total taxable value to all taxing subdivisions in
which property of the taxpayer is located
and certifies to the county assessors the
value so determined. § 77-802.
During the August 2, 1988, hearing, the
Board dismissed Enron's request for equalisation with the railroads and car
j^ifcompanies doing business in Nebraska.
Additionally, the Board decided to equalise
Enron's property, and all other centrally
assessed property, through application of a
statewide "aggregate level of assessment"
determined by the Department of Revenue
to be 88.7 percent of actual value. The
department first calculated the average ratio of assessed value to actual value for all
classes of tangible property: residential
(improved and unimproved), commercial
and industrial (improved and unimproved),
agricultural (improved and unimproved),
personal, and centrally assetised. Then the
department aggregated the average ratios
to arrive at the 88.7 percent figure.
At the Board's August 2, 1988, hearing,
Enron objected to being equalized with the
statewide "aggregate level of assessment"
of 88.7 percent of value. In dismissing the
matter, the Board stated in its order:
(TJhe uncontraverted [sic] evidence
shows that all property valued by the
state, including the property of Enron, is
at 100 percent of value; that said proper
ty is equalized to the same level of value
as all property valued by ''.<> state that
being the aggregate level of value for all
tangible property in this state; and, that
the State Board has properly fulfilled its
duty to equalize all the tangible property
in the state.
Enron argues before this court that its
property should be assessed at 73.7 percent
of actual value, the aggregate level at
which unimproved agricultural land is being valued in this state.

Since the perfection of this appeal, o
December 19, 1988, an opinion was filed ii
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight
Circuit which affirmed the decision of th
U.S. District Court in Trailer Train Co. e
al
v. Leuenberger,
No. CV87-L-2
(D.Neb. Dec. 11, 1988). That court said ii
part:
In [Burlington Northern R. Co. t
Bair, 584 F.Supp. 1229 (S.D.Iowa 1984)
the other centrally assessed taxpayer
were still subject to the personal propei
ty tax as are the taxpayers here who ar
not in agriculturally related businesses
The railroad in that case received th
same "preferential tax treatment" tha
Trailer Train is accorded here. This i
because the other taxpayers are not pre
tectedjiuby § 306<lM<i). When three
fourths of the commercial and industria
personal property in the state is no
taxed because personal property used ii
agriculturally-related business is exempt
railroads are discriminated against i
their personal property is taxed. Th
appropriate remedy, as awarded by th
trial court, is to enjoin the collection o
the discriminating tax, even though othe
taxpayers do not receive the same bene
fiU.
Trailer Train Co. et al. v. Leuenbergei
No. 8&-1118, slip. op. at 7 (8th Cir. Dec. IS
1988). Following argument of the case ii
this court, the Supreme Court of the Unite*
States issued an order on May 15, 198S
denying the petition for certiorari filed b;
the Tax Commissioner of Nebraska. There
fore, the Board's argument throughout it
brief that the judgment of the U.S. Distric
Court is not binding in this instance is n<
longer valid.
Enron assigns as error: (1) The Boar
erred in dismissing its request for equalize
tion; (2) the Board erred in failing to fin
Enron's pipelines to be personal propert;
and to equalize that portion of its correlat
ed unit value with railroads and car compa
nies doing business in Nebraska; (3) th
Board erred in adopting and applying
"blended" or "aggregate" equalization rs
tio, composed of an average of the levels a
which all various types of property ar
valued; and (4) the Board erred in failin
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to equalize Enron's property with unimproved agricultural land.
Basically, Enron made two requests of
the Board. First, it contended that its
property should be equalized with the property of the railroads and car companies
operating in Nebraska, which were also
assessed on a unitary basis. In other
words, the final judgment of the federal
court enjoined the State of Nebraska from
assessing the personal property of railroads and car companies, and Enron insists
that it not be taxed on that portion of its
unit value that represents personal property. In that connection, it further argues
that its pipelines are personal property and
should not be assessed. Secondly, Enron
did not want the Board to equalize its other
property with the aggregate level of assessment for all property in the state, including centrally assessed property such as
Enron's which is assessed at 100 percent of
actual value.
jfoiThe Board argues that it lacks authority and jurisdiction to consider and act on
the issues raised by Enron in the first
instance, and therefore this court acquired
no jurisdiction to consider the issues on
appeal. In other words, the issues raise
questions of law, including constitutional
issues, and the Board insists that it has no
authority to consider those issues.
[3-5] Neb.Rev.Stot § 77-505 (Cum.
Supp. 1988) requires the Board to review
the abstracts of assessments of property
submitted by the county assessors and to
equalize such valuations for tax purposes
within the state. More pertinent to this
case, § 77-802 requires the Tax Commissioner to determine the total taxable value
of a public service entity like Enron for
each of the local assessing districts. The
action of the Tax Commissioner, of course,
is appealable to the Board. This court has
stated the Board has a wide latitude of
judgment and discretion in equalizing assessment of property. City of Omaha v.
State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 181 Neb. 734, 150 N.W.2d 888 (1967).
The Board acta in a quasi-judicial capacity
when equalizing property. Box Butte
County v. State Board of Equalization &
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Assessment, 206 Neb. 696, 295 N.W.2d 670
(1980). County boards of equalization are
required to make the initial determination
as to whether certain locally assessed property is exempt from taxation, which involves a mixed question of fact and law.
See, e.g., Ev. Luth. Soc. v. Buffalo Cty.
Bd. of Equal, 230 Neb. 135, 430 N.W.2d
502 (1988); Bethphage Com. Servs. v.
County Board, 221 Neb. 886, 381 N.W.2d
166 (1986).
Implicit in the determination of tax exemption, as pointed out in Bethphage, was
the
application
of
the
facts
to
§ 77-202(1 He), which provides that exempt
from taxation is property "owned by . . .
religious, charitable . . . organizations and
used exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes. ..-." Certainly this involves a mixed
question of fact and law and involves the
quasi-judicial power of the board of equalization.
[6] In the instant case, there is a difference between Enron being able to request
equalization with the railroads and car companies and Enron being entitled to be
equalized with the railroads and car companies. It is common sense that Enron cannot be equalized with those companies unless it makes ajj^request. It also seems
clear that to make such a request, Enron
must start with the Board, the only entity
with statutory authority to equalize the
valuations of centrally assessed taxpayers.
As previously stated, our review on an
appeal such as this is for error appearing in
the record, but we review questions of law
de novo on the record.
I7J We therefore hold that in an application before the Board, a taxpayer may
employ any factual or legal argument in
support of his, her, or its position requesting equalization, subject to the final determination of questions of law on a de novo
basis by this court on appeal.
[8] Article VIII, § 1, of the Nebraska
Constitution provides in relevant part that
except for motor vehicles, "[t]axes shall be
levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property
"
It would seem that no question exists that
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if the Board arbitrarily undervalues a particular class of property so as to make
another class of property disproportionately higher, or achieves the same result because of legislative action, this court must
correct that constitutional inequity by lowering the complaining taxpayer's valuation
to such an extent so as to equalize it with
other property in the state See, Kearney
Convention Center v Board of Equal,
216 Neb 292, 844 N W 2d 620 (1984), Banner County v State Ba\ of Equal, 226
Neb 236, 411 N W 2d 35 (1987) This being the case, no logical reason exists why
the same requirement of valuation reduction should not be imposed when the disproportionality is brought about by a final
judgment of the federal court exempting
the personal property of the railroads and
car companies from the imposition of a
state tax
[9] The state, by not taxing the person
al property of railroads and car companies,
although acting involuntarily and under
compulsion of federal law, nevertheless, by
complying with that mandate, has denied
Enron equal protection of the law contrary
to the 14th amendment to the U S Consti
tution
In Stoux City Bridge v Dakota County,
260 U S 441, 43 S Ct. 190, 67 L Ed 340
(1923), the county taxed the bridge company's property at actual value while other
property in the county was assessed at
only 55 percent of its value The bridge
company alleged this practice violated the
equal protection lanclause of the 14th
amendment to the U S Constitution

taxable property in the same class contravenes the constitutional right of one
taxed upon the full value of his proper
ty"
(Citations omitted) Stoux City Bridge,
supra, 260 U S at 445, 43 S C t at 191
The Court held that the taxing of the
bridge company's property at 100 percent
of its actual value while other property is
taxed at 55 percent of its actual value
violates the equal protection clause of the
14th amendment
[10] The Court also held that
the right of the taxpayer whose property
alone is taxed at 100 per cent of its true
value is to have his assessment reduced
to the percentage of that value at which
others are taxed even though this is a
departure from the requirement of stat
ute The conclusion is based on the pnn
ciple that where it is impossible to secure
both the standard of the true value, and
the uniformity and equality required by
law, the latter requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose
of law
260 U S at 446, 43 SCt at 191
As we have previously stated, it makes
no difference if the undervaluation of the
property of the railroad and car companies
comes about because of deliberate action
by the Board, legislative enactment, or the
final and binding judgment of the federal
courts The conclusion remains the same
The equal protection clause of the 14th
amendment mandates that the same result
be reached with respect to the personal
property of Enron as that in the case of the
railroad and car companies

Citing Sunday Lake Iron Co v Wake
It therefore becomes necessary to deterfield, 247 U S 350, 38 S Ct 495, 62 L Ed
mine whether the pipelines of Enron are
1154 (1918), the Court stated
personal property and thus exempt from
"The purpose of the equal protection
^jjpitaxation under the doctrine of Trailer
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
Tram Co, et al v Leuenberger, No
to secure every person within the State's
CV87-L-29 (DNeb Dec 11, 1987), affd
jurisdiction against intentional and arbi
No 8&-1118 (8th Cir Dec 19, 1988), cert
trary discrimination, whether occasioned
denied, Boehm v Trailer Train Co et al,
by express terms of a statute or by its
US
, 109 S Ct 2066, 104 L Ed 2d
improper execution through duly consti
tuted agents And it must be regarded 630 (1989)
as settled that intentional systematic un
[11] Neb Rev Stat $77-103 (Reissue
dervaluation by state officials of other 1986) provides

The terms real property, real estate
and lands Bhall include city and village
lots and all other lands, and all buildings,
fixtures, improvements, cabin trailers or
mobile homes which shall have been permanently attached to the real estate
upon which they are situated, mines, mm
erals, quarries, mineral springs and
wells, oil and gas wells, overriding royal
ty interests and production payments
with respect to oil or gas leases, units of
beneficial interest in trusts, the corpus of
which includes any of the foregoing, and
privileges pertaining thereto
Personal property includes all property oth
er than real property and franchises Neb
Rev Stat § 77-104 (Reissue 1986) The is
sue therefore is whether pipelines are fix
turea, and thus real property, or are per
sonal property
Section 77-103 does not provide a defini
tion for fixtures However, this court in
State ex rel Meyer v. Peters, 191 Neb 330,
216 N W 2d 520 (1974), stated that the common law rules relating to futures are
largely codified in ft 77-103
[12] To determine whether an item constitutes a fixture, this court looks at three
factors (1) actual annexation to the realty,
or something appurtenant thereto, (2) appropriation to the use or purpose of that
part of the realty with which it is connectr
ed, and (3) the intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a
permanent accession to the freehold
Bank of Valley v US Nat Bank, 215
Neb 912, 341 N W 2 d 592 (1983), T-V
Transmission v County Bd of Equal,
216 Neb 363, 338 N W 2d 752 (1983)
[13] The third factor, the intention to
make the article a permanent accession to
the freehold, is generally regarded as the
most important factor when determining
whether an article is a fixture The other
two factors, annexation and appropriation
to the use of the realty, have value pnmari
ly as evidence of such intention See gen
erally Bank of Valley v US Ui&Afa*
Bank, supra The intention of the party
making the annexation can be inferred
from the nature of the articles affixed, the
relation and situation of the party making
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the annexation, the structure and mode of
annexation, and the purpose or use for
which the annexation has been made
Bank of Valley v US Nat Bank, supra,
Pick v Fordyce Coop Credit Assn., 225
Neb 714, 408 N W 2d 248 (1987), Fuel
Exploration, Inc v Novotny, 221 Neb 17,
374 N W 2d 838 (1985)
In this case, the pipelines are buried in
the ground
In Sulphur Sprtng$ Val
Elec Coop v City of Tombstone, 1 Ariz
App 268, 401 P 2d 753 (1965), affd 99 Ariz
110, 407 P 2d 76, the Arizona court had to
address whether the pipes, poles, and wires
that were the chief components of a utility
distribution system were fixtures and
therefore real property that had to be sold
at public auction To determine whether
an article is a fixture, the Arizona courts
consider the same three factors this court
considers
The pipes were buried in the ground
The court noted that there was no evidence
of an agreement between the city and owners of the fee that the chattels were to
become accessions to the realty The court
held that because there was no proof of the
adaptability to the use for which the real
estate was appropriated and no proof of an
intent by the annexor that the attachment
of the chattels be permanent, despite an
nexation to the realty, the utility equipment
had not lost its character as personal property
[14] In considering the issue of annexa
tion when determining whether an article is
a future, some courts have looked at
whether removal of the article will injure
the realty or will injure the article itself
Enron quotes at length from one such case
In Stem Brothers, Inc v Alexandria
Township, 6 N J Tax 537 (1984), the
question was whether certain under
ground storage tanks were fixtures or
personal property
In this case, the
court focused upon the injury by removal
test, and stated "These [the five under
ground storage tanks] could be lifted
from the subject property intact just as
could be done with the 20,000 gallon
above-ground tanks and no damage at all
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would occur to iai»the tanks The only
preparatory work that would need to be
done before the tanks could be lifted
onto a truck would be removal of the soil
covering them
The excavation that
would result from uncover»np cme of the
20,000 gallon tanks woul'
'urge
Each such tank is ten feet m diameter
and 80 feet long so that the excavation
would have to be somewhat longer,
wider, and deeper than those dimensions
Despite this size, however, such an excavation could not in any reasonable sense
be said to constitute 'irreparable' physical damage to the land because the hole
could easily be refilled As a result, the
land would be virtually the same in all
respects as it had been befoie The sole
question, then, is whether the excavation
would constitute 'serious' physical damage to the land within the meaning of the
phrase 'material injury* as used in the
Business Personal Property Tax Act
"Some of the factors which might have
to be considered in determining whether
'serious physical damage' had occurred
to unimproved land are (a) any change
in the market value of the land as a
result of the condition, (b) the amount of
time and the cost required to repair the
condition, and (c) the hazard or disloca
Uon caused by the condition
"I find that no 'serious physical damage' would be caused to plaintiffs land
by an excavation to remove the underground storage tanks and to restore
plaintiffs unpaved parking yard to its
original state There is no indication
that the value of the land would be affected by such an excavation The entire
process of removing a tank and restoring
the ground to its original state would
require only two days and would create
no serious hazard or dislocation Finally,
the cost to excavate and refill the hole
would be relatively insignificant
"I therefore conclude that all nine of
plaintiffs fuel oil storage tanks were
business personal property for the tax
year 1981 and that the tanks should not
have been assessed by the taxing district

for local property tax purposes
6
N J Tax at 543 "
las»Bnef for appellants at 26-27
Earl Berdine, an Enron employee, testi
fied in his deposition that very little dam
age generally results to the pipe when it is
removed and that the only damage to the
land is "a temporary inconvenience while
the work is actually going on and then
after the work is completed the land is
restored, put back into its original use "
115] The second factor, appropriation to
the use or purpose of that part of the
realty with which the article is connected,
focuses on the relationship between the
article and the use which is made of the
realty to which the article is attached If
the chattel is a necessary or useful adjunct
to the realty, then it may be said to have
been appropriated to the use or purpose of
the realty to which it was affixed If the
chattel is attached for a use which does not
enhance the value of the land, it is general
ly deemed not to become a part of the land
See 1 G Thompson, Commentaries on the
Modern Law of Real Property § 56 (1980)
The pipeline companies in Yellowstone
Pipe Line Co v SL Bd. of Equal, 138
Mont 603, 358 P 2d 55 (1960), cert denied
366 U S 917, 81 S Ct 1095, 6 L Ed 2d 241
(1961), were attempting to establish that
their pipelines were real estate The pipelines were imbedded in real estate rights
of way obtained from the owners of the fee
by written conveyance The State Board
of Equalization argued that the pipelines
did not improve the real estate, served no
purpose on the land, did not enhance the
value of the real estate, and could be removed at any time by the company
Under Montana case law, if property was
placed on land to improve it or make it
more valuable, it was generally deemed a
fixture, but if it was attached for a use
which did not enhance the value of the
land, it remained a chattel Considering
the established rules regarding fixtures,
the Yellowstone Pipe Line Co court stat
ed
The line could as easily he on top of the
ground were it not for the maintenance
problem brought on by its exposed posi

tion and the difficulty of crossing natural
and man made obstructions Does the
pipe line improve the land and make it
more valuable7 To the contrary the land
182imakes the pipe line more valuable
since it removes it from danger of dam
age were it exposed To what purpose is
the pipe line put7 It is used for the
transportation of petroleum products
and, in our opinion, such use bears no
relationship whatever to the use of the
realty There can exist here no presumption that respondents intended the pipe
to become part of the realty because the
evidence is conclusive that they had no
such intention
Id 138 Mont at 630-31, 358 P 2d at 69
The court concluded that the pipeline is not
a fixture
As Enron points out in this case, it has
the right to remove its pipeline and does so
on occasion According to Enron, and we
agree, the pipeline is not adapted to the use
to which the ground in which it is embed
ded is applied Most of the ground is agn
cultural land, and while the pipe is in place,
a farmer or rancher may continue to con
duct his normal operations The pipeline
does not improve the land nor make it more
valuable The ground is only a foundation
upon which the pipes can rest Use of the
pipeline bears no relationship to the use of
the realty, the pipeline being buried in or
der in part to minimize maintenance
Finally, was the intention of Enron to
make the article a permanent accession to
the freehold7
In a number of cases, the courts have
considered the fact that the annexor had an
easement as establishing an intent that the
article remain personal property
In
Southwestern
Public Service Co v
Chaves County, 85 N M 313, 512 P 2d 73
(1973), the court had to decide whether
certain equipment located on easements,
including poles and transmission lines, was
real estate The court noted that if South
western intended the equipment installed
on unowned land to become part of the
realty, Southwestern would under general
law, be parting with title to the equipment
The court concluded that there was no evi
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dence, of either a subjective or objective
nature, indicating Southwestern had any
such intention To the same effect, see,
Sulphur Springs Val Elec Co op, Inc v
City of Tombstone, 1 Anz App 268, 401
P 2d 753 (1965), Liberty Lk Sewer v Liberty Lk Utils 37 Wash App 809, 683 P 2d
1117 (1984), In re Mobihfe Corp, 167
So 2d 336 (Fla App 1964)
|822The evidence here was that Enron's
normal method of operation is to obtain
easements for purposes of laying its pipelines Its pipeline is generally located on
nghts-of way rather than land Enron owns
in fee Enron never intended, as we view
the record, to part with the title to its
pipelines by conducting its operation in this
manner Furthermore, the evidence dis
closes that Enron retains possession of the
pipes for purposes of repair, replacement,
and recycling if necessary
(16] The Board cites only one case in
which the court held that the gas pipeline
of a gas transmission company was not
personal property but, rather, was real
property for tax purposes Transco Corp
v Prince William Co, 210 Va 560, 172
S E 2d 757 (1970) That court agreed that
the chief test to be considered in determin
ing whether the chattel has been converted
into a fixture is the intention of the party
making the annexation
We agree, but
conclude that in the instant case the in ten
tion of Enron was not to convert its annex
ations into fixtures Consequently, we find
the pipelines to be personal property
Finally because the unitary value of En
ron may include some real property, it is
necessary that we determine whether that
portion of its valuation should be based on
an aggregate or blended ratio, or on the
average ratio of unimproved agricultural
land
117] In Kearney Convention Center v
Board of Equal, 216 Neb 292, 344 N W 2d
620 (1984) *< held that the uniformity
clause of the Nebraska Constitution required that the complaining taxpayer's land
had tx> be valued at 44 percent the lowest
ratio of assessed valuation to actual valua
tion We had concluded that although the
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taxing authorities may classify different
types of property for taxation purposes,
nevertheless, the results reached by such
different methods and reasonable classifi
cations must be correlated so that the valu
ations reached shall be uniform and propor
tionate The record in this case does not
support such a favorable finding for the
Board
Although article VIII, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution was amended in 1984
in an attempt to permit the valuation of
agricultural land by a different method,
this court concluded that the result must be
correlated with the value of all other land
At the risk of being redundant, we state
that such a result laahas not been reached
in this case

232 Neb 885
jgttFrederick M GETZSCIIMAN,
A I A , Appellee,
v
MILLER CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC,
a Nebraska Corporation, and Lawrence
Hoffman, Appellants, Carol Hoffman,
Appellee.
No 87-746
Supreme Court of Nebraska
July 21, 1989

Architect sued clients for breach of
contract, in regard to client's refusal to pay
architect on the ground that the actual
construction costs were in excess of client's
The Board has asked us to reconsider our
anticipation Clients counterclaimed for
decision in Banner County v Stale Board
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty
of Equal, 226 Neb 236, 411 N W 2 d 35
The District Court, Douglas County, Law
(1987) There is nothing to reconsider
rence J Comgan, J , entered judgment on
Neb Const art VIII, ft 1, providing that
a jury verdict for architect, and clients ap"(t)axes shall be levied by valuation um
pealed The Supreme Court, Shanahan, J ,
formly and proportionately"
(emphasis
held that (1) a jury question was present
supplied), to aay nothing of the 14th
ed as to whether architect's claim was deamendment to the U S Constitution, which
feated by clients' claim that the construe
directs that no state shall "deny to any
tion costs exceeded an alleged agreement,
person within lU jurisdiction the equal pro(2) the court did not abuse its discretion m
tection of the laws," both remain viable and
rejecting clients' tendered instructions on
in full force and effect Banner County
tort claims, and (3) court properly rejected
could be written in no other way
testimony of clients' expert concerning an
The order of the State Board of Equaliza
architect's duties in the course of a con
tion and Assessment is reversed, and the tracted project
cause is remanded for further proceedings
Affirmed
not inconsistent with this opinion
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS

(p |llVMM«ISmfM>

1 Contracts «=»1W

If there is express contract for archi
tecturai services, architect's duties are determined by contract for architect's em
ployment
2 Contracts *=»280<4)

Implicit in every contract for architec
tural services is duty of architect to exer
else skill and care which are commensurate
with requirements of profession
3 Contracts *»28(K4)
If architect fails to exercise reasonable
professional care in discharge of his con
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tractual duties architect breaches contract
of employment
4 Action *=>27(1)
Accompanying every contract is com
mon law duty to perform thing agreed to
be done with care skill, reasonable expedi
ency, and faithfulness, and negligent fail
ure to observe any of these conditions is
tort as well as breach of contract
6. Action «=>27(1)
In context of negligence claim based
on architectural contract, tort liability may
arise when architect negligently fails to
perform express or implied contractual
duty
t. Contracts <t»321(l)
Architect employed to prepare plans
and specifications for building, with understanding that construction would be accom
plished within certain cost limitations, can
not recover compensation for architectural
services when building cannot be erected
except at cost materially in excess of
amount specified
7. Contracts «=>312<1)

When architect has no express contrac
tual obligation to design structure within
specified budget or to estimate construe
tion cost of proposed project construction
at cost greater than anticipated by or ac
ceptable to owner is no defense to archi
tect's action to recover fee
8. Judgment «=>199(6)
Entry of judgment notwithstanding
verdict is authorized if appropriate motion
is filed within ten days after reception of
verdict to be set aside
Neb Rev S t
ft 25-1316 02
• Judgment «=» 199(3 9)
Motion for judgment notwithstanding
verdict may be granted when movant's previous motion for directed verdict, made at
conclusion of all evidence, should have been
sustained Neb Rev St (25-1316 02
10 T r i a l •=•142

Court cannot decide issue as matter of
law unless facts adduced on issue are such
that reasonable minds can draw but one
conclusion from evidence, in jury trial,
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when evidence compels but one reasonable
conclusion regarding issue or question in
litigation court can properly direct verdict
on such issue or question
11 Contracts «=>352(3)
In architect s breach of contract action
against client arising from client's refusal
to pay architect, evidence presented jury
question as to whether architect's claim
was defeated by client's defense that actual
cost of construction was in excess of
client's anticipation, evidence was conflicting on question whether client informed
architect that there was limitation on cost
of construction, and there was no contrac
tual provision concerning architect's eati
mate of costs
12 Appeal and Error «=»1032(3)
To establish reversible error from
court's refusal to give requested instruction, appellant has burden to show that
appellant was prejudiced by court's refusal
to give tendered instruction, that tendered
instruction is correct statement of law, and
that tendered instruction is warranted by
evidence
13 Contracts «=*353(8)
In architect's breach of contract action
against client, ansing from client's refusal
to pay architect on ground that actual con
struction coats were in excess of client's
anticipation, court did not commit reversible error by rejecting client's requested
instructions on architect's duty of reason
able care, and breach of fiduciary duty,
court's instruction on architect's contractu
al duties expressed elements which, if
proved, entitled client to recover on its
counterclaim for tortious breaches of duty
by architect
14 Appeal and Error «=>970<2)
Evidence *»99
Admission or exclusion of evidence is
matter for discretion of trial court, whose
ruling on evidential question will be upheld
unless such ruling constitutes abuse of dis
cretion

